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**Komunikacyjny konstrukt kryzysu waluty euro. Analiza debaty politycznej w prasie
codziennej w Polsce, Niemczech i Wielkiej Brytanii.**

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**Communicative Construction of the Euro Crisis in the Press:
Political Debate in Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom.**

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*The European approach to the crisis
has been to talk in terms of great drama
while acting with self-defeating slowness
or what one might have called
the fierce urgency of tomorrow.*

*(“Slouching towards Bethlehem: The Euro crisis”,
The Guardian, 11 November 2011)*

*“Discourse is a place where relations of power
are exercised and enacted.”*

(Fairclough, 1989a, 43)

I. Introduction

Politics and media are inseparable in the contemporary world. Indeed, the interaction between political and media systems is a major factor in determining the way both are organised and work (Mancini 28). As Zielonka reminds, “the relationship between the media and politics has been mainly understood as separate but with a mutual dependency, in which the political system has the upper hand and largely determines the shape of a media system” (313). Lately, this separation has virtually disappeared from our world and the two become ever more entangled. Political systems feed the media with content for press reports. Media reporting of events often influences the reactions of politicians. For politicians, media is also a means to reach their audiences. Even though journalism is thought to be mainly driven by marketisation, journalists have emerged as influential actors on the political scene. They now have the power to shape political agenda and co-construct specific events such as crises (Strath and Wodak 31; Lampropoulou 469; Bourdieu and Ferguson). This increasingly important role of media and communication in its entangled relationship with political systems has not been given due attention.

Moreover, in contemporary societies, media are the main source of information. They provide ways of understanding the world through different representations, and media reporting about politics is one of the main factors in constructing a society and shaping its worldviews. As Tuchman notes, “[n]ews ... helps to constitute it [an event] as a shared social phenomenon, ..., news defines and shapes that event” (Tuchman 184). As a consequence, our perception of the world is often formed through exposure to certain media content that can be biased. It is therefore necessary to be able to identify and understand that bias.

Media scholars involved in comparative research on European media coverage encounter a particular difficulty. The coverage of European issues is largely presented through the perspective of national media or specialised English language business papers and journals read across borders. On an everyday basis, Europeans are thus primarily provided with news coverage framed through the national political and economic institutions of their respective member state (Picard 2). It is often claimed that due to this division the development of wider and trans-national or ‘European’ patterns of interpretation is limited in favour of national interests and ideologies (Michał Krzyżanowski, “Brexit and the Imaginary of ‘crisis’” 5).

My thesis investigates the communicative construction of the discourse on the Euro crisis in the European press in the context of the complex relationship between media and politics.

EU and its Crises

One of the words often used in media discourse about Europe today is *crisis*. This is not a new phenomenon in the European Union's history. In fact, the EU has encountered several significant crises since its creation. These have included among others the failure of the European defence and political communities in the 1950s, France's vetoes of UK membership in the 1960s, the 1965 Empty Chair crisis, the attempts to form a European Monetary System, and the September 1992 "Black Wednesday" crisis (Davis Cross 8–9). The EU also experienced a crisis of European foreign and security policy at the beginning of the 1990s during the so-called Balkan conflict. One of the more recent challenges included the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the largest in the Union's history, that is often understood as a process of ongoing smaller crises. One would also need to mention here the rejection of the European constitution in 2005 through referenda in France and the Netherlands (Hepp 6). Many of these events were perceived in Europe as critical junctures, primarily as they questioned the viability of the European integration project (Davis Cross 8–9).

In the more recent past, the EU has again faced a concentration of events that were widely reported in the media as crises: the Euro crisis that started in 2008; the annexation of Crimea by Russia (2014) and the subsequent ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine; a wave of refugees coming to Europe as a result of a war in Syria, widely referred to as the migration crisis (2015); and Great Britain's decision to leave the EU as a result of the referendum on the EU membership (2016). In relation to these events, the crisis that the EU has had to face was of a structural and institutional nature. It was a crisis of democratic legitimacy within its institutions, which has arguably led to a political crisis.

In particular, the 2008 economic crisis has been an important focus of media coverage both within Europe and beyond. It has occupied an important place in the press, television broadcasts, and in everyday conversations. As Hepp reports, already in December 2003, *The Sun* mentioned the phrase "EU in crisis", beginning the discourse that gained in intensity when the financial crisis exploded (1). On 13 December 2008, the German tabloid *Bild* used the metaphor of a domino-effect to describe the ongoing problems with the Euro and

financial politics. At the same time, in the Polish *Dziennik Zachodni*, one could read of a “joint struggle” of EU member states against the crisis (Hepp 1).

The number of significant, if not existential, difficulties that the EU has experienced and which recently have increasingly been referred to as ‘crises,’ were characterised by a widespread belief that the EU’s very existence has been under serious threat. It should be noted that Europe’s existential crises are perceived as such also because they are *socially constructed* as such, which means that the society recognises and defines these events as crises (Davis Cross 24).

Notion of *Crisis*

The term *crisis* comes from the Greek word *κρίσις* (krisis) which has its roots in the verb *κρίνω* (krino) meaning to “separate” (part, divorce), to “choose,” to “judge,” to “decide,” to “disagree,” or to “fight.” This has allowed a broad spectrum of meanings (Koselleck and Richter 357–58). Originally, in the medical context, crisis would signify a decision in the sense of reaching a verdict or a judgment at a turning point of a disease. “It was coined to denote a moment in which the future of the patient was in the balance, and the doctor had to decide which way to go and what treatment to apply to help the ill into convalescence” (Bauman and Bordoni 7). It was also a condition that called for a decisive judgment and a decision between alternatives (Roitman).

Although the primary medical meaning of the crisis remained dominant until the early modern period, from the seventeenth century on, the term entered the domains of politics, economics, history, and psychology, among others, in its metaphorical meaning. In particular, in politics it came to mean not only “divorce” and “disagreement” but also “decision”, in a sense of reaching a turning point (Koselleck and Richter 357–58). The medical origins have been preserved in contemporary political language but, given its metaphorical flexibility, it has gained in importance and entered into daily use. Today, there is virtually no sphere of life that has not been analysed and interpreted through the concept of crisis and the decisions and choices it entails and demands (Koselleck and Richter 358). The most common understanding in day-to-day situations is that a crisis is an exceptional event in the history of an organisation, institution, or society.

A widely accepted definition could include its characterisation as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of social system, which – under time

pressure and highly uncertain circumstances – necessitates making critical decisions” (Rosenthal et al. 10; Davis Cross 23). Within the field of international relations, Ikenberry defines a political crisis in a similar way: “a historical juncture when conflict within the political order has risen to the point that the interests, institutions, and shared identities that define and undergird the political system are put in jeopardy. The settled rules, expectations, and institutions that constitute the political order are rendered unsettled” (Ikenberry 3). This political crisis might, moreover, be seen as an existential crisis – an event that anticipates a fundamental change or even an end to a certain way of life.

As an unexpected event, a crisis triggers urgency for political leaders to respond in new ways to manage it and to resolve it. The use of the concept of crisis reduces the room for maneuver as the time for taking decisions is determined by imminent pressures for action (Koselleck and Richter 370). Therefore, as Bauman and Bordoni accurately summarise,

speaking of crisis of whatever nature, including the economic, we convey firstly a feeling of uncertainty, of suddenness, of an unstable and dangerous situation, of our ignorance of the direction in which the affairs are about to turn - and secondly the urge to intervene: to select the right measures and decide to apply them promptly. When we diagnose the situation as ‘critical’, we mean just that: the conjunction of a diagnosis and a call for action (Bauman and Bordoni 7).

The implied assumption is, above all, that the crisis is discontinuous rather than a permanent feature of the narrative and should not be assigned the characteristics of a permanent condition (Holton 504).

2008 Financial and Economic Crisis and Repercussions for the EU

The economic turmoil that broke out in 2008 in the US, caused by the breakdown of subprime and housing markets and the subsequent collapse of Lehmann Brothers in the US, turned into a global economic recession and is recognised today as a global crisis that affected all sectors of the economy (Kotz 305). The crisis initially touched US investment banks, however, due to the structure of financial markets it spread to Europe and other parts of the world with unprecedented speed (Kutter 446–48; Kundera et al. 230; Kundera 393). Scholars from the Marxist tradition of economics, but also Keynesian economists, emphasised its structural and ideological aspects as another major capitalist crisis (Mylonas 646).

By the term *Euro crisis*, the main subject of this thesis, I refer to the crisis witnessed in the Euro zone since 2008, which in many ways was a continuation of the 2008 global financial crisis. In Europe, it began to manifest itself in 2008 with the decline in real estate prices, which, as a consequence, led to the bankruptcies of banks and investment firms. Fearing the costs of bankruptcies many countries, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, were forced to take over the liabilities and recapitalise the banks with state capital. As a result, these governments faced fiscal crises in 2009. Despite swiftly adopted anti-crisis measures, the EU was criticised as ineffective, because the crisis has revealed the lack of coordination of Member States' economic policies and institutionalised mechanisms of control that would allow for a swift common response to emergency situations (Kutter 448; Kundera et al. 230–32).

Kutter gives account of how the Greek government disclosed in October 2009 that its borrowing level was higher than previously reported and higher than permitted by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This led to the lack of trust by the creditors that supported the Greek sovereign debt and, eventually, to the Euro zone crisis. Even though at first it was managed as a routine scandal, it quickly turned into a political crisis in individual Member States. It hit Portugal, Italy, and Spain particularly hard, but also Ireland, and later the entire Union (Kutter 446).

The escalating financial crisis revealed the weaknesses of the Union, among others, the lack of coordinated economic policies of the Member States. Existing instruments proved inadequate and insufficient to bring the situation under control. The functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was questioned, which in turn led to the structural crisis. Continuous disagreement among EU governments as regards the adequate rescue measures paralysed the functioning of the Community. The situation was solved only in early May 2010 when the EU Council agreed on a rescue package for Greece. The adoption of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the creation of a task force on economic governance in March 2010 mitigated the consequences of the crisis and paved the way for the reform of the EMU (Kutter 446–48; Kundera et al. 230–32).

It has soon become visible that this crisis was a multilevel phenomenon that included not only economic dimensions such as a banking crisis, a sovereign debt crisis, and a market crisis, but also had political repercussions, causing structural and institutional uncertainties within the EU, and ultimately triggering a political crisis in the Union as a whole. In this way

the Euro crisis became a “signifier for various financial and economic-related phenomena,” and subject to diverse interpretations. Moreover, as a signifier, it moved away from its etymological meaning and came to mean a protracted state of affairs (Hepp 6-7).

Bauman and Bordoni too noted that one of the distinguishing features of this crisis was its duration. “When one crisis ends, ... another takes its place. Or perhaps it is the same huge crisis that feeds on itself and changes over time ... becoming an everyday habit which we have to deal with rather than an occasional, annoying inconvenience to get rid of in the quickest way possible” (Bauman and Bordoni 6-7).

One could thus say that the discourse around the Euro crisis was a notable example of how ‘crisis’ seems to have lost the meaning of a decisive moment in time. The economic crisis has helped the governments of European countries to introduce the rhetoric of a permanent *state of exception*, which was reflected and perpetuated in the media coverage. Uncertainty associated with a crisis is thus extended into the future, while the moment of decision is not ultimately linked to a solution (Bauman and Bordoni 6–7; Agamben and Attell 2).

Crisis and the New Rules of the Game

The above-described change of meaning has significant consequences. Agamben has argued that the economic crisis has been used to serve the aim of the governing elites to achieve a permanent *state of exception* as the main way to govern in Western democracies (Agamben, *The State of Exception - Der Ausnahmezustand*; Joris et al.; White 303). Apart from being the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics, the *state of exception* has thus become an everyday reality, in which any given decision of the government can be justified as an anti-crisis measure. The crisis has thus become “a part of normality” in political and social life (Agamben and Attell 2; Bauman and Bordoni 6–7).

This normalisation of crisis has blurred the distinction between crisis and normality: crisis is no longer seen as a decisive moment that demands solutions in order to restore normality (Holton 503). In the current situation, the crisis as an instrument of power serves to legitimise political and economic decisions, depriving citizens of an opportunity to decide on alternatives. Proposed solutions are defended as a response to crisis circumstances whose exceptionality is often marked by the vocabulary of “emergency”, “exceptional”, “save”, “rescue”, and “security.” The sense of urgency that permeates emergency politics is often used to justify the lack of debate, consultation, and other forms of efforts to win public

support. Necessity, rather than consent, becomes the main governing principle, while any event with an adverse effect on the economy is “blamed on the crisis.” This frees decision makers from taking responsibility and can be seen as a form of depersonalisation and deagentalisation (Bauman and Bordoni 3; White 30).

This form of emergency politics has been widely manifested throughout Europe since 2008 at both the EU and national levels. As White correctly points out, perhaps the most salient instance of emergency rhetoric by European political leaders, seeking to increase their executive powers and limit public debates over unpopular structural changes and reforms, was Barroso’s infamous credo “exceptional measures for exceptional times” (White 304).

The implication that crisis is permanent by both member state governments and the EU institutions has allowed them to escape justifying political failures. As such, it has also been an important aspect of the communicative construction of the European Union. This has, in part, motivated the pursuit of the objective of this thesis, namely to trace the shifts in meaning of crisis in the discourse on the Euro crisis.

Europeanisation of Debate on the Euro Crisis

The framing of Europe as “in crisis” is not a new phenomenon. Paradoxically, this ongoing narrative seems to become a constitutive element of Europe. Scholars have argued that crises play an important role in the European integration and in the construction of a European society. The communicative construction of Europe within the debate on crisis has been the focus of research that discussed various crises and their contribution to the emergence of the European Public Sphere (EPS)¹ (for example Joris et al.; Kaitatzi-Whitlock; Post and Vollbracht; Triandafyllidou et al.; Tzogopoulos; Wodak and Angouri). Empirical studies confirm that crises lead to a higher level of European societalisation² and result in a more intense cross-border communication within Europe and about Europe, as well as a politicisation of the discourse on the EU (Triandafyllidou et al.; Hepp 35). Krzyżanowski found that one can observe significant intensification and acceleration of the formation of the

¹ The European Public Sphere (EPS) is a widely researched concept which is introduced in this thesis as the context for the further analysis rather than an analytical category. It is important from the point of view of the reception of press stories.

² Hepp refers the term ‘societalisation’ (from German *Vergesellschaftung*) to the writings of Max Weber and describes the continuous process of constructing society. He applies this idea of society to the field of economic and fiscal policy and argues, after Heidenreich, that from an institutional perspective, various crises, including the Euro crisis, can be understood “as a chance for an incremental europeanisation” (Heidenreich in Hepp 33).

European Public Sphere at times of different crisis events (Krzyżanowski, “Europe in Crisis?” 20). Moreover, according to Cross and Ma, European actors seem to use crises as *windows of opportunity* that open space to “further shape European order, enhance legitimacy, and increase integration” (Cross and Ma 1).

Additionally, Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw note that the Euro crisis fostered the *europeanisation* of national public spheres, meaning that public attention regarding Europe has increased in the member states due to the media coverage and that European issues have become more salient in national media contexts. Their findings show that various stories on the Euro crisis were not only discussed simultaneously, they were also framed in similar ways (Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw 1, 15).

This is further confirmed by Risse-Kappen, who underlines that the coverage of EU issues in national media has increased significantly since the mid-1990s (see for example Koopmans and Statham; Wessler and Brüggemann; Grande and Kriesi). Political demands or claims become europeanised when they involve EU-related or cross-border issues. Risse-Kappen also points to available data on the Euro crisis that prove a substantial and repeated presence of a few supranational EU and executive actors, e.g. from other member states, in various debates. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel dominates in various national media contexts (Risse-Kappen, “No Demos?” 1211). They can thus be seen as linked and constituting a part of a common European debate.

According to Risse-Kappen, over the past fifteen years, a growing number of empirical studies have also demonstrated the gradual europeanisation of public spheres and the development of dual identities among European citizens – in relation to their nation-state and to Europe. These identities require space to manifest themselves in the public sphere that would create and reinforce a sense of community. Risse-Kappen argues that in the absence of significant European-wide media, the europeanisation of national media can be observed and measured through (1) visibility and salience of EU related questions, policies and actors; (2) presence of other European actors; and (3) similarity of reference frames across borders with regard to European issues and topics. A fourth indicator measures the degree of conflict and polarisation of European issues in various public spheres (Risse-Kappen, “No Demos?” 1210–11). Elsewhere, Risse-Kappen’s findings indicate that we are witnessing a turning point in the history of the EU, as most indicators suggest the gradual europeanisation of identities

and public spheres leading to increased politicisation of national debates about the EU (Risse-Kappen, “No Demos?” 1207–12).

Europeanisation also means that “similar frames are used in the various public arenas to allow cross-border understanding and communication” (Risse-Kappen, “No Demos?” 1211). Unfortunately, scholarly analysis still lacks systematic research about the framing and communicative construction of the Euro crisis in the various national public spheres. Kriesi and Grande argue that both national and European executive actors tend to frame the Euro crisis predominantly in economic terms, while political parties use also cultural frames (Kriesi; Grande and Kriesi; Risse-Kappen, “No Demos?” 1211–12). Joris, Puustinen, et al. measured the occurrence of metaphorical frames in the Euro crisis coverage and distinguished four main frames present across ten EU member states with different intensification: disease, war, natural disaster, and game (see Joris, Puustinen, et al.).

On the other hand, data collected by Drewski suggest that the German and Spanish editorials differ substantially in their framing of the Euro crisis. Drewski points to a sharp divide between north and south rather than a common European discourse, despite it having converged around a common set of issues (Drewski 266). This is the context in which the metaphorical frames and representations of social actors and their influence on europeanisation will be investigated in the sample under scrutiny.

Once again, the Euro crisis is central to the analysis of the political discourse about Europe, but crisis seems to also comprise a positive component. Roitman and Hepp recall that for Foucault, it is productive, as it involves a change, and through this necessitates transformation (Roitman; Hepp 32-33). Conflictual events like the Euro crisis might, therefore, be even more important for the communicative construction of Europe than any consensual communication as they open new spaces for social actors and for their interpretations of the events. Eder has described the Euro crisis as a kind of “tipping point” (Eder 220) in the construction of Europe, representing “a ‘critical moment’ in the evolution of a European society” (Eder 219) and “triggering people-making in Europe” (Eder 224). Using Albert Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, it has become an “event in which the people raised their ‘voice’ rather than an ‘exit’ from a discourse about Europe, the EU and its future” (Eder 219; Hirschman 30; Hepp 34). As Risse-Kappen puts it: “the more contentious European policies and politics become and the more social mobilisation occurs on European issues, the more we actually observe the emergence of a European Public Sphere” (Risse-

Kappen, *A Community of Europeans?* 112). Likewise, Krzyżanowski has found that the representation of Europe in news media discourse has shifted over time from causing problems for the nation to being a source of common values (see Krzyżanowski, “Europe in Crisis?”).

In the reality following the Brexit referendum, these are contentious claims to make. It is worth investigating whether the Euro crisis indeed brought the europeanisation of the debate and emergence of the EPS in the sense that the discourse was shaped in a convergent way, with the main topics and actors being discussed in a similar way, or on the contrary, whether anti-EU rhetoric and eurosceptic attitudes and opinions in the press were more present, which would signify a divergent element.

The Brexit referendum did not mark a departure from the discourse on the EU. The British relationship with the EU and its future is definitely one of the main subjects broadly discussed in the British media at present, but in the current circumstances it would be difficult to claim that it created a European people making among all member states. It would be interesting to explore whether the construction of the discourse on the Euro crisis could have contributed to this divergence.

The issue of europeanisation constitutes an important context to my research, as the discussion on the Euro crisis brought an inflated level of coverage of European issues in the daily press and arguably led to certain political consequences. However, it is not explicitly a part of my research project. In this thesis, I will analyse how this coverage has been constructed without investigating the effects on the European Public Sphere specifically. For this purpose, a separate research would be necessary.

Euro Crisis as Mediatized Conflict

Through their intensive reporting on the Euro crisis and adopting certain perceptions of it, the media have played an active role in its communicative construction. The media are not simply the prism through which events are reported, they play an integral part of the articulation of a conflict. That is, they have an “active performative involvement and constitutive role within” it, which is why the crisis is considered to be a *mediatized conflict* (Cottle 9).

During the Euro crisis, the media often served as a “threat multiplier,” strengthening negative ideas about events that in turn had an impact on perceptions about the future of the EU, and thus fuelled a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to Davis Cross (Davis Cross 6–7):

When speculators began to bet against the viability of the Euro, borrowing costs went up in many EU member states that had previously had healthy economies, leading to tangible problems for business and employers. Moreover, when policy makers then reached with a strict turn to austerity, this clearly exacerbated the crisis, making it worse that even initial negative perceptions had predicted (Davis Cross 25).

Additionally, news media played a significant role in the formation of consensus, as it is the role of the media to not only report and inform, but also to create space for reflection and potentially for action (Lampropoulou 468). The Euro crisis was hence initially reflected, but later also reinforced by media in the public sphere.

For example, Risse-Kappen found that the representations of the EU and its member states in the Euro crisis discourse brought out the most severe stereotypes that Europeans might ascribe to each other. In the initial phase of the crisis, media discourses portraying Greece as either the ‘perpetrator’ or the ‘victim’ have become common. Greek street posters, for instance, depicted German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Nazi uniform with the EU stars around the swastika (Risse-Kappen, “No Demos?” 1210). On the other hand, as Wodak demonstrated, “Greece has been continuously constructed as the weakest link of the EU ‘family’ and the starting point of a potentially ‘contagious’ Euro zone crisis” (Wodak and Angouri 417). The two metaphors were used to position Self and Other in various contexts to explain socioeconomic changes and are reflected in the analysed sample as well.

As Bickes argues, the discourse shifted and evolved over time, changing the mediated images of the Greek people:

The initial phase of *Greek bashing* in 2010/2011, when Greece and its role within the European financial crisis were depicted in an indecently harsh and aggressive manner, was accompanied by public demands for a *Grexist*. Compared to the start of the crisis in 2010, a considerable change took place in 2012 when the tone generally became more moderate and less offending. The debt-burdened countries, and especially their population, receive much more sympathy as the crisis progresses and the attention of the audience is often drawn to the suffering of those in the crisis-hit countries. ... The media tried to convey the message that these people are suffering from politicians’ mistakes, the banking crisis and economic stagnation (Bickes et al. 438–39).

The Euro crisis triggered multiple cleavages and conflicts reflected in various media texts: among others between left and right; between Greece and “others”; between haves and have-nots (Wodak and Angouri 418). In the context of the claim of the europeanisation of the debate on the Euro crisis, these divisions are particularly relevant to media research addressing the mediatised communicative construction of the crisis, as the media frame the debate and disseminate narratives and scenarios about it. In part, analysing the discourse around the Euro crisis in the UK in relation to other EU member states may shed some light onto the later crisis of Brexit.

Summary of Main Aims, Methods and Tools

Political scientists and media scholars use different concepts and interpretative frames, different research agendas and address different audiences. One of the results of this is that most of the investigative work in the field of political discourse focuses on a single country with little comparative perspective. Additionally, most of the research comes from the liberal Anglo-American academic tradition (Zielonka 2). I attempt to overcome the divide between communication/media studies and politics, and put the European experience in a comparative context. Moreover, with my research, I address the gap between quantitative and qualitative analysis when it comes to the investigation of political communication by complementing the quantitative analysis with a qualitative component.

This study also focuses on the Euro crisis because it is of fundamental importance for the history of the European Union, perhaps the most serious threat facing the Union’s very existence since its formation.

In order to fulfil the aims of the project, I will compare and contrast the political debate in the media on the Euro crisis in selected EU member states and explore how the crisis has been communicatively constructed. My main objectives are to pinpoint the convergence and/or divergence in the communicative construction of the discourses in different countries and by different political orientations. My research questions are:

- Was the discourse on the Euro crisis in the Polish, German and British press of different political orientations convergent or divergent?
- If it was convergent, which dominant ideology did it represent?
- If it was divergent, what were the lines along which the differences were constructed?

As debates and arguments about values require a normative stance that is often hidden, it is important to challenge hegemonic opinions and ideologies expressed in a discourse. I will, therefore, deconstruct ideological positions and demonstrate which values and beliefs underlie the various proposals or claims that are presented in the media discourse on the Euro crisis. I will assess whether the discourse on the Euro crisis reflected the various positions of all the parties involved or whether it reinforced the dominant stance and whose stance it was. This should, additionally, lead to meaningful conclusions on the extent to which, and in which ways, the discourse on the Euro crisis has been europeanised in national debates.

Using a combination of quantitative content based and qualitative text based analyses, I will present the discursive constructions of the European Union and European values in a selection of daily newspapers throughout selected time periods in three EU member states: Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Germany is one of the founding members of the EU and a leading member of the Euro zone (“From 6 to 28 Members”). At the time of the analysed sample Poland was an important pro-European member of the EU. Furthermore, under the terms of the Treaty of Accession with the European Union, Poland agreed to “participate in the Economic and Monetary Union from the date of accession as a Member State with a derogation” (*Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (2003)*). That means that Poland is required by the Treaty to accept the Euro under specific conditions without a target date. Finally, the UK is a predominantly eurosceptic EU member, not a member of the Euro zone, and has been granted a permanent opt-out clause, which means that it was not required to participate in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and consequently to introduce the Euro (*United Kingdom: EMU Opt-out Clause*). My analysis will follow the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis which will be presented in detail in the methodology chapter (Chapter IV).

My main findings point to an ideologically convergent picture across the member states and the newspapers under scrutiny. The thesis argues that the discourse employed by the examined outlets reinforced the dominant story about the Euro crisis that has been presented by politicians along the lines of neoliberal economic theory. The structural reasons that led to the EU democratic deficit are underlined, but stereotypical misrepresentations such as the negligence of southern nations also occur in this context. The solution to the problem was reported as largely being possible through the adoption of structural reforms and austerity

measures in the economies in trouble and, in a longer-term, creating a fiscal union of all member states. Countries which fell into the crisis are represented as wild, irresponsible, unable to discipline themselves and in need of external help to temper them. The Greeks were also passivised and impersonalised, which could have resulted in backgrounding their identity and their role.

Additionally, I find that the Euro crisis itself is presented as a major actor, personified and endowed with enormous powers. Expressions of duration suggest a protracted state of affairs allowing the decision makers to justify their policies with the crisis. The analysis of metaphors delivers further findings about the deagentalisation of the policy makers through dominant metaphorical frames of disease and natural disaster. Furthermore, arguments, which at first sight appear rational, in fact take the form of “moralised activities,” while authorisation with the use of an expert is the most frequently used legitimating strategy across the sample.

This PhD project is partially a result of a cooperation on the international project “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU” hosted by the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford, United Kingdom (2010-2012), in which I have been a project associate, managing the Polish team. This empirical quantitative research explored how the Euro crisis has been portrayed in the media in eleven EU member states and how differences in coverage and journalistic practices affected perceptions of the crisis and Europe in these countries. The data gathered within this research project serves as a departure point for my analysis.

Structure of the Thesis

In the following chapters, I will first present Critical Discourse Studies approach (Chapter II) and introduce the different media models in the three EU member states concerned (Chapter III) – Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) – keeping in mind how this could impact the reporting on the Euro crisis which constitutes an important context for the analysis.

Following this, the analytical part of my thesis will be divided into two parts preceded by the detailed description of methodology used (Chapter IV). In Chapter V, I will perform an entry phase analysis by comparing and contrasting the findings of the quantitative analysis of the project “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU” for the

three member states under scrutiny. This analysis will serve to establish the limits of the media discourse, the main topics, and the key actors, which will allow me to identify the analytical categories for the in-depth textual analysis.

In Chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX, I will focus on the qualitative, textual analysis of a selected sample of articles. Based on the primary material published by selected newspapers, I will deconstruct the discourse around the event that gathered the broadest coverage within the sample – the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi from the position of Prime Minister of Italy and the appointment for this position of Mario Monti (12-13 November 2011) – with the focus on roots, solutions, consequences, as well as temporal and spatial representations of the Euro crisis (Chapter VI). Further, I will investigate the representation of social actors (Chapter VII) and legitimating strategies (Chapter VIII), including the use of metaphors (Chapter IX).

II. Critical Discourse Study – Interdisciplinary Approach to Discourse Analysis

The growth of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a field corresponds to the increase of critical interest in the role of language in contemporary society. As a result of the development of the media industry, key areas of social life have become strongly related to media and thus public communication has become more salient and more important to a range of social processes. The increased significance of language in social life has contributed to greater attention being paid to language practices shaped according to political, economic, and institutional objectives. Language has, therefore, become in the centre of attention of diverse studies. This is notably the case within politics where the careful design of political language in the media is crucial to achieve intended goals (Fairclough et al. 359).

Origins of Critical Discourse Studies

The roots of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) lie in several disciplines such as: rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, social psychology, cognitive science, literary studies, sociolinguistics, applied linguistics and pragmatics. Despite deriving from different disciplinary backgrounds and using diversity of methods and objects of investigation, they all deal with a common notion of *discourse* (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 1).

CDS emerged as a new independent discipline between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s in the humanities and social sciences. The foundations of this new branch of linguistic research were laid by the *critical linguistics* in Britain in close association with *systemic linguistic theory* that looks beyond formal rules to build a mental picture of reality and understand experiences (Halliday; Halliday and Matthiessen). With its practical ways of analysing texts and the attention it assigns to the role of grammar it also contributed in the analysis of ideology (Fairclough et al. 360).

As a network of scholars, CDS constituted itself in the early 1990s involving Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Ruth Wodak, and Ron Schollon. The start was marked by the launch of van Dijk's journal *Discourse and Society* (1990) as well as several publications led by similar research goals. Since then, several new journals have been launched, such as *Critical Discourse Studies*, *The Journal of Language and Politics*,

Discourse and Communication, and *Visual Communication* among many others. In addition, multiple overviews, handbooks, and readers have been published. Regular CDS meetings and conferences have taken place and collaborative interdisciplinary projects have been undertaken since then. In other words, CDS has become an established discipline and a paradigm in linguistics recognised in academia across the world (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 3).

Theoretical Background

In its various forms, Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA) approach derives its academic origins from 'Western Marxism', especially the social and political thought of Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and Louis Althusser. In particular, Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' defined as "winning the consent of majority," upon which relies the preservation of power, has been influential in CDA (see Gramsci and Hoare). The emphasis on hegemony conveys a focus on ideology and practices of ordinary life reflected and translated into capitalist social relations, which is at the heart of my thesis (Fairclough et al. 360).

The term 'critical' can be closely associated with the Frankfurt School which re-examined the foundations of Marxist thought and extended the Kantian 'critique' to the analysis of cultural forms of different kinds, which are perceived as central to the reproduction of social relations in capitalism (Wodak 83). As Wodak claims, adhering to a 'critical' stance should be understood as "gaining distance from the data ..., embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self-reflection while undertaking research" which I will attempt to apply throughout this study (Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)" 87).

In addition, Foucault's work on discourse as *knowledge systems* of human sciences (see *The Archeology of Knowledge*) has generated immense interest in discourse analysis. He presented discourse as an instrument of persuasion, as regards the perception and structuring of the world (Jabłońska 80). The French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, with his work *Language and Symbolic Power* on the relationship between language, social position and symbolic value within the dynamics of power relations has been another influential figure (Fairclough et al. 361). Bourdieu pointed to domination structures hidden in discourse which exert its power defending the access to the distribution channels of information. He was especially interested in the intersection of media/journalism and politics (Jabłońska 81).

Within linguistic and literary studies, Mikhail Bakhtin emphasised, among others, the dialogical character of texts and introduced the idea of *intertextuality* which suggests “a continual dialogue and interrelationship between texts and other works that influence its perception and interpretation” (Fairclough et al. 361). Within this notion of text, the meaning does not reside in the text, but is produced by the reader. Closely related, Valentin Voloshinov, a linguist from the Soviet Union, in his work *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* developed the first linguistic theory of ideology claiming that all language use is ideological which is an underlying notion of this thesis. In addition, the thought of Jurgen Habermas, has its influence on CDA with his notion of context and the public sphere in which linguistic and social interactions take place (Fairclough et al. 361).

Research Aims and Methods within Critical Discourse Analysis

Located within the social constructivist paradigm, CDA looks at the ways in which individuals make sense of the world by means of construction of subjective meanings and their negotiation. The key claim of CDA is that major social and political processes and movements, such as, for instance, neoliberalism, are complex phenomena with a partly linguistic-discursive character. Therefore, I use CDA, which takes a problem-oriented and interdisciplinary approach, to disentangle this complexity. It is not aimed at investigating linguistic units *per se* but at analysing, understanding and interpreting complex social phenomena that require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodological approach (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 2).

CDA is based on relativist ontology with regard to power relations, which sees media discourses as components of a social world providing different social discursive constructions and representations. Therefore, CDA highlights the discursive nature of power relations in contemporary societies, for instance, in how power relations between media and politics are exercised and negotiated in discourse (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 2-3).

Bowing to subjectivist epistemology, CDS have never been based on or attempted to provide one single theory. Neither is one single methodology characteristic of research in CDS. On the contrary, studies in CDA derive from different theoretical backgrounds and orient themselves towards different data and methodology (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 3). As Wodak emphasises,

CDA is not a discrete academic discipline with a relatively fixed set of research methods. ... CDA [is] a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda. What united them is a shared interest in the semiotic dimension of power, injustice, abuse, and political-economic or cultural change in society. CDA is distinctive in a) its view of the relationship between language and society, and b) its critical approach to methodology (Wodak 79).

Consequently, Critical Discourse Analysis is performed by defining objectives and pursuing them with the choice of appropriate methods given the problem under investigation. “A good method is a method that is able to give a satisfactory, which means reliable and relevant answers to the questions of a research project. It depends on one’s aims, expertise, time and goals, and the kind of data that must be generated – that is on the *context* of the research project” (van Dijk, “CDA Is NOT a Method of Critical Discourse Analysis.”). The choice of appropriate methods often includes combining various approaches, and drawing on diverse linguistic analytic techniques and theories, but most of the time it will involve a close textual analysis.

From an axiological perspective, Critical Discourse Studies aim to contribute to addressing the social ‘wrongs’ by analysing their roots and possible solutions. That is why CDS scholars and their research are often explicitly committed to supporting social equality and justice, specifically interested in the discursive reproduction of power abuse and the resistance against domination. CDS is, therefore, more problem oriented than discipline oriented (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 63).

In general, CDS as a school or a paradigm is characterised by a number of principles: [...] all approaches are problem oriented and thus necessarily interdisciplinary [...]. Moreover, CDS approaches are characterised by the common interests in deconstructing ideologies and power through the systematic and reproducible investigation of semiotic data (written spoken or visual). CDS researchers also attempt to make their own positioning and interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and remaining self-reflective of their own research process (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 4).

Power and Ideology in Critical Discourse Studies

In the tradition of Critical Theory, CDS aims to shed light on the discursive aspect of social processes of power and domination, which in a dialectical understanding of a social world are implied in a particular discursive conceptualisation of the world. In other words, the relations

between power and domination are not simply named in language but conceptualised. While people often remain unaware of both the ideological charge of using language in particular ways and the underlying relations of power, CDA aims to make these aspects of discourse as social practice more visible. Hence, CDA frequently explores the linguistic means used to “reinforce and intensify inequalities in society” and aims at revealing “structures of power and unmasking ideology” (Wodak 80).

Power relates to an asymmetric relationship among social actors belonging to different social groups or holding different social positions. Following Max Weber, Wodak and Meyer regard power as “the possibility of having one’s own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others.” Some of the ways in which power can be implemented are, for instance, physical violence, exerting control over other people through threats or promises, the submission to authority, or control through material objects, such as means of production, transportation, weapons, etc (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 88).

Within CDS, power is usually perceived in the Foucauldian sense, focused primary on the structural dimensions between power and discourse in a Weberian tradition (Foucault 1975). For Foucault, “in modern societies power and domination are embedded and conveyed by discourse,” while linguistic expressions can provide a tool to alter and express the distribution of power in hierarchical structures (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 10-11).

Accordingly, discourse plays a pivotal role in the exercise of power, which can be legitimised or de-legitimised in discourses. Texts often constitute sites where social struggle takes place and where traces of differing ideological fights for dominance and hegemony are manifested. Discourses express social cognition and may thus influence the worldviews of other groups and their members (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 71).

Therefore, CDS researchers investigate the ways in which discourse produces or reproduces social domination, understood mainly as the power abuse of one group over others, and examine which linguistic forms are applied to achieve it in various expressions (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 88).

CDS can be defined as fundamentally interested in analysing hidden, opaque, and visible structures of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in the language. In other words, CDS aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted,

legitimised, and so on, by language use or in discourse. Most critical discourse analysts would thus endorse Habermas's claim that 'language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations of organised power. Insofar as the legitimisation of power relations ... are not articulated ... language is also ideological' (Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* 130).

The most common definition of *ideology* sees it as "a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values" (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 8). Yet, according to Althusser, whose ideas on the notions of ideology have also been very influential in CDS, ideology is not 'just' a dominant system of ideas and beliefs but "represent[s] the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" which "has a material existence" (Althusser 109). For Althusser, discursive practices can be explored as material forms of ideology (Fairclough, *Language and Power*. 102–08); also Chouliaraki and Fairclough).

Elsewhere, van Dijk defines ideologies as the worldviews that constitute social cognition: "schematically organised complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of social world" (van Dijk, *Ideology* 258). In his view, ideology is a system of meanings, values, and beliefs that govern the way people perceive their world and themselves. Van Dijk claims that ideologies can be defined as "the basis for the social representations shared by members of the group," while language use plays a significant role in their reproduction (van Dijk, *Ideology* 263–76).

Similarly, for Wodak and Meyer, ideology is seen as:

an (often) one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group. Ideologies serve as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse: for example, by establishing hegemonic identity narratives, or by controlling the access to specific discourses or public spheres. In addition, ideologies also function as a means of transforming power relations (Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)" 88).

On the other hand, Fairclough conceives ideology as "construction of practices from particular perspective" (Fairclough, *Language and Power*. 71), which contributes to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. For Fairclough, the analysis of texts is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique as the

ideological meanings carried in the discourse are usually implied or presupposed. “Texts do not typically spout ideology. They so position the interpreter though their cues that she or he brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts – and reproduces them in process” (Fairclough, *Language and Power*. 71).

Consequently, CDA researchers agree that ideology serves as a set of internalised representations that govern the perception of power relations. Dominant ideologies may appear as ‘neutral’, linked to assumptions that often remain unchallenged, explicitly or implicitly expressed in many ways in discourse (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 5).

Therefore, CDS is particularly interested in the ideologies hidden and inherent in everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised, for instance, in conceptual metaphors and analogies (Lakoff and Johnson). It is the functioning of ideologies and the role they play in public debate which interests CDS researchers. Thus, one of the aims of the critical discourse researcher, according to Wodak and Meyer, is to

‘demystify’ the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance for language is not powerful on its own – it is a means to gain and maintain power by the use powerful people make of it. Therefore, CDS critically analyses the language use of those in power who have the means and opportunities to improve conditions (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 88).

One of my goals in this thesis is to show in an explicit way how different worldviews, ideologies and power relations were mediated and expressed textually in the media discourse on the Euro crisis, and what impact they had on the social perception of the crisis.

Notions of *Text, Discourse, and Context*

The term *discourse* is used in various ways across the social sciences. Being located within social constructivist paradigm, CDS sees discourse as a form of social practice (Wodak and Fairclough) and considers the *context* of language use to be crucial (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 5).

This implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and all the diverse elements of the situations, institutions, and social structures which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and

social structures, but it also shapes them. To put in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped (Wodak 79-80).

Furthermore, the notion of *discourse* is distinguished from the notion of *text*. “*Texts* constitute parts of discourses. They make speech acts durable over time and thus speech production with speech reception. In other words, texts – be they visualised and written or oral – objectify linguistic actions” (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 89–90).

Discourses are additionally *historical* and therefore cannot be fully understood without reference to their various *contexts*. They are linked to other discourses which were produced earlier, around the same time or later. In this respect, the notions of *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity* become of crucial importance for CDA with regard to the analysis of the relationships with other texts. Moreover, the notion of context in CDS includes, among others, sociopsychological, political, historical and ideological factors, and thereby postulates *interdisciplinarity* (Wodak 94).

Four levels of context were distinguished by Wodak and Reisigl: 1. the immediate context - language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse, 2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between discourses and texts across time and space established via explicit or implicit references, 3. the non-linguistic social and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation,’ 4. the broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 93). It is the role of the researcher to decide how much contextual knowledge must be brought in to the interpretation.

Major Approaches within Critical Discourse Studies

Three major approaches have been developed within Critical Discourse Studies (CDS): *the discourse-historical approach (DHA)* of Ruth Wodak, *a socio-cognitive model* of Teun van Dijk and *a dialectical-relational theory of discourse* of Norman Fairclough.

The DHA was developed by Ruth Wodak and scholars associated with the University of Vienna working within the traditions of Bersteinian sociolinguistics and the Frankfurt School. The distinctive feature of this approach is its attempt to integrate in a systematic way available background information into the analysis, which constitute the abovementioned

notion of *context*, key for the interpretation of the many layers of discourse (Wodak 85-86). The DHA has been used to investigate, among others, identity politics and patterns of decision making in EU organisations (see Wodak and Krzyżanowski).

Moreover, according to the DHA, macro-topic-relatedness, pluri-perspectivity, and argumentativity are formal constitutive elements in the theoretical conception of ‘discourse’. In other words, besides being a set of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action and being socially constituted as well as socially constitutive, discourse is at the same time considered to be related to a macro-topic and to the argumentation about validity claims (truth and normative rightness), which involves social actors with different perspectives (see Reisigl and Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination* 89; Hart and Cap 69).

Teun Van Dijk’s work has highlighted the cognitive dimensions of how discourse operates in racism, ideology and knowledge and developed a *socio-cognitive model* of Critical Discourse Analysis. Focused on the cognitive component, it deals with processes and representations involved in the production and comprehension of discourse. Van Dijk’s work on the role of media in the reproduction of racism has highlighted the convergence between public representations and common ethnic prejudices. Recent works incorporating cognitive perspectives include also work on cognitive metaphor theory (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, ch. 3). Also Paul Chilton’s cognitive linguistic approach has made an important contribution to the analysis of political discourse specifically (Chilton; Wodak and Chilton).

Norman Fairclough’s work, on the other hand, has focused on a *dialectical-relational theory of discourse* and a transdisciplinary approach to social change and explored the socially transformative effects of discursive change (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, ch. 4).

CDS distinguishes between approaches that proceed *deductively* – illustrate their assumption with examples that seem to best speak in favour of their claim (e.g. the dialectical-relational approach and socio-cognitive approach) -- and *inductively* – select problems for investigation and analyse them through in-depth studies and ample data collection to get deeper insight (e.g. the discourse historical approach, social actors approach, corpus linguistics approach, dispositive analysis) (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 18). As my

research focuses on the analysis of existing sample of data, primarily an inductive approach will be applied.

Following the flexibility offered by Critical Discourse Studies, mapping different approaches has become more difficult, as various authors use different theoretical backgrounds depending on their specific interests and research questions. However, most researchers integrate linguistic categories into their analysis as a broad range of macro- and micro-linguistic as well as pragmatic and argumentative features can be effectively operationalised in text analysis (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 20).

Research Design

The following study will be an inductive analysis on the Euro crisis, structured on the *discourse-historical approach (DHA)* as introduced by Ruth Wodak in *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (ch. 2) and will derive additional elements as deemed suitable from *the socio-semiotic approach* of Theo van Leeuwen, *the socio-cognitive approach* of Teun van Dijk, *the dialectical-relational approach* of Norman Fairclough, and text linguistics.

The analysis will follow a multilevel pattern of analysis, originally introduced by Wodak and Meyer in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* and later elaborated by Krzyżanowski in *The Discursive Construction of European Identities*. It distinguishes between the *entry-level* (thematic, topic-oriented, or content oriented) and *in-depth* (strategy and argumentation oriented) analysis. In the entry phase, the focus is mainly on *discourse topics* that allow researchers to identify the key tendencies in the contents of analysed texts and overall framing of the discussed issues. In the next stage, the in-depth analysis, focuses on the key patterns of argumentation and legitimation, including the role of social actors and the strategic use of metaphors. My analysis will rely on the notion of discursive strategy as introduced by Reisigl and Wodak in *Discourse and Discrimination*. Following that approach, I will perform three levels of analysis, to establish: 1) topics of the discourse under investigation (entry phase, content analysis), 2) discursive strategies (in-depth analysis) combined with 3) elements of linguistic methods with which these strategies has been realised (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 32).

The aim of the first step of the analysis is to establish ‘discourse topics’ defined as “semantic macro-propositions” or “the most ‘important’ or ‘summarising’ ideas” (Dijk, *Prejudice in Discourse* 56). Following van Dijk’s definition,

[t]opics conceptually, summarise the text, and specify its most important information. ... The hierarchical set of topics or macro-propositions forms the thematic or topical structure of the text. Language users employ such macro-structures in order to understand globally and to summarise a text. In news discourse, the top of this macro-structure is conventionally expressed in the headline and the lead paragraph (Van Dijk, *Racism and the Press* 131).

Thus the aim of the entry-level analysis is to establish the boundaries of identified discourses.

Moreover, having identified the main topics of the discourse on the Euro crisis, I will also analyse to which degree the topics identified have been prioritised depending on the country of origin or the political orientation of the newspaper. Thus, I will also investigate whether there were primary and secondary discourse topics (Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2008).

The entry-level analysis will be performed by means of quantitative analysis on a broad sample of texts. Turning to in-depth qualitative analysis, I will explore the discursive strategies and their realisations (the second stage in the Reisigl and Wodak's model). These strategies are defined after Bourdieu as "actions objectively oriented towards goals that may not be goals subjectively pursued" (Wodak, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* 32) -- in other words, these are intentional discursive practices employed to achieve a particular aim (Reisigl and Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination* 44).

Wodak has defined five macro-strategies in discourse analysis: 1) referential/nomination, 2) predication, 3) argumentation, perspectivisation, framing, 4) discourse representation, 5) intensification / mitigation. This set is, however, not finite and there might be more specific strategies such as commonly researched within the dialectical-relational approach the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them' (positive self and negative other) or a specific representation of social actors (Van Leeuwen, "Legitimation in Discourse and Communication"). In particular, there has been three domains of social life that may be discursively constituted are: *representations* of the world, social *relations* between people, and social and personal *identities* (Wodak 91; Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)" 112–13).

As a third step, throughout my analysis, I will incorporate pragmatic features of texts in the exploration of the linguistic means with which these strategies have been realised. A close textual analysis of selected articles will integrate the linguistic details and the socio-political and economic aspects of the debate. Among others, I will take a close look at representation of social actors as well as the construction (or denial) of their agency, the argumentation and

legitimation strategies (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*), including the use of metaphors (Semino).

For the sake of this analysis, I will use Wodak's macro-strategies and investigate whether other discourse strategies were present in the analysed texts. I will specifically focus on three elements:

(1) *referential or nomination strategies* which focus on categorisation devices, such as biological, naturalising and depersonalising metaphors, often describing social actors, especially in-groups and out-groups. This will address the question how social actors are referred to linguistically. In other words, how are people, objects, events, processes and actions related to the Euro crisis named.

(2) *predicational strategies* which connect social actors with positive or negative attributions, values and features; and

(3) *argumentation strategies* based on rhetorical tropes (metaphors) and van Leeuwen's four legitimation strategies through which positive and negative attributions are justified (see Van Leeuwen, "The Representation of Social Actors," and Van Leeuwen, "Legitimation in Discourse and Communication"; Boukala 489–90; Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 33).

For the sake of transparency, I will keep the description of the content of the texts and their interpretation and explanation separate. As a result, the analysis will have a dual focus. On the one hand, it will concentrate on the discourse in selected daily newspapers and examine, by means of topic-oriented analysis, the key themes and frames in the mediated political discourse in the complete sample studied. On the other hand, a closer look will be taken on the discourse of one selected period within the broader context of the Euro crisis that generated the largest coverage among the analysed newspapers pegged around the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi from the position of Prime Minister of Italy and the appointment for this position of Mario Monti (11-14 November 2011). This was also an important event as it marked a turning point in the development of the Euro crisis with the adoption of Brussels favoured scenario and measures towards the way out of the crisis by the Europe's fifth largest economy. This second step of analysis will examine in which ways policy and political responses are discursively constructed and legitimised.

In line with the discourse-historical tradition in Critical Discourse Studies (Krzyzanowski, *The Discursive Construction of European Identities*; Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*), this study perceives discourse as a social practice. The focus is on how social phenomena – in this case phenomena related to crisis situations – are constructed and represented linguistically in political discourse. This also allows to demonstrate that discourse is a carrier of different forms of legitimation and ideologies, and of discursively constructed forms of political agency.

This research project subscribes to the tradition of CDA of engaging in a close reading of specific texts and the tendency to move away from the analysis of a large samples of texts to close analysis of individual texts, with the aim of disclosing patterns and tendencies in the media debates, as demonstrated in (Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*), Wodak and Meyer (*Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*) and Vaara.

III. Media and Crises

The media has the power to disseminate information to a large audience and to amplify the views of other social actors, especially opinion leaders in order to build public perceptions around specific narratives. As Critcher argues, “[media discourses] define, describe and delimit what is possible to say and not possible to say” (Critcher 170). However, as Critcher also claims, beyond the media’s power to reach many people, it also manipulates, exaggerates, or misrepresents events, particularly under the pressure to provide news within strict deadlines, and to update information more quickly than the competition (Critcher). As Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer report:

Media coverage of crises has become more aggressive and frequent, with the proliferation of news magazines and 24-hour news programs. Typically, the media seek information about scope of harm, cause, blame, responsibility, and remedial efforts. Generally, the broader scope of harm and the more dramatic the visual event, the more extensive the media coverage (Seeger et al. 8).

As a result, the media tend to spin events in a negative direction, which has a particular effect on the crisis situations. According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda, the media can play a particularly crucial role in the early stages of the crisis by over-reporting and distorting events, as well as predicting the negative development of events (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 23), as in case of the Euro crisis which will be demonstrated in the following chapters.

The media define events and shape responses also through its volume of coverage, framing, and spin (Davis Cross 33–35). Media often serve as a ‘primary definer’ which frames an event as a crisis thus becoming a contributing factor to the social construction of a crisis (Critcher 15).

Due to the significance of the media coverage, in this chapter, I will analyse, compare and contrast the structures of the media systems in the countries of analysis – Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom, with a specific focus on the role that media market structures play as the context of discourse. The analysis will take as a departure point the Hall and Mancini’s models, including the specificities of the national media markets. Within the Liberal model, I will take an in-depth look at the UK media market, and within the Democratic Corporatist model at the German media environment. Given the scope of this analysis, I am particularly interested in the structure of the press sectors. Finally, I will discuss the validity of the Hallin

and Mancini's model for Central Eastern Europe (CEE). One of my aims is to investigate whether the structure of media markets influenced the coverage and the way in which the discourse on the Euro crisis has been shaped in the countries under analysis. In particular, bearing in mind the UK's recent decision to leave the EU, it will be interesting to see whether there were significant differences that could contribute to the negative perception of the EU in the UK.

The field of comparative research on media systems has a long tradition reaching back to the 1950s. In the *Four Theories of the Press* (1956), Siebert, Peterson and Schramm introduced the (1) authoritarian; (2) libertarian, (3) social responsibility, and (4) Soviet Communist press theories, including Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the last category. Though often criticised, the approach was a departure point for starting academic debate on normative media theories and classifying media systems which in turn provided a beginning for comparative research (Zielonka 310-11).

With time, the number of categories to describe and compare media systems increased and the approach shifted from normative to empirically based research. Comparative studies of media systems have become an important element of the study of contemporary communication. Jakubowicz points out that comparative media system analyses are currently perceived as the key approach to understanding processes of globalisation in the media, as well as transnational and cross-border communication worldwide (Jakubowicz 1).

Currently, the most acknowledged reference frame for media scholars to perform a comparative analysis of media systems is Hallin and Mancini's framework described in *Comparing Media Systems* (2004) which consists of four dimensions: (1) *structure of media markets*, including particularly the degree of development of the mass circulation press; (2) *political parallelism*, assessing the presence of partisan press, (3) *professionalisation of journalism*, and (4) *role of the state*, in particular the degree and the form of state intervention in the media system.

Hallin and Mancini have also argued that there are significant links between the patterns along which media systems develop based on these dimensions, and that there are certain key characteristics that constitute the context of political systems such as: (1) *role of the state*, (2) *type of democracy* (consensus vs. majoritarian), (3) *type of pluralism* (individual vs.

organised), (4) *degree of rational-legal authority*, and (5) *degree of pluralism* (moderate vs. polarised) (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 296).

By using the aforementioned dimensions and characteristics, Hallin and Mancini conceptualised three models of relations between media and the political system in which they function corresponding to geographical regions:

1. The North Atlantic or Liberal Model -- Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland;
2. The North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model -- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland;
3. The Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model -- France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain;

Liberal or North Atlantic Model and the UK's exception

The Liberal or North Atlantic model, characterised by early development of press freedom, a high level of press circulation, high journalistic professionalism, mostly neutrally oriented press, the absence of state intervention, and weak party organisation, prevails in the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, and Canada. Liberal institutions developed relatively early in these countries preserving a traditionally strong role of the market and a relatively limited role of the state. That is why despite a strong professionalisation, in the Liberal model, journalism can be limited by commercial rather than by political interests (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 75, 246).

All the Liberal countries are characterised by moderate pluralism and tend toward majoritarianism, while rational-legal authority is strongly developed. The media have been largely separated institutionally from political parties and other organised social groups, since the late nineteenth century. However, the high partisanship of the press is what distinguished the UK model from other countries in this group. Also, news journalism became predominant, with a somewhat stronger commentary tradition found also in Britain, and the state intervention in the media sector has been generally limited in comparison with the Democratic Corporatist or Polarised Pluralist systems, while in Britain public broadcasting and the regulation of commercial broadcasting have both been very strong (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 75, 246).

Table 1. Characteristics of the Liberal model

Dimensions		Characteristics	
(1) <i>structure of media markets (level of circulation),</i>	high	(1) <i>role of the state,</i>	limited
(2) <i>political parallelism,</i>	low	(2) <i>type of democracy</i>	majoritarian
(3) <i>professionalisation of journalism,</i>	high	(3) <i>type of pluralism</i>	individual
(4) <i>role of the state</i>	low	(4) <i>degree of rational-legal authority,</i>	high
		(5) <i>degree of pluralism</i>	moderate

The media landscape in the United Kingdom that is classified under the Liberal model is large, mature and complex, arguably ranking second globally to that of the US. This status might be assigned to some extent to the popularity of English as the most common language of production and content in contemporary commercial media markets and a number of UK media organisations, notably Reuters and the BBC, having an international standing (“National Media Profiles: United Kingdom”).

The British press market is second largest in Europe, following the German. Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the print media in the UK is the existence of a large national newspaper sector. In 2016, 117 daily titles were published and circulated in 10 940 copies and 26 Sunday titles circulated in 5765 copies. This is more than in France, Germany and the US (Konarska 213). Additionally, specialised business English language magazines contribute to these numbers (Konarska 221).

About 75 million copies, commonly divided into three sectors – ‘quality’, ‘middle market’ and ‘red-top tabloid,’ are sold every week and read by about 70 per cent of the adult population. The newspaper readership tends to be stratified by class and a left/right political divide. The figures for 2018 indicate that tabloids account for 48 per cent, mid market tabloids -- 33 per cent, and broadsheets -- 19 per cent of market share. Moreover, the importance of regional and local media should not be underestimated. In particular, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish are widely distributed in their respective areas with overall around 40 million copies circulated and read by about 84 per cent of the adult population (“National Media Profiles: United Kingdom”).

According to *Media Landscapes*, the UK environment is characterised by a strongly partisan mass circulation of the press. The national press exerts a strong influence on the public

sphere, particularly at election time, as commercial media are largely funded by advertising. On the other side, thanks to the strong commercial basis, the press operates independently of government and political control (“Country Analysis: United Kingdom”).

Another reason for the UK being an exception within Hallin and Mancini’s Liberal model is that the division between fact-based news and opinion pieces does not result in political neutrality, as it does in the other countries, such as the USA, Ireland and Canada. As Hallin and Mancini note, the concept of ‘press parallelism,’ characteristic for Britain, reflects political party divisions and distinct political orientations in the British press while not having formal links to political parties. It is also reflected by the readers choice of newspapers according to their political preferences (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 208). As a result of political parallelism in the British press, many have become concerned with the disproportionate tendencies to lean towards the right.

Additionally, the strong connection between ownership and partisanship, as well as the high degree of concentration of newspaper ownership in the UK market has led to concerns about shrinking media plurality (“Country Analysis: United Kingdom”). Owners of four largest newspapers reach 75 per cent of market revenue and 71 per cent of readers which de facto means they have the control over the information which is passed (Konarska 219–20).

A similar concentration of ownership can be observed in the regional and local press market. According to the European Journalist Centre, the five largest owners control 72.5 per cent of the market which makes more than 700 newspapers. Three of them are also among the top four national newspaper companies. Altogether, newspaper ownership is heavily concentrated in three corporations, accounting for 360 titles, some of them being the largest circulating in their sectors (“National Media Profiles: United Kingdom”).

The daily paid circulation of national newspapers, which has traditionally been very strong in the UK, has been steadily declining in recent years. It has fallen approximately 40 per cent between 2010 and 2018, while online readership is rising. Print newspapers are read by a quarter of adult population over 15 every day (13.6 million daily) and reach larger audiences weekly (24.9 million) and monthly (30.8 million) (“Country Analysis: United Kingdom”).

Democratic-Corporatist or North/Central Europe Model with Germany in Focus

The Democratic-Corporatist or North/Central Europe model is specific to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. It is characterised by large press circulation, a certain level of press partisanship and therefore political parallelism. It is based on merit selection criteria and career improvement, as well as a rooted tradition of state intervention with policies of press subsidies rather than strong party organisations (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 195-6; Konarska 114).

As in the Liberal model, press freedom and the newspaper industry developed early in North Central European countries as a result of the Protestant Reformation. Rates of newspaper readership are still very high today in these countries. However, unlike the Liberal model, it is characterised by a history of strong party newspapers, and thus a political press strongly linked to the interests of distinct social groups often coexists with the commercial press (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 195-6).

Commentary-oriented journalism dominates the market and is accompanied by a growing emphasis on values of professionalism and information-oriented journalism. In the Democratic-Corporatist model, the media are seen to a large extent as social institutions under the responsibility of the state that provides support and regulation (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 74).

Table 2. Characteristics of the Democratic-Corporatist Model

Dimensions		Characteristics	
(1) <i>structure of media markets (level of circulation),</i>	high	(1) <i>role of the state,</i>	high
(2) <i>political parallelism,</i>	high	(2) <i>type of democracy</i>	consensus
(3) <i>professionalisation of journalism,</i>	high	(3) <i>type of pluralism</i>	organised
(4) <i>role of the state</i>	high	(4) <i>degree of rational-legal authority,</i>	high
		(5) <i>degree of pluralism</i>	moderate

The German press market in particular is characterised by a long history of mass media development as some of the first newspapers date back to roughly 400 years ago. But what distinguishes Germany from other countries of this group is that during the years of Nazi rule the mass media became a tool of the dictatorship. The current structure of the German media

market is to a large extent a result of the compromise adopted after World War II based on the representativeness of various interest groups, while guaranteeing political independence of the media (Konarska 113–14; Thomaß and Horz).

Until 1990 the media system in Eastern Germany was highly centralised and controlled by the Communist Party. This control disappeared during the unification process, but different patterns of media usage are still characteristic for East and West. As a result, today, the major media production centres are located in the “old” West, while newspapers of the former East are usually controlled by Western companies (Thomaß and Horz).

Following the data from the *Media Landscapes*, the German press market is the largest in Europe and presents the broadest diversity of titles. The German Publishers’ Association (Bundesverband Deutscher Verleger) reports that in 2017, the number of newspaper titles amounted to 327 with a circulation of 14,7 million copies (Konarska 121). In addition, German readers have a choice between 21 weekly papers (circulation of 1.7 million) and seven Sunday papers (2.9 million). Additionally, regional and local subscription papers ensure high levels of press circulation (329 in 2016), which is complemented by country-wide quality newspapers (i.e. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*) and tabloids (i.e. *Bild*) (Thomaß and Horz).

As a general trend, since the early 1990s the newspaper market in Germany has shrunk, which had the largest impact on the tabloids due to the growing popularity of online platforms offering similar content. However, the most circulated paper in 2015 was still *Bild* (with 10 million copies), followed by the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (1.1 million), the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (0.68 million), *Die Welt* (0.67 million), the *Handelsblatt* (0.42 million) and *Die Tageszeitung* (0.2 million) (Thomaß and Horz). The total circulation of printed newspapers experienced a drop of 11 million copies between 2000 and 2016, according to Röper (2016).

Since 2008, when the crisis started to be felt in the EU, concentration processes in the media market in Germany have accelerated even more. As a result, ten publishing companies reach a market share of approximately 60 per cent, while the five largest companies through a highly-diversified range of print-and other products acquired over 42 per cent of the market in 2016, according to Röper (2016). The “big five” are *Axel Springer SE*, *Südwestdeutsche Medienholding*, *Funke Mediengruppe*, *Du Mont Schauberg*, and *Madsack*, with *Axel Springer SE* taking the lead (Thomaß and Horz).

Local newspapers traditionally play a strong agenda setting role in Germany. Local and regional press makes about three-quarters of all daily press circulation, which is a result of the federal structure of the state (Konarska 121–22). However, data on the number of subscriptions reflect the wider downward trend (Newman et al.).

With regard to political parallelism, some newspaper and magazine publishers side with specific political agendas and reflect this in their editorial policies, even though they do not have structured links to political parties, for example, *Axel Springer SE*, publisher of the most widely circulated tabloid, *Bild* (Thomaß and Horz). Another problem is the unification of the content which is a result of the inner restructuring in the publishing companies driven by financial considerations (Konarska 127).

Polarised Pluralist or Mediterranean Model

In contrast to the two models described above, in Southern Europe a media system closely linked to politics has been created. The Polarised Pluralist or Mediterranean model that dominates in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain is characterised by low levels of press circulation, low levels of rational-legal authority, a tradition of clientelism, the existence of an elite-oriented press, and media instrumentalisation that accompany strong and rooted political organisations (Mancini 32).

In the Mediterranean countries, the commercial press is weaker than in either the Liberal or Democratic Corporatist systems. Newspaper circulation is relatively low and electronic media occupy the central stage. Political parallelism in the Polarised Pluralist model tends to be high with press often focusing on political life. Commentary-oriented and advocacy-centred journalism is stronger than in other parts of Europe. Also, journalistic professionalism is not as much in the centre of attention compared with the Liberal or Democratic Corporatist systems. As there is not clear differentiation between journalism and political activism, and political loyalties often take over commitments to professional norms and values. The state plays an interventionist role as an owner, regulator, and provider of funds for media outlets, though its capacity to regulate effectively is often limited with an exception of France. The instrumentalisation of the media by the state, political parties, and private owners who have political ties is also relatively frequent (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 73, 138-9).

Table 3. Characteristics of the Polarised Pluralist model

Dimensions		Characteristics	
(1) <i>structure of media markets (level of circulation),</i>	low	(1) <i>role of the state,</i>	high
(2) <i>political parallelism,</i>	high	(2) <i>type of democracy</i>	consensus/ majoritarian
(3) <i>professionalisation of journalism,</i>	low	(3) <i>type of pluralism</i>	organised
(4) <i>role of the state</i>	high	(4) <i>degree of rational-legal authority</i>	low
		(5) <i>degree of pluralism</i>	polarised

To sum up, according to Hallin and Mancini, a relationship between media systems and political systems can be traced. The press market can be characterised by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media as in the Liberal Model or as in the Democratic-Corporatist Model by the coexistence of commercial media and media with ties to organised social groups, as well as by a relatively active but legally limited role of the state. On the other hand, in the Polarised Pluralist Model, the state plays a strong role and media are integrated into party politics while commercial media are weaker (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 11).

While the United Kingdom and Germany are located in the Liberal and the Democratic-Corporatist models, respectively, Poland is situated in Central Eastern Europe. In CEE, media markets do not let themselves be easily classified into one of the three models within Hallin and Mancini's framework and it cannot be easily and unconditionally applied to fully explain journalistic practices and the relationship between the political and media systems.

Central Eastern Europe Media Model and the Case of Poland

Following a substantial critique regarding the limited application of the models to countries outside of Western Europe, Hallin and Mancini published an edited volume *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World* (2012) which incorporates a broader and more global perspective, including case studies of the media systems in Israel, Poland, the Baltic states, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, China, and the Arab world, as well as a methodological reflection on the relation and applicability of Hallin and Mancini's framework to non-Western media systems.

Further research was conducted, among others by Jonathan Hardy (2008), who analysed the impact of transformation processes on the shape of contemporary media systems and Roger

Blum (2005), who attempted to adapt and complete Hallin and Mancini's models by modifying the media market dimensions that they proposed. Finally, Dobek-Ostrowska applied Hallin and Mancini's framework to Central and Eastern Europe media systems in her volume titled *Comparative Media Systems: European and Global Perspective* (2010).

Zielonka underlined that in the Central Eastern Europe (CEE) region the position of key actors in media systems is specifically determined by a combination of local and global factors (*glocalism*) (6). Similarly, Mancini claims that with some major divergences among different countries CEE presents a model characterised on the one hand by external influences, but also by imitation attempts, and domestic conditions. Therefore, a concept of hybridisation, as merging elements from different models, seems to be more suited to understand media system in CEE (Mancini 26, 36). The result is, however, quite different from what can be observed in established democracies. The categories derived from the analysis of Western media systems do not easily apply to CEE countries, and are not sufficient to explain in full what constitutes journalistic practices in the region (Mancini 32, 36).

Indeed, the region is diverse and characterised by various media models as each country followed a different path from communism, transforming its relationship between media and politics – from strongly controlled ones in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to more liberal ones in Poland and Hungary (Rantanen and Belakova 306–07).

Nevertheless, certain commonalities and recurring features exist. One such characteristic is the volatility of the political systems in most CEE countries where political parties and leaders tend not to have particularly long political lives. After the transition from communism to market economies media ownership became concentrated in the hands of foreign media conglomerates which often transformed media outlets into a tool for the promotion of the interests of the owner or a certain political orientation (Mancini 28).

Without doubt, studying media in CEE challenges previously developed models aimed at explaining the relationship and differences between political and media systems. At the same time, exploring CEE is considered most fruitful when similarities and differences are analysed in relation to the 'East' and 'West' in a global context (Rantanen and Belakova 310).

Poland's Media Market

Poland represents a large media market in the CEE region, but it is still much smaller than in Germany or the UK. Similarly to the Liberal and the Democratic-Corporatist model, Poland has developed strong media outlets with some level of independence from political pressures and with a well developed level of professionalism. It also created a leading newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the only mainstream newspaper in CEE with a reputation of having influence among the international press (Mancini 30–31).

Historically, mass press in Poland started to develop relatively late compared to Western European countries. One of the most important reasons for this was the lack of the Polish statehood between 1795 and 1918. During the Polish partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the ruling authorities either strictly limited or did not allow publication in the Polish language. The journalistic profession started to emerge from literary groups, politicians, and social activists, the vast majority of whom emigrated in the nineteenth century to Western Europe, mainly France and the United States, where they were writing for newspapers addressed to Polish emigrants (Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 27).

In the interwar period, the Polish media system could be best situated within Hallin and Mancini’s Polarised Pluralist and Democratic Corporatist model.

The Polish press before World War II shared several features found in the press of Southern European countries, such as polarised pluralism, political and literary roots of journalism, and limited access to or lack of commercial and popular newspapers. Church-linked media, typical of the Mediterranean countries, played a significant role in Poland as well. As in Southern Europe, mass-circulation newspapers never developed. However, features characteristic of the Democratic-Corporatist model, such as “critical professionalism” of journalists linked with political parties, well-organised formal education in journalism, strong professional associations, and a relatively high level of journalistic autonomy, also developed in the interwar Polish press (Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 28–29).

However, with the communists taking over in Poland after WWII, the Soviet press model replaced the external pluralist model in Central Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s, following the collapse of communism, the Polish media system that closely resembled the Polarised Pluralist model began to undergo a deep structural transformation to an independent and free media market. The aim of the round table compromise in Poland was to create media which

should present “reliable and possibly full and objective information, express social opinions, hold authorities accountable, and protect civil liberties, contribute to democratic reforms.” They were envisaged to be based on freedom of speech and pluralism (Pokorna-Ignatowicz 31). Additionally, an intense process of privatisation, involving foreign ownership and the technology transfer from the West, competition, commercialisation, and tabloidisation facilitated an evolution of the Polish media system toward the Liberal model.

Three groups of publications emerged. Titles owned by the state were transformed into private and self-managing commercial enterprises operating in free-market conditions. Privately owned periodicals and newspapers published before 1989 continued their activity on the competitive market. New publications, such as *Gazeta Wyborcza*, which had appeared on the market before the first semi-democratic elections in 1989, constituted the third group (Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 30–31).

One of the key differentiating factors of CEE, including Poland, from Western democracies lies in the media ownership which, as a result of the transition from communism to market economy, involved a massive transfer of property from the public to the private sector. As noted by Zielonka, in many cases, this transfer was not transparent and resulted in growing ownership concentration in the region. With pluralistic markets becoming public and private duopolies, external media groups took over large part of the media in the region. They generated a transfer of Western technology and know-how to CEE, but also commercialised journalistic output. Consequently, the public sector has shrunk and fused with the private. Public television remained largely dependent on advertising revenues from the private sector, and no public subsidies remain available for the press (Zielonka 6-7; Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 31).

According to Dobek-Ostrowska, the Polish media landscape today is a product of these processes and can be understood as a hybrid of the Liberal and Polarised Pluralist models, along with a few elements of the Democratic Corporatist model and the country’s post-communist legacy.

Certainly it has many characteristics of the Polarised Pluralist model. The system is characterised by a small circulation of daily newspapers and the central position of the electronic media. The media, above all the press, strongly focus on political life, and external pluralism and the tradition of commentary-oriented journalism are important. Instrumentalisation of the public broadcasting media by the government and political parties is evident. Journalistic professionalism is at a lower level than in the Democratic Corporatist or the Liberal model. Relationships between the media

and political elites are characterised mainly by conflicts over the autonomy of journalism. The state plays a significant role as the owner of public radio and television (Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 49).

Polish media market offers more than 5,000 press titles both on national and regional level. Among well performing outlets are the main quality dailies such as *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita*, financial and economic dailies such as *Gazeta Prawna*, *Gazeta Podatkowa*, *Puls Biznesu*, and *Gazeta Giełdy Parkiet*, and some opinion magazines such as *Polityka*, *Newsweek*, and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. In the first half of 2009, the two largest national dailies were circulated in the amounts over 638,000 copies for *Fakt*, and 497,000 for *Gazeta Wyborcza* (“National Media Profiles: Poland”). *Gazeta Wyborcza*, launched in 1989, was leading as the top quality national daily for over a decade until *Fakt*, considered a moderate tabloid and owned by Axel Springer, took over. In the first half of 2009, the readership of *Fakt* reached 14.79 per cent of the market, while *Gazeta Wyborcza*’s readership amounted to 14.35 per cent. Circulations of the regional daily newspapers stretch from approximately 20,000 to 100,000 copies. The top regional newspapers are *Dziennik Zachodni*, *Gazeta Pomorska* and *Głos Wielkopolski* (“National Media Profiles: Poland”). The process of transformation of the media system in Poland after 1989 is presented in detail in Pokorna-Ignatowicz and Dobek-Ostrowska, *Transformacja Systemów Medialnych W Krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej Po 1989 Roku*.

Today, foreign ownership amounts to 80 per cent of the market, including many German conglomerates such as H. Bauer (operating in Poland as Wydawnictwo Bauer LTD), Verlagsgruppe Passau (Polskapresse), Axel Springer (Axel Springer Polska LTD), Norwegian Orkla Press (Presspublica). Agora S.A with an 18.3 per cent share of the total press market is the only among domestic outlets able to compete with the top foreign companies (“National Media Profiles: Poland”).

However, with the Euro crisis, foreign media owners began to withdraw from CEE. Their place has been largely filled by local oligarchs, who have different objectives. For them, media are not necessarily expected to generate financial profits, but to help their owners’ businesses and to enhance their political influence, which brings CEE closer to the Mediterranean model. Especially for new parties in young democracies media presence is the key way to win elections, by publicising and ‘selling’ their programs to the electorate through the media. This results in the powerful leverage that media have over the parties, but it also

tempts political parties to control the media for their own needs (Zielonka 6-7; Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 44).

Today, there are few media outlets that keep up a high level of professional journalism in Poland. Even though Poland seems to be close to the Democratic Corporatist or Liberal model in terms of journalistic professionalism, the tradition of politicised journalism is still deeply rooted in Polish society. Weak journalistic standards and a limited development of professional self-regulation resembles the Mediterranean pattern and reflects the fact that journalism in Poland, to a large extent, acts under pressure from the political and business world (Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 40, 43). Since the Law and Justice Party’s return to power in 2015, the polarisation of the press became even more visible, with the two main parties being closely linked to specific media which present two different and often opposing versions of the same events.

Despite criticism and limitations of Hallin and Mancini’s model, it still remains “the most well-developed analytical framework so far for understanding the relationship between media and political systems” (Hardy 232). As a result, media scholars apply and adapt the framework for their studies.

Due to their history and geopolitical status, the three countries under scrutiny in this research, Poland, Germany, and the UK, represent different state-media system relations. Despite its long tradition of partisan press, the UK belongs to the Liberal model, Germany can be categorised as belonging to the Democratic Corporatist model, and Poland, the largest market in Central Eastern Europe, resembles a hybrid model, based on the Polarised Pluralist and Liberal models, with a few elements of the Democratic Corporatist model. This constitutes an important basis for the further analysis of the discourse on the Euro crisis present in the press.

Today, there’s a tendency to mix the Liberal model with the Polarised Pluralist model in this region of Europe, and the media systems in Poland and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe are affected by the same processes of change as their Western European counterparts, including strong neoliberal tendencies (Dobek-Ostrowska, “Italianisation of the Polish Media System?” 49). The differences are becoming smaller and the emerging global media culture tends towards the Liberal Model that involves the homogenisation of media systems and their messages which I will investigate in the context of the reporting on the Euro crisis (Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems* 294).

One relevant question that I will investigate in this dissertation is whether the media–state relation has an impact on the way how the Euro crisis has been reported in the daily press. One of the results of the following analysis is that, in the coverage of transnational issues such as the Euro crisis, one can observe an emerging global media culture that presents a converging discourse. In other words, the discourse does not show clear differentiation that would correlate with the widely recognised models of media–state relationships.

IV. Methodology

This PhD research incorporates some of the findings I gathered as a project associate responsible for the analysis of the Polish press in an international project “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU” (further referred to as *The ECMC project*), hosted by the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford, and combines them with the findings of other project members and further analysis of a selected sample. The results of the project have been published in an edited volume (see Picard). The first analytic part of this thesis is an entry phase analysis of quantitative data gathered with regards to Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom. It thus relies on the methodology of data gathering designed in the ECMC project and aims to delineate the boundaries of the discourse.

The three countries have been chosen for the analysis due to their differing relationship with the structures of the EU as well as differences in the structure of their respective media systems. Germany is one of the Western-European founding members of the EU, its key driving force since 1950 and a leading member of the Euro zone (“From 6 to 28 Members”; Michał Krzyżanowski, “Brexit and the Imaginary of ‘crisis’” 7). Poland is a central eastern European country, one of the so called “new member states” that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 as a leader of the largest single expansion of the European Union – in terms of territory, number of states, and population – to date (Trichet). As the largest member state from CEE it often fulfils the role of a representative of the perspective and interests of the region (*Program Polskiej Prezydencji W Grupie Wyszehradzkiej*). Poland has experienced a sustained economic and infrastructure development since becoming an EU member and was an outspokenly pro-European member at the time of the analysed sample (Michał Krzyżanowski, “Brexit and the Imaginary of ‘crisis’” 7). Although Poland is not a member of the Euro zone, under the terms of the Treaty of Accession with the European Union, it “shall participate in the Economic and Monetary Union from the date of accession as a Member State with a derogation” (*Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (2003)*), which means that Poland is required by the Treaty to accept the Euro under specific conditions, however without a fixed target date. On the other hand, the United Kingdom joined the EU along with Denmark and Ireland in the first enlargement in 1973, after reaching an agreement with

France, that had previously prevented its accession (“From 6 to 28 Members”). The UK is a predominantly eurosceptic EU member, is not a member of the Euro zone and indeed has been granted a permanent opt-out clause, which stipulates no requirement to participate in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and consequently introduce the Euro (*United Kingdom: EMU Opt-out Clause*). These differing circumstances might have influence the impact of the Euro crisis on the economies of particular countries and could be reflected in different tendencies in the media coverage of the events and in the media discourse.

Additionally, the selection offered a possibility to analyse the selected primary sources in their original language without the need to consult translations which could affect the message and the reading of the texts. This is of particular importance for qualitative text analysis.

This empirical analysis will establish the main topics of the discourse, define the key social actors, and identify analytical and interpretative categories, which will be used for the in-depth analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Selection of Newspapers

The analysis will be based on primary material from the broadsheet daily press as selected by the ECMC project manager on the basis of different political orientations, with the objective of achieving a balanced view of the dynamics of the discourse on the Euro crisis. It will be limited to press texts with images being excluded.

The decision to use primary material from daily newspapers was done for two reasons. Firstly, there is ample evidence that in contemporary media landscapes television still, to a large extent, derive stories from the press and cover a comparable range of topics (see Picard). Secondly, the full TV coverage was not accessible to me which would raise the risk of important omissions in the coverage and consequently of the sample being biased.

Four newspapers in each country under analysis were selected for the study: the leading financial/business newspaper, two leading papers representing conservative and liberal views, and the leading tabloid. In case of the absence of a tabloid or lack of access to the archive, a centrist general circulation paper was selected to replace the tabloid. This situation occurred

in the case of Poland in which access to the archives of *Fakt* was not possible electronically, and therefore *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* was chosen as a substitute.

Taking into account the particularities of media markets in the selected countries, the following choice has been made for Poland:

1. *Puls Biznesu* - the only daily newspaper broadly devoted to business and economic issues. It is published by a Polish branch of the Swedish Bonnier Group. The average circulation of *Puls Biznesu* was 9,802 copies in 2017 (Kurdupski).
2. *Gazeta Wyborcza* – the leading quality daily newspaper in Poland, by far outselling others in the circulation size (a daily average of 110,948 copies in 2017). It was founded in 1989 and originally represented anti-communist political activists centred around the Solidarity movement in Poland. Its political orientation is centre-left. The paper includes numerous local editions across the country. It is published by the Polish corporation Agora SA (Kurdupski).
3. *Rzeczpospolita* – the second most popular Polish newspaper, with an average circulation of 48,881 copies in 2017. It was published for the first time in 1920 as a tool of the conservative Christian National Party. It has kept a strong conservative angle since then and by many is considered to be an ideological alternative to *Gazeta Wyborcza*. It appears every day except Sundays and includes a business section. It is claimed to be most influential newspaper among Polish elites and decision-makers (Kurdupski).
4. *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* – a daily newspaper in Poland created in 2009 from a merger of *Dziennik Polska-Europa-Świat*, owned by Axel Springer, and *Gazeta Prawna*. At its inception, it was foreseen as a competitor to *Gazeta Wyborcza*, therefore its political profile was more leaning to the right than of its left-liberal rival, resulting in a centre-oriented broad spectrum of views on its pages. It sold an average of 40,693 copies in 2017 (Kurdupski).

In the German media landscape, the data was taken from:

1. *Handelsblatt*– a leading German specialised business and financial daily newspaper, founded in 1946 and published in Düsseldorf by the Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt. It has a circulation of an average of 127,546 daily copies in 2018 according to Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern

- (“IVW”). Handelsblatt appears five times a week, from Monday to Friday and has been named the most often cited daily business newspaper in Germany (“German Online Newspapers and Magazines”).
2. *Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)* – is the largest German national daily newspaper with a circulation 343,540 copies daily (“IVW”, 2/2018). It has been published since 1945 in Munich. The editorial stance of the newspaper is liberal and generally centre-left. Read in Germany by 1.24 million readers daily, it is also relatively broadly circulated abroad (“German Online Newspapers and Magazines”).
 3. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (F.A.Z.)* – is a national centre-right newspaper, founded in 1949 and published daily in Frankfurt am Main. *F.A.Z.* is one of several quality national newspapers in Germany (along with, among others, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*) and among these has the second largest circulation nationwide, with 256,188 sold daily in 2016 according to the IVW data (“IVW”). It is also the German newspaper with the widest circulation abroad, to 148 countries. It appears six times a week, from Monday to Saturday. The Sunday edition is the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (F.A.S.)* (“About Us: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”).
 4. *Bild* - a German tabloid founded by Axel Springer in 1952 with a sold circulation of 1.58 million copies in 2017 (“IVW”). The paper is published six times a week from Monday to Saturday by Axel Springer AG. The Sunday edition is called *Bild am Sonntag*. It is the best-selling non-Asian newspaper and has the eighth-largest circulation worldwide according to the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (“World’s 100 Largest Newspapers”). Although it has been described as “notorious for its mix of gossip, inflammatory language, and sensationalism,” it is claimed to maintain a strong influence on German politicians and decision makers (Steininger).

In the British media context, the newspapers included in the data were:

1. *Financial Times* – a daily newspaper with a particular emphasis on business and economic news. Founded in 1888 as the *London Financial Guide* and published by Pearson in London, the paper merged in 1945 with its closest rival, the *Financial News*. It has an average daily readership of 2.2 million people worldwide according to PwC audited figures for November 2011 and appears six times a week, with its

Saturday edition called the *Financial Times Weekend*. In December 2016, print sales for the paper stood at 193,211 daily copies according to the ABC figures (Ponsfort; “Financial Times Annual Results 2017”; “Financial Times: About Us”; “Press Reference: The United Kingdom”).

2. *The Guardian* – a leading British national daily newspaper, representing liberal views. Founded in 1821, it was known as *The Manchester Guardian* until 1959. Its sister papers include *The Observer* (a Sunday paper) and *The Guardian Weekly*. In December 2016, *The Guardian* in print form had an average daily circulation of 161,091 copies. *The Guardian* has changed format and design over the years, moving from broadsheet to Berliner (Ponsfort; “Press Reference: The United Kingdom”). For its reporting on government surveillance, *The Guardian* was named newspaper of the year at the 2014 British Press Awards (Rawlinson; “History of the Guardian”).
3. *The Times* – a leading daily national newspaper based in London, representing conservative views. It began in 1785 under the title *The Daily Universal Register* and became *The Times* on 1 January 1788. *The Times* and its sister paper *The Sunday Times* (founded in 1821) are published by Times Newspapers, since 1981 a subsidiary of News UK, owned by the News Corporation group led by Rupert Murdoch. *The Times* is believed to be important in shaping London's elites' views of events and to be an integral part of the political structure of Great Britain (Nevins). It had an average daily circulation of 446,164 in 2016 according to ABC's data (“The Times: British Newspaper”; Ponsfort; “Press Reference: The United Kingdom”).
4. *The Sun* - the leading daily tabloid newspaper in the United Kingdom and Ireland and the second highest selling European tabloid newspaper. Like *The Times*, it is published by the News Group Newspapers a division of News UK, itself a wholly owned subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. *The Sun* has the largest average daily circulation in the United Kingdom of 1.5 million copies in 2018 (“The Sun - Readership Data”). There is the Sunday edition *The Sun on Sunday* and national editions are published in London (*The Sun*), Dublin (*The Irish Sun*) and Glasgow (*The Scottish Sun*) (“The Sun - Readership Data”; “Press Reference: The United Kingdom”). For this study, only the London edition was used.

Selection of Time Periods

The empirical material was collected within the scope of eleven periods representing major developments in the Euro crisis between 2010 and 2012 that generated the largest press coverage. The coverage selected for the study began seven days before and ended seven days after each major development.

These inclusive dates are:

1. 4 - 18 February 2010 – the European Union summit (11-12 February) relating to the role of European governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in any intervention to address the Euro crisis
2. 25 April – 9 May 2010 – Euro zone members and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agree to a 100 billion EUR intervention for Greece (May 2),
3. 9 – 23 December 2010 – the European Union Contract change (16 December),
4. 29 July – 12 August 2011 – the European Central Bank asks Italy for more austerity measures (5 August),
5. 28 September – 12 October 2011 – the Greek general strike against austerity measures (5 October),
6. 19 October – 2 November 2011 – the European Union Summit boosting the stability fund, extending new aid, and requiring banks to raise new capital (26-27 October),
7. 5 – 19 November 2011 – Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation and the appointment of Mario Monti as the Prime Minister of Italy (12-13 November). (Due to the largest coverage within the sample, this period has been selected for further in-depth analysis.),
8. 19 – 30 November 2011 – the European Commission releases the Green Paper on stability bonds and proposes to bring national budgets under the control of the European Commission (23 November),
9. 16 – 30 May 2012 – the European Union summit (23 May) to boost growth and balance austerity,

10. 18 June – 5 July 2012 – Spain formally requests assistance (25 June), Merkel calls the Eurobonds “economically wrong and counterproductive,” (27 June), the European Union Summit on Debt Crisis (28-29 June),
11. 8 – 22 July 2012 – Merkel’s affirmation of the need for adherence to budget targets and European monitoring (15 July).

In selecting these particular time frames the aim was to focus on periods in which significant developments led to extensive amounts of coverage. Sampling broader periods before and after the events allowed to capture the coverage which is related but not published on the very day of the event and ensured the inclusion of weekend editions that often add significant and extended commentary (Picard 272).

Selection of Content

The analysed material was collected by way of database keyword searches with the terms EURO and CRISIS, or their national linguistic equivalents. In Polish, it resulted in the terms EURO and KRYZYS (including all grammatical cases), and in German, EURO and KRISE (including all grammatical cases). The choice of these terms was based on test searches that showed they gather the largest number of articles, and the desire to avoid the duplication of articles that may occur by employing additional terms. The material was collected and analysed in original languages (Polish, German and English).

On average, only 30 per cent of articles returned by electronic databases were chosen for analysis. The remaining articles were evaluated as irrelevant and rejected due to the following reasons: too short for analysis (often only one or two sentences), articles about the crisis in specific branches (e.g. trains, advertising, car industries), not connected directly to the Euro crisis, specifically nationally related articles, (e.g. regarding Polish entry to the Euro zone, GDP etc. but not directly focussing on the Euro crisis), articles on the crisis in the US and not related to Europe (banking crisis reports on specific banks and rating agencies), stock exchange reports (forecasts, exchange rates etc.), articles on the EU's agenda (e.g. information on upcoming summit meetings but not relevant to the Euro crisis), information on internal situation in a particular European country which is not under analysis of this dissertation), or related specifically to the football championships Euro 2012 (on investments preceding and bankruptcies after the Euro 2012).

Search Results

The table below presents a total number of articles sampled in the three member states under scrutiny.

Table 4. The total number of articles sampled in the three member states under scrutiny.

Germany		Poland		UK	
Handelsblatt	730	Puls Biznesu	90	Financial Times	796
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	726	Rzeczpospolita	279	The Times	388
Süddeutsche Zeitung	626	Gazeta Wyborcza	192	The Guardian	574
Bild	198	Dziennik Gazeta Prawna	124	The Sun	138
Total	2,280	Total	685	Total	1,896

Number of articles by newspaper: Poland

685 news stories were selected for the analysis in the 11 sample periods from the Polish press. *Rzeczpospolita* represented the largest part of the coverage with 279 news stories and 40.7 per cent of all coverage. The second newspaper to give a large result was *Gazeta Wyborcza* with 192 news stories (28 per cent). *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* published relatively few - 125 news stories (18.2 per cent) and finally *Puls Biznesu* only 90 (13.1 per cent).

Table 5. The number of articles by newspaper: Poland

Name	Frequency	Per cent
Puls Biznesu	90	13.1
Gazeta Wyborcza	192	28.0
Rzeczpospolita	279	40.7
Dziennik Gazeta Prawna	124	18.2
Total	685	100

Number of articles by newspaper: Germany

Due to a vast amount of news stories found, a further sampling by day (evry second day) was applied by the German team³. As a consequence, 1,140 articles were coded resulting in a projected 2,280 articles in the German newspapers in the sample periods in total. The highest number – 730 articles - was recorded in *Handelsblatt*. *Frankfurter Allgemeine* published 726 stories followed by *Süddeutsche Zeitung* with 626. Remarkably, even the tabloid *Bild* with 198 published, on average, more than one article per day (Picard 273).

Table 6. The number of articles by newspaper: Germany

Name	Frequency	Per cent
Handelsblatt	730	32.0
Süddeutsche Zeitung	626	27.5
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	726	31.8
Bild	198	8.70
Total	2,280	100

Number of articles by newspaper: the UK

The total number of British news stories on the Euro crisis analysed was 2,074. The *Financial Times* represented almost half of the coverage with 857 news stories (41.3 per cent). *The Guardian*, with 625 news stories and 30.1 per cent of coverage, was the second one to discuss the Euro crisis. *The Times* published 441 news stories (21.3 per cent) and finally *The Sun* only 151 (7.3 per cent) (*The Euro Crisis Research Project Dataset and National Reports*).

Table 7. The number of articles by newspaper: UK


Name	Frequency	Per cent
Financial Times	857	41.3
The Guardian	625	30.1
The Times	441	21.3
The Sun	151	7.3

³ The detailed description of the sampling method can be foud in Picard (273).

Total	2,074	100
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The graph below presents the comparative distribution of news stories according to types of newspapers and countries.

Figure 1. The distribution of news stories according to types of newspapers and countries



It can be seen that the *Financial Times* (UK) presented the biggest share of news stories on the Euro crisis among the business newspapers (41.3 per cent). The distribution among the left wing oriented dailies was comparable – between 27.5 per cent for *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Germany) to 30.1 per cent for *The Guardian* (UK). Among the right wing oriented newspapers, the Polish *Rzeczpospolita* featured the largest amount of news stories (40.1 per cent). The investigated tabloids presented a relatively small share – 8.7 per cent *Bild* (Germany), and 7.3 per cent *The Sun* (UK), while the Polish centre oriented *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* features a significantly higher amount of stories (18.2 per cent). In the UK and Germany the crisis was thus an interesting subject for financial newspapers while in Poland it primarily attracted the attention of the centre-left and right wing media.

Codebook

The selected articles were coded against a codebook developed for the study. The codebook included 25 questions. The first 11 questions referred to the technical aspects of selected

articles, such as newspaper type, date of coverage, story impetus, source, topic, size, page and section placement, sources quoted, etc. The other main groups of questions referred to the roots of the crisis and who bore the responsibility for it, the possible responses, rescue measures and their consequences, the beneficiaries and casualties of the Euro crisis, the portrayal of the ECB and other EU institutions, the main geopolitical frame of the articles, and metaphors included in the depiction of the crisis. The detailed Codebook can be found in Annex 2.

Reliability Test

Due to the fact that the coding was performed by several coders assigned by different teams, a reliability test has been conducted. The reliability test compares the results of two coders coding 36 articles independently from each other. The choice of the articles was based on the newspaper and the length of an article, according to the following scheme:

Size of article	Type of paper			total
	liberal	business	tabloid/central	
short	4	4	4	12
medium	4	4	4	12
long	4	4	4	12
total	12	12	12	36

A reliability coefficient according to the Holsti Formula was calculated.

$$R = \frac{2 \times C_C}{C_A + C_B}$$

C_C = Number of common coding of coders A and B

C_A = Number of coding of coder A

C_B = Number of coding of coder B

The method adds together the number of judgments that are the same and divides this sum by a total number of judgments made. The Holsti formula for the sample of 36 articles from the

Polish press returned a value of 0.79, from the German sample – 0.71, and the British sample – 0.82. All of the abovementioned results fulfil the reliability criteria.⁴

Selection of the Period for In-depth Analysis

The initial quantitative analysis allowed me to scale down the very sizable volume of texts by identifying three “peaks” in the sample – the periods, which due to the importance of the events they discussed attracted the largest amount of coverage and provided the possibility of the most detailed analysis. The table below presents the number of articles per period per country.


Table 8. The number of articles per period per country

Number of articles per period					
No	Period	Germany	Poland	UK	Total
1	11-12 Feb 2010_Eu summit-Role of EU-Governments and IMF	116	39	127	859
2	2 May 2010_Agreement on 100bn intervention in Greece	334	81	176	1,472
3	16 December 2010_Change of EU contract	140	38	91	898
4	5 August 2011_ECB claims more austerity measures from Italy	162	73	142	1,019
5	5 October 2011_Greek general strike against austerity measures	232	72	168	1,277
6	26-27 October 2011_EU summit-Boosting stability fund, extending new aid	264	89	218	1,573
7	12-13 November 2011_Berlusconi's resignation - Monti's appointment	216	68	296	1,746
8	23 November 2011_EC Green Paper on stability bonds	194	57	141	1,416
9	23 May 2012_EU summit on growth and balance austerity, attention on Spain, UK governmental meetings	220	57	224	1,290
10	28-29 June 2012_EU summit on the Sovereign Debt Crisis	260	75	216	1,313
11	15 July 2012_Merkels affirmation of need or adherence to budget targets and European monitoring	142	36	97	855
	Total	2,280	685	1,896	13,718

The following chart demonstrates the distribution of articles per period.

⁴ A detailed description of the results can be found in (Picard 293–96).

Figure 2. The distribution of articles per period



The three peaks have been identified corresponding to the following events:

- 1) 2 May 2010 -- the agreement on the 100 billion EUR intervention in Greece,
- 2) 12-13 November 2011 -- the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi and the appointment of Mario Monti as a Prime Minister of Italy, and
- 3) 28-29 June 2012 -- the EU Summit on the Sovereign Debt Crisis.

Out of the three peaks identified the one that returned the largest number of articles is the period between 5 and 19 November 2011 pegged to Silvio Berlusconi's resignation from and the appointment of Mario Monti as the Prime Minister of Italy (12-13 November). Additionally, it was an important event in the development of the crisis as it marked the moment when the EU used its power to convince the government of an economically significant member state to its strategy to cope with the crisis and introducing the necessary reforms. This could have potentially a substantial impact on the further development of the crisis. Therefore, this period has been chosen for the in-depth textual analysis.

As in the context of Poland the choice of the ECMC project to substitute the leading tabloid with a centre oriented daily newspaper would not serve the purpose to deliver unbiased results, I have decided to exclude *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* from the in-depth analysis and thus narrow it down to a leading conservative, a leading liberal and a leading business dailies.

While the empirical material in this reporting period gathered a corpus of 1746 texts, the in-depth, qualitative analysis presented in the second part of this thesis was undertaken on a sample of 131 news stories limited to the days when the events took place (12-13 November) and enlarged by the coverage one day before and one day after the days of the events thus forming the so called sample reporting period. The sample period comprised thus articles

published between 11 and 14 November. After rejecting irrelevant articles the sampled returned 131 articles that were analysed.

The largest number of articles published in the analysed period (62) were found in the UK. 52 stories were published in Germany and 17 in Poland.

Table 9. The number of articles analysed by newspapers and countries

11-14 November 2011										
Germany			UK			Poland			Total	
	all	selected		all	selected		all	selected	all	Selected
Handelsblatt	14	13	Financial Times	34	28	Puls Biznesu	6	4	54	45
Süddeutsche Zeitung	30	16	The Guardian	25	17	Gazeta Wyborcza	7	5	62	38
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	26	23	The Times	20	17	Rzeczpospolita	17	8	63	48
Total	70	52	Total	79	62	Total	30	17	179	131

The Polish corpus stood out from other corpora of texts having returned only 685 articles, which constitute 29 per cent of the German and 35 per cent of the British samples. This tendency has been however observed in other comparative quantitative analysis (see for instance Krzyżanowski, “Brexit and the Imaginary of ‘crisis’”). The significant differences in the volume of articles referring to the Euro crisis can be assigned to the different overall volume of stories published by the newspapers. In the period selected for the in-depth analysis (11-14 November 2011), the search in *Gazeta Wyborcza* returned 216 news stories, whereas *The Guardian* published 1,258 (almost six times more) and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2,430 (over eleven times more). However, on average in *Gazeta Wyborcza* 7 per cent of all published articles were devoted to Euro crisis, while only 4 per cent in *The Guardian* and 2 per cent in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. This would then suggest that although the amount of articles published in Poland was much smaller than in the UK and Germany, the coverage of the Euro crisis was in fact relatively strong since the ratio of all articles published in the same period was the highest. There remains a question as to whether this is a consequence of different market structures or public interest and while this is an important subject for further academic research, there is no space in this thesis for a detailed investigation as regards this aspect.


V. Entry-phase Analysis: Delineating the Boundaries of Discourse

In this research, the aim of the quantitative analysis, in frames of the Critical Discourse Analysis, is to delineate the boundaries of discourse based on data delivered by a set of variables (for details see a coding sheet in Annex 1 and a codebook in Annex 2). The aim of this part of the analysis is to identify the main topics and key social actors in the discourse on the Euro crisis in the news stories under investigation, as this will determine the analytical categories for the further in-depth qualitative analysis.⁵

What do the articles indicate is the main fundamental root of the crisis?

The roots of the crisis were largely absent from the discourse in the Polish and the British press and were mentioned in only 7 per cent and 18.7 per cent of the stories, respectively. In Germany, about one in three articles (35.8 per cent) dealt with fundamental roots of the crisis, which can be considered to be a comparatively high amount.

Figure 3. The main fundamental root of the crisis



⁵ For further discussion of the quantitative results please consult Picard.

The press in non-Euro countries – Poland and the UK – identified mostly “starting conditions and the structure of the Euro system” as the root of the crisis (Poland: 39.6 per cent and UK: 38.9 per cent). More precisely, in the analysed news stories authors pointed to the incompatibility of one currency in relation to the fiscal and economic sovereignty of nations as the main causes, suggesting also that the Euro currency was a political project not based on economic foundations. They also expressed the opinion that the countries in crisis had not been economically or structurally ready for the membership in the Euro zone.

In Germany, on the other hand, national policies and developments (46.3 per cent), – in particular fiscal and social policies (33.8 per cent), and industrial policies and developments (12.5 per cent) – were most often seen as the fundamental roots of the crisis, followed by the policies adopted by banks and financial institutions (25 per cent).

These policies were also the second most common and a significant reason of the Euro crisis in news stories published in the UK papers (28.6 per cent). Political roots were pointed in the UK as the cause of the crisis in 13.1 per cent of articles. These articles variously pointed to the unwillingness of member states to transfer power to the EU, the ineffectiveness of the central European institutions, differences in political cultures, or the political failure in the countries with problems. Interestingly, the Polish press almost exclusively pointed to the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the Euro currency, as the fundamental root of the crisis in 16.7 per cent of articles and to national fiscal and social policies as a third factor (12.5 per cent).


In the non-Euro member states under consideration, the fundamental roots of the crisis were seen in the EU institutions or as a consequence of the EU laws and actions, in contrast to national policies, as was the case in Germany, which will be further reflected in the media discourse.

The roots of the Euro crisis have been an important part of the discourse and will be further explored in the in-depth analysis (Chapter VI) which will, in particular, discuss the structural flaws in the institutional design of the European Union and the Euro currency (the lack of common fiscal policy but also democratic deficit in the EU) as well as the weaknesses of European economies. Finally, false reporting of macroeconomic data by Greece was in the centre of the debate.

Who do articles indicate should bear the main responsibility for solving the problem?

The question of responsibility for solving the Euro crisis was relatively widely discussed in the Polish press, where 36 per cent of the articles pointed to this aspect. It was also widely elaborated in Germany and present in about half of all articles in the German press. However, only about 16.6 per cent of the news articles coded in the UK explicitly mentioned the responsibility to solve the crisis.

Figure 4. The main responsibility to solve the crisis



Of those, over 70 per cent of articles in the Polish press pointed to either the European Union or the Euro zone members as the main actors who should bear the responsibility of finding a solution to the problem. Similarly, in the United Kingdom over 70 per cent of the news stories identified the Euro zone members, the European Union or the European Central Bank (ECB) as the main responsible.


In Germany, most of the articles find the Euro zone members as a group responsible for the solution (35 per cent). However, compared with Poland and the UK, the responsibility was shifted to the countries with debt problems, which are identified in 20 per cent of news stories as the actors responsible. By contrast, in Poland and the UK, countries with debt problems

(Greece, Italy, Spain) are seen as responsible only in 9.3 per cent and 8.4 per cent amount of stories, respectively. Interestingly, banks and investors are mentioned in only a marginal number of articles in all the countries.

What do articles indicate should be the main mechanism for responding to the crisis?

Short-term responses were relatively widely discussed in the Polish press and mentioned in 31 per cent of articles. About the same percentage (33.1 per cent) of all news stories in the UK explicitly mentioned what the main and short-term response to the crisis should be. Even more than that - over half of news stories in Germany also discussed the subject (62.5 per cent).

Figure 5. The main specific mechanism for response to the crisis



The most common solution mentioned in the Polish press was the reduction of budget deficits (30.4 per cent), followed by loans from other countries (21.5 per cent). ECB loans and bond purchase (19.5 per cent) as well as the reduction of the national budget deficits (19.2 per cent) were the most frequent solutions pointed to in the UK press. Loans from other countries with


supervision (37.6 per cent) clearly dominated the articles in Germany, followed by the reduction of budget deficits (16.3 per cent).

Altogether the reduction of budget deficits was seen in all three countries as an important step to solve the crisis as well as loans either from the ECB or from other countries. Polish outlets gave relatively low attention to the supervision of the loans, while growth policies played a significant role only in the British discourse. Among other responses in the Polish press was the suggestion of the ECB buying debts, as well as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Investment Bank (EIB) loans. In the British press, one of the most important mechanisms suggested was the banking union.

What do the articles indicate should be the primary broader response needed to the crisis?

Long-term responses were mentioned in almost the same amount of articles as short-term mechanisms (32 per cent) in the Polish press. In the UK, only 25.2 per cent of the news stories explicitly indicated a long-term response. In Germany, almost half (47.6 per cent) of the articles addressed the broader, longer term response to the crisis.

Figure 6. The primary broader response to the crisis




The most frequently suggested long-term response by the German and the British press were structural reforms in nations with problems (Germany: 56 per cent, UK: 53 per cent). Austerity measures suggested included labour markets, education and health, and tax structures. Reforms in nations with problems were also an important recommendation in the Polish press, mentioned in 37.3 per cent of news stories. However, Polish newspapers focussed more on EU power over national budgets, creating the so called fiscal union, as a long term response to the problem (44.2 per cent), which is also a frequent suggestion in the UK (15 per cent) and in Germany (18.2 per cent). Only a small number of articles in all three national contexts recommended that countries in crisis should drop the Euro or that the Euro zone should be broken up. Among the nations that should drop the Euro currency or carry out structural reforms, Greece and southern European countries were mentioned most often in all three media contexts.

These findings are further supported by the results of the in-depth analysis (Chapter VI). In a short-term perspective, the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort has been crucial and sparked a vivid discussion. In the long-term, structural reforms in form of austerity measures in the countries most hit by the crisis were seen as inevitable, followed by the creation of the fiscal union which would harmonise fiscal policies of the member states.

What do articles indicate as the main benefit from the existence of the Euro currency?

Not many articles explicitly referred to the benefits of the existence of the Euro currency (Poland: 2 per cent, Germany 10 per cent, the UK: 1.8 per cent). Among news stories that pointed to the benefits, those for the national economy were mentioned most frequently (Poland: 75 per cent, Germany: 44 per cent, the UK: 24.3 per cent). However, the main benefit according to the British papers was the improvement for business competitiveness (categorised as “other”). The German press also mentioned the benefits for the European economy (nearly 23 per cent) and European politics (20 per cent) as important indicators.

Figure 7. The main benefit from the existence of the Euro currency




It was uncommon to find articles that clearly indicated the country or regions that have mainly benefited from the Euro, however when such topics were present, Germany was mentioned most often across the three countries and Polish articles also mentioned Greece, Russia and southern countries in this context. Interestingly though, the German press also places attention on the Euro benefiting EU member countries as a whole.

What do articles explicitly indicate as the main harmful consequence from the existence of the Euro currency?

Only a few articles addressed the harmful consequences of the Euro in comparison to those mentioning the benefits of the Euro currency (less than 1 per cent in Poland, 6 per cent in the UK, and 7 per cent in Germany).

Figure 8. The main harmful consequence from the existence of the Euro currency




When mentioned, the Euro currency is seen as harmful for both national and European economy in all three countries, by a large majority of articles – 80 per cent in the Polish press, nearly 80 per cent in the UK, and 65 per cent in German articles. The countries that suffer the most are, according to these newspapers, the EU countries in general and the Southern countries, including Greece, in particular. Polish articles mention only Greece and interestingly, the German press also mentions Germany in this context.

Who do articles indicate primarily benefit or will benefit (economically or politically) from the Euro crisis?

Large investors, speculators, and hedge funds (classified in the political and financial authorities category) is by far the group most commonly presented as the main beneficiaries of the Euro crisis in the UK (nearly 90 per cent). In Poland and in Germany, the results are split between one country or particular region (Poland: 62.5 per cent, Germany: 32.2 per cent) and private economic actors (Poland: 37.5 per cent, Germany: 44.3 per cent). However, as in the case of Euro beneficiaries, the main crisis beneficiary was mentioned only in less

than 3 per cent of the articles in Poland, less than 10 per cent in the UK, and 17 per cent in Germany.

Figure 9. The primary beneficiary from the Euro crisis




Germany was most often seen in this context as the beneficiary in all the three countries. Interestingly, the British press mentioned also the UK and the EU countries in general, and the Polish press included Poland. In other words, all the countries under investigation saw themselves as indirect beneficiaries of the crisis.

Who do the articles indicate primarily suffer or will suffer (economically or politically) from the Euro crises?

The sufferers of the crisis were a much wider topic than the beneficiaries. It was discussed in about 34 per cent of the news stories in the Polish press, nearly 45 per cent in the UK, and was the most frequent topic in the German press (64.3 per cent).

Figure 10. The primary sufferer from the Euro crisis




In all the three countries under investigation, one specific country or region in particular is primary suffering from the Euro crisis and this country is Greece (Poland: 50 per cent, Germany: 41 per cent, UK: 81 per cent). Private economic actors follow as second (Poland: 23 per cent, Germany: 30 per cent, UK: 12 per cent) and population is third (Poland: 24 per cent, Germany: 18 per cent, UK: 7 per cent) with slight variations in the values for each.

The southern countries, led by Greece, are mentioned most frequently as sufferers in all the three countries. Interestingly, in the German press, it is Germany that is mentioned most frequently as a single country to suffer from the crisis as well as benefitting from it. The British press also pointed many times to the UK as a sufferer. Only the Polish press did not see Poland as a sufferer from the Euro crisis.

What are the main geopolitical frames of the articles?

The dominant geopolitical frame of the Polish and the German articles is overwhelmingly European, with nearly 70 per cent of the Polish and 46 per cent of the German stories pointing to this conclusion. In the British newspapers, half of the stories were written from a foreign perspective. The foreign frame was also the second most frequent frame in Poland (22 per cent) which might indicate a certain lack of integration with the EU among the EU member states who are not members of the Euro zone at the same time.

Figure 11. The main geopolitical frame




The second most common frame in Britain and Germany was the domestic geopolitical frame (Germany: 27 per cent, UK: 23 per cent), which represents the amount of articles that were mainly focused on the impact of the Euro crisis in the UK or Germany respectively.

What is the main portrayal of European Commission/European Union/Euro zone institutions?

The EU is mainly portrayed as ineffectual in Poland (55.6 per cent) and the UK (63.2 per cent), even though at the same time it is seen as strong and determined (Poland: 14 per cent, Germany: 13 per cent, UK: 9 per cent) and central to the solution of the problem (Germany: 44.5 per cent, UK: 19.8 per cent, Poland: 16.9 per cent).

Figure 12. The main portrayal of European Commission/European Union/Euro zone institutions



The EU institutions were portrayed in a large amount of the news stories under scrutiny in the Polish press (54 per cent). However, most news stories in the UK, 91.2 per cent, did not include any portrayal of the EU institutions. In Germany, they were presented in only 28 per cent of articles.

This may point to the certain feeling of isolation by the British people, be it due to geographical, political or historical reasons, which have led to its perception of separation from the mainland Europe and less concern with the EU institutions as such that eventually resulted in the Brexit referendum. The UK is also more concerned with its economy in its relations with the EU than the political association, which has been underlined by the British government on many occasions.


Germany on the other hand seems to be a strong believer in the central role of EU institutions (44.5 per cent) which capabilities should be increased (14.3 per cent).

What is the main portrayal of European Central Bank?

Similarly to the EU institutions, besides being strong and determined (Poland: 16 per cent) and central (Poland: 13 per cent), the European Central Bank (ECB) is mainly portrayed in Poland as acting within its legal framework (40 per cent), albeit ineffectual (Poland: 25 per cent). According to the German and the British press, the ECB is central to finding the way

out of the crisis (Germany: 39 per cent, UK: 48 per cent), even though ineffectual (Germany: 10 per cent, UK: 39 per cent). In Germany, it is additionally described as acting at the border or outside its legal framework (Germany: 15 per cent).

Figure 13. The main portrayal of the European Central Bank




Even though the ECB was considered profoundly ineffectual and at the same time central to the solution of the crisis, only few articles claimed that it was lacking capabilities and should be therefore given more powers (Poland: 4.7 per cent, Germany: 9.2 per cent, UK: 3.9 per cent). These findings are also reflected by the in-depth analysis (Chapter VI) where the role of the European Central bank as seen as crucial.

What consequences of the rescue measures are foreseen?

The predicted consequences of the Euro crisis were very different in all the three member states. The German press presented a positive way out of the crisis with the Eurozone preserved (nearly 33 per cent of news stories) and subsequent deeper integration (15 per cent). In Britain, the forecasts were mixed. The main consequence was deeper integration within the Euro zone (33.1 per cent) which would be preserved (17.4 per cent). However,

some of the members would be forced to drop the Euro (25.6 per cent) according to the British press.

Figure 14. Consequences of the rescue measures



The most pessimistic vision was presented in the Polish press, where the main consequence foreseen was dropping the Euro (nearly 40 per cent of news stories), followed by the break up of the Euro zone (nearly 19 per cent).

The consequences of the Euro crisis have also been reflected in the in-depth analysis of the sample period and will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI. Dropping the Euro was an important element of the discussion but also further consequences such as the rise of euroscepticism were discussed.

Initial Findings and Conclusions

In this chapter, I have quantitatively analysed the empirical material in order to decode the limits of discourse and to determine analytical categories (main topics and key actors) that will be operationalised in the in-depth qualitative analysis in the following chapters. Of particular importance were the variables that delivered information about the roots and causes

of the crisis (variable 14), the responsibility for causing the crisis (variable 15), as well as short and long-term solutions to the crisis (variables 16 and 17). The benefits and harmful consequences of the Euro currency were present in very few articles (variables 18 and 19). Also the newspapers evidently focused more on those who suffered from the crisis (variable 21) than those who benefited from it (variable 20). Finally, the consequences of the Euro crisis were also a salient element of the discourse (variable 25). The results also point to the geopolitical frame (variable 22), the representation of the EU institutions in general (variable 23) and the European Central Bank (variable 24) as important elements to be investigated in further research.

Accordingly, the categories that will be further textually investigated in the subsequent chapter are the roots, solutions, consequences. Additionally, representations of social actors (including EU institutions) in terms of assigning responsibility for causing and finding a solution to the crisis as well as spatial and temporal representations of the crisis will be analysed along with their textual realisations.

VI. In-depth Analysis: Dimensions of the Euro Crisis

In the following chapter, I will move to close textual analysis of selected articles with the aim to anchor the data in the wider socio-political and economic context. I will conduct *a systematic, in-depth qualitative analysis* of media discourse, using different discourse analytical categories.

I will start with the description of the sample (section 1). Then, based on the data delivered by the sample, I will deconstruct the context for the main event under investigation (section 2 – the situation in Italy, section 3 – the situation in Greece) as represented in the newspapers. Subsequently, I will present the analysis of the discourse around the roots of the crisis (section 4), the proposed solutions (section 5) and the consequences (section 6). I will further move towards the analysis of the temporal and spatial representations of the Euro crisis (section 7). Throughout this process, I will support my findings with quotes from primary sources.

In subsequent chapters, the key categories applied will include: representations of self and others (us vs. them) and the positioning of individual and collective actors in the discourse (representations of social actors), as well as argumentation and legitimation strategies, including metaphors and metaphorical frames.

As in the context of Poland the choice of the ECMC project to substitute the leading tabloid with a centre oriented daily newspaper, would not serve the purpose to deliver unbiased results, I have decided to exclude *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna* from the in-depth analysis and thus narrow it down to a leading conservative, a leading liberal and a leading business dailies.

Sample Description

The coverage in the UK was dominated by commentaries quoting experts, mostly economists, in particular in reference to the condition of the Euro zone, the European economy and possible solutions to the crisis. Politicians were quoted when reporting on political events and policies adopted or to be adopted to counter the recession.

The most commonly discussed topic was the future of the Euro project, including the possible scenarios for the breakup of the Euro zone (e.g. Barker, Alex, Peter Spiegel, and Hugh

Carnegy. “Officials dismiss talk of shrinking currency bloc as 'intellectual' musings.” Financial Times, 11 November 2011). In this context, the future of the European Union, the democratic deficit and the poor construction of the EU and the Euro zone were broadly deliberated (Alexander, Douglas. “Our mature patriotism: The Tories are shockingly complacent about the Euro crisis. But it’s vital we safeguard our status.” The Guardian, 14 November 2011; Wintour, Patrick. “UK Treasury prepares for 'economic Armageddon'.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011; “What is taking place in Europe is unfolding far from its people and the democratic mandates of government.” The Times, 12 November 2011). Several articles such as Patrick Wintour’s mentioned the possibility that Britain would join the Euro zone (Wintour Patrick. “Britain needs a new EU policy for a new era, says Labour.” The Guardian, 14 November 2011).

The role of the European Central Bank in finding a solution to the crisis was broadly emphasised across all the analysed British newspapers (Inman, Phillip. “ECB pressure: What Europe's central bank could do to get the money flowing: if it were allowed.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011; Wintour, Patrick. “UK Treasury prepares for 'economic Armageddon'.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011; Beattle, Alan. “Special drawing rights enjoy rare moment in limelight.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011; Sherlock, Dave. “Italy turmoil triggers sharp swings in stocks.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011; Buckley, Neil. “Putin calls for ECB to step in to save the Euro.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011; Bone, James. “Super Mario takes charge to save Italy and the Euro.” The Times, 14 November 2011; Watson, Roland. “MPs urge Cameron to protect City interests.” The Times, 14 November 2011; Charter, David. “Germany's tough talking threatens to widen divisions.” The Times, 12 November 2011; Wighton, David. “Draghi's work has only just begun.” The Times, 12 November 2011).

Britain’s internal economic situation vis-à-vis the crisis and the political situation of Britain in the EU were another common topics discussed in the UK dailies (Somerset, Merryn. “Hang on to gold and keep faith in cash.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011; Rigby, Elizabeth. “Treasury prepares Euro zone rupture measures.” Financial Times, 11 November 2011; Stratton, Allegra. “Europe in crisis: Tony Blair: Breakup would be ‘catastrophic’.” The Guardian, 14 November 2011; Stewart, Heather. “Prepare for the worst, warns prime minister: Eurozone crisis hitting Britain hard, says Cameron, despite calmer day on markets.” The Guardian, 12 November 2011; Wintour, Patrick. “UK Treasury prepares for 'economic

armageddon!." The Guardian, 11 November 2011; Collinson, Patrick. "Britain's small investors suffer pounds 9 billion loss as European fund values plummet." The Guardian, 11 November 2011), including the possibility of a referendum in Britain and the issue of the redistribution of powers between Brussels and the member states (Wintour Patrick. "Britain needs a new EU policy for a new era, says Labour." The Guardian, 14 November 2011; Rees-Mogg, William. "Barroso's twisted logic is anathema to Britain." The Times, 11 November 2011).

Several articles were explicitly devoted to the description of the situation in Italy (Ashley, Jackie. "How Europe propped up the buffoon Berlusconi." The Guardian, 14 November 2011; Hooper, John. "Euro zone crisis: Markets and Italian MPs applaud arrival of 'Super Mario'." The Guardian, 12 November 2011; Jones, Tobias. "Life after Berlusconi" The Guardian, 11 November 2011; Dinmore, Guy and Giulia Segreti. "Italy races to install Monti." Financial Times, 14 November 2011; Sherlock, Dave. "Italy turmoil triggers sharp swings in stocks." Financial Times, 12 November 2011; Macintosh, James. "Bond vigilantes make a comeback." Financial Times, 12 November 2011; Roubini, Nouriel. "Why Italy's days in the Euro zone may be numbered." Financial Times, 11 November 2011; "Where next for Rome?" Financial Times, 11 November 2011; Chaffin, Joshua. "A hazard puzzle to solve." Financial Times, 11 November 2011; Bone, James. "Super Mario takes charge to save Italy and the Euro." The Times, 14 November 2011; Emmott, Bill. "Berlusconi's legacy: 17 years of standing still." The Times, 11 November 2011.), including a ridiculing portrait of Silvio Berlusconi in *The Times* ("My Week Silvio Berlusconi, The Times, 12 November 2011). The economic and political situation in Greece is mentioned as a background to the main events, in particular the possibility of Greece leaving the Euro zone (Rustin, Susanna. "Hope or despair?: The conversation: Can Europe pull back from the brink of total economic chaos?" The Guardian, 12 November 2011; Smith, Helena. "Euro zone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister." The Guardian, 12 November 2011; Stewart, Heather. "Prepare for the worst, warns prime minister." The Guardian, 12 November 2011; Boyes, Roger. "A banker in charge, sneers protester as academic forms interim cabinet." The Times, 11 November 2011; Chaffin, Joshua. "A hazard puzzle to solve." Financial Times, 11 November 2011). Often several the same subjects were repeated throughout the articles, structuring the discourse along the same lines such as references to roots of and solutions to the crisis.

Additionally, the rise of populism as a result of the crisis appears in one article in the Financial Times (Steinglass, Matt. “Dutch right clamours for return of the guilder.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011), as we will see later this subject was also mentioned by Vivian Reding in an interview for the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita.

The German articles showed similar traits. Several articles focused extensively on the situation in Italy, including long description of internal situation in the country under the rule of Berlusconi and its impact on the society (Bachstein, Andrea, Klaus Brill, Christiane Kohl, and Stefan Ulrich. “Mein Land: Arrivederci Silvio Berlusconi.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011; Woller, Hans. “Die große Verwerfung: Italien nach Berlusconi.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011; Bachstein, Andrea. “Ende des Spuks.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Schönau, Birgit. “Italiens erste Maske.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Krieger, Regina. „Italien will mit Monti aus der Krise.“ Handelstblatt, 14 November 2011). The situation in Greece serves as a background to the events (Kotteder, Franz. “Tristesse in Olivenöl.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Schümer, Dirk. “Irsinn mit Kurzzeitgedächtnis.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Lämmel, Peter. “Auch Habermas sollte sich an die Fakten halten.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Theodorou, Yannis. “In diesen Tagen.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).

The Süddeutsche Zeitung featured several long interviews on the future of the Euro zone and possible solutions to the crisis, such as the one with Beatrice Wede di Mauro, a German Professor of economics and an advisor to Chancellor Angela Merkel (Balsler, Markus, and Markus Zydra. “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen”. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011) or an interview with Otmar Issig, a former Head economist of the ECB on the solution to the crisis and the role of the ECB (Einecke, Helga. “Italien kann sich selbst retten.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011). The role of the ECB is also discussed in several other articles (Hulverscheidt, Claus. “Nicht mit meiner Zentralbank.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Kerber, Markus C. “Unabhängigkeit perdu.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 November 2011).

The future of the EU (Kornelius, Stefan. “Volkes Helden.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Kirchner, Thomas. “Der Auszug aus Brüssel.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 November 2011) and the democratic deficit in the EU (“Demokratische Rückkopplung.”

Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 November 2011; Wiedenfeld, Ursula. „Die Rache der Demokratie.“ Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011) are also present in the German sample of articles.

Given that the German media is aimed at domestic readers more than the British press, the internal situation in the country vis a vis the crisis and its impact on the political scene are discussed widely (Braun, Stefan. “Ein klares Signal für eine Lohnuntergrenze.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011; Connolly, Kate. “Mein Deutschland.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Steltzner, Holger. “Inflationsunion.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011; Bielmeister, Stefan. “Übertriebene Rezessionsfurcht.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2011; Goffart, Daniel, and Thomas Sigmund. “Die Scheinehe.” Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011; Delhaes, Daniel. “Die CDU bleibt die Europapartei.” Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011), including the structure of the economy (Bingener, Reinhard, and Timo Fräsch. „Der liberale Stabilitätsmechanismus.“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2011). Several articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Handelsblatt referred specifically to financial markets and their reaction to the crisis. The leading *leitmotif* of the articles is the lack of trust (Misstrauen) and insecurity (Unsicherheit).

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung featured a lengthy discussion held by the Nobel prize laureate Paul Krugman and a former Head economist of the ECB Otmar Issing on the diagnosis and solutions to the crisis (“In der Diagnose vereint, in der Therapie getrennt.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).

Similar subjects dominated the Polish press: the situation in Italy (Kowalczyk, Piotr. „Czas wyrzeczeń dla Włoch.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011; Lorenz, Wojciech. „Nowy rząd na kryzys.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011; Potaczała Maiusz. „W strefie Euro coraz gorzej”. Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011; Kowalczyk, Jacek. „Game over, Silvio i G-Pap”. Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011), in particular the appointment of Mario Monti as a new Prime Minister of Italy (Bielecki, Tomasz. „Ile wytrzyma Monti.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011), corruption in everyday life in Italy as a source of the problems (Kowalczyk, Piotr. „Tysiąc Euro łapówki na głowę.” Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2011), and the present situation and the future of the Euro currency in relation to possible solutions to the crisis (Mitraszewska, Agnieszka. „Katastrofa kolejowa w wolnionym tempie”. Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).

Gazeta Wyborcza featured an interview with Janusz Lewandowski, Commissioner for the Budget and Financial Programming at the time, where he spoke about the economic situation in the EU, the condition of the Polish economy in the crisis, the situation in Greece, the roots and possible solutions to the Euro crisis, and the role of the Merkel and Sarkozy duet in solving the crisis (Pawlicki, Jacek. „Bardzo słabe twarde jądro”. Wywiad. Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).

Rzeczpospolita published an interview with Viviane Reding, the then Commissioner for Justice and Citizenship and vice-President of the European Commission, on the future of the EU (a two-speed Europe), immigration, and the rise of populist tendencies in Europe (Lorenz, Wojciech. „Kryzys musi nas jednoczyć, nie dzielić.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).

Another interview in Rzeczpospolita with the Finnish Minister for European Affairs and Trade, Alexander Stubb, discussed the solutions and potential consequences of the crisis for the EU (Zuchowicz, Katarzyna. „Kraje, które mają kłopoty trzeba bardziej kontrolować.” Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2011).

The general economic and financial markets situation was mainly discussed in Puls Biznesu („Zmienność duża, ale trend wzrostowy”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011; “Teraz obligacje, akcje w 2012 r.”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011). As in Germany, the situation in Poland vis a vis the crisis was also discussed (Bojanowski, Marcin. „Minister finansów szykuje Polskę na kryzys.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011; Słojewska, Anna. „Złe prognozy dla Europy.” Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2011). Rzeczpospolita published an article by a renowned economist, Andrzej Koźmiński, on the impact of the crisis on the situation in Poland (Koźmiński, Andrzej. „Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).

A powerful metaphor of the crisis as a broom sweeping the political scene and removing inefficient politicians like dust appeared in an article by Jacek Pawlicki in Gazeta Wyborcza (Pawlicki, Jacek. “Kryzysowa miotła,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).

The topics present in the sample under analysis have thus largely covered the main topics identified in the quantitative analysis presented in the first part of this thesis and will be explored in detail in the following chapters.

Situation in Italy

The political situation in Italy and Greece constituted an immediate context for the analysis of the discourse on the Euro crisis in the given sample. In mid 2011, Italy followed Greece, Portugal and Ireland, and joined the group of countries hit by the debt crisis. Berlusconi's resignation followed a period of serious difficulties in the Italian economy.

Financial Times reported on the impact of these events on the European economy, compared them to a disease spreading across the body towards the most vital organs and quoted Jyrki Katainen, the then Prime Minister of Finland:

Like a *life-threatening disease* (emphasis added), trouble *spread this week from the Euro zone's fingers and toes into its beating heart* (emphasis added). The nation in peril was no longer a small, outlying state such as Cyprus, Greece, Ireland or Portugal, but Italy - the world's eighth largest economy, a founder member of the European Union and a country so deeply in debt that the funds required to save it would be far beyond anything yet amassed by Europe's crisis managers. 'It's hard to see that Europe would have the resources to take a country the size of Italy into the bail-out programme,' observed Jyrki Katainen, Finland's prime minister" (Barber, Tony. "Enter the technocrats: Political turmoil in the Euro zone", Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

Due to the growing debt, the trust and price of Italian 10-year bonds started to fall below the seven per cent level, which markets consider unsustainable – “the danger point breached by Portugal, Ireland and Greece before they were forced to seek bail-out funds” (“Italy turmoil triggers sharp swings in stocks”, Financial Times, 12 November 2011; „Nowy rząd na kryzys”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011⁶; “Italian yields ease back below 7 per cent. ” Financial Times, 11 November 2011). As one of the major economies in the EU, Italy was considered too big to be bailed out. On the other hand, its collapse would inevitably pull the whole Euro zone into recession, which was feared as “the greatest danger for the Euro zone” („Game over, Silvio, G-Pap”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011).⁷

With interest rates on its sovereign debt surging above 7 per cent, there is a rising risk that Italy may soon lose market access. Given that it is too big to fail but also too big to save, this could lead to a forced restructuring of its public debt of €1,900bn. That would partly address its "stock" problem of large and unsustainable debt but it would not resolve its "flow" problem, of

⁶ org. Polish: „zaufanie do włoskich obligacji państwowych zaczęło drastycznie spadać”

⁷ org. Polish: “Włochy są obecnie największym zagrożeniem dla strefy euro”

a large current account deficit, lack of external competitiveness and a worsening plunge in gross domestic product and economic activity” (“Why Italy's days in the Euro zone may be numbered”, Financial Times, 11 November 2011).

In order to avoid bond prices from further falling and to regain the trust of the markets, Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was forced to resign after 17 years in office, which was referred to by one outlet as an end of the so called “bunga-bunga era” in Italian politics (Polish: „zakończenie ery bunga-bunga” in „Game over, Silvio, G-Pap”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011).

Newspapers broadly reported the flaws and inefficiencies of the system built by Berlusconi, and described widely spread corruption, nepotism, and the Prime Minister’s frivolous lifestyle (“My Week with Silvio Berlusconi,” The Times, 12 November 2011). Italy under Berlusconi was referred to as “TV democracy, in which the cheap fiction of reality shows has become reality, “the Botox regime,” and “the media dictatorship” (Schönau, Birgit. “Italiens erste Maske.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁸

It has been widely believed that this „political tsunami” (org. Polish: “Przez Włochy przetacza się polityczne tsunami” in “Czas wyrzeczeń dla Włoch”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011) and a new technocratic government built by Mario Monti tasked with introducing economic reforms would calm down the markets („Game over, Silvio, G-Pap”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011).

In stark contrast to Berlusconi, Mario Monti studied in Milan and at Yale University and later became professor at universities in Milan, Trento and Turin. Before he became Prime Minister, he held the post of the president of the prestigious Luigi Bocconi Milan University of Economics. As an EU Commissioner for Competition and the Internal Market (1999 - 2004), he earned himself the nickname "Super Mario" and a reputation of a highly controversial man (Krieger, Regina. “Italien will mit Monti aus der Krise.” Handelsblatt 14 November 2017), particularly for his work against cartels hampering competition in the EU.

Equipped with the powers that the big businessmen would have called a license to kill, he declared war against these practices. That’s what gave him his fame and earned him the nickname of the “Hunter of Corporate Scalps”. Monti's victims were such powers as Microsoft, General

⁸ org. German: “Fernsehdemokratie, in der die billige Fiktion der Realityshows zur Wirklichkeit erhoben wurde, das Botox-Regime, die Medien diktatur.”

Electric, Volvo, Boeing, Volkswagen and British Telecom. When he punished Nintendo, he was called Super Mario, and the French President Jacques Chirac, called him a stupid lawyer for making it impossible for the French government to rescue the concern Alston with public money (own translation, „Czas wyrzeczeń dla Włoch”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁹

He was described as a “charismatic economy professor and former European Commissioner” („Czas wyrzeczeń dla Włoch”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011,¹⁰ „Game over, Silvio, G-Pap”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011).¹¹ Perceived by Italians as a “mighty anti-Berlusconi” („Ile wytrzyma Monti”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011),¹² Monti was believed to be recognised for his professionalism and qualifications in Italy and abroad, and respected and trusted in the EU and by economists and financiers across the world („Czas wyrzeczeń dla Włoch”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011 and „Ile wytrzyma Monti”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).¹³

Monti stands for economic and financial expertise, for education, good manners and little noise. Party political power games are for the internationally respected academic a horror, says his environment. Monti embodies another Italy that wants nothing to do with the Bunga Bunga era of resigned Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. He had accused him of “never really being interested in economic policy” (own translation, Krieger, Regina. “Italien will mit Monti aus der Krise.” Handelsblatt 14 November 2017).¹⁴

He was broadly believed to have the blessing of the Brussels elites as one of the most effective commissioners for competition and the internal market in the EU (Barber, Tony. “Enter the technocrats: Political turmoil in the Euro zone”, Financial Times, 12 November 2011) to keep the Italian economy from plummeting into the recession. Italian senators hoped he could “save his country from default, the Euro from collapse - and the world economy from depression (emphasis added)” (“National: Euro zone crisis: Markets and Italian MPs

⁹ org. Polish: “Wyposażony w uprawnienia, które wielcy biznesmeni nazwali licencją na zabijanie, wydał tym praktykom zdecydowaną wojnę. Jej zawdzięcza światową sławę. I przydomek Łowca Korporacyjnych Skalpów. Ofiarą Montiego padły takie potęgi, jak Microsoft, General Electric, Volvo, Boeing, Volkswagen, British Telecom. Gdy ukarał Nintendo, przewali go Super Mario, a prezydent Francji Jacques Chirac – tęym notariuszem za uniemożliwienie ratowania koncernu Alstom pieniędzmi z budżetu.”

¹⁰ org. Polish: “charyzmatyczny profesor ekonomii i dwukrotny komisarz europejski”

¹¹ org. Polish: “Mario Monti, ekonomista, były unijny komisarz ds. konkurencji”

¹² org. Polish: “potężny Anti-Berlusconi”

¹³ org. Polish: “Ma ogromne kwalifikacje.”

¹⁴ org German: “Monti steht für Wirtschafts- und Finanzexpertise, für Bildung, gute Manieren und wenig Lärm. Parteipolitische Machtspiele seien dem international geachteten Akademiker ein Graus, heißt es aus seinem Umfeld. Monti verkörpert ein anderes Italien, das mit der Bunga-Bunga-Ära vom zurückgetretenen Regierungschef Silvio Berlusconi nichts zu tun haben will. Diesem hatte er vorgeworfen, ‘sich niemals wirklich für Wirtschaftspolitik interessiert zu haben.’”

applaud arrival of 'Super Mario'," The Guardian, 12 November 2011). The Times saw his mission as "to renew Italy", and "to save Italy" (Bone, James. "Super Mario takes charge to save Italy and the Euro," The Times, 14 November 2011).

Subsequently, President Giorgio Napolitano, formally asked the unelected Mr Monti to take office less than 24 hours after Silvio Berlusconi resignation from prime minister's position and following parliament's approval of reforms demanded by the EU.

Mr Napolitano said Italy could not afford elections at a time of market crisis, with €200 billion (£172 billion) of debt maturing by the end of next April. He said the duration of the government would depend on its actions as well as the reaction of markets and European institutions. Elections must be held by early 2013 ("Italy races to install Monti", Financial Times, 14 November 2011).

In another article, the Financial Times also reported on the events in the following way:

A clutch of rebellious centre-right legislators caused Italy's prime minister to lose his parliamentary majority on Tuesday in a vote that prompted him to scribble on his notepad: "Eight traitors." One day later, Giorgio Napolitano, Italy's president, made Mr Monti a senator for life in a step that grants him a parliamentary seat and potential platform to serve as premier (Barber, Tony. "Enter the technocrats: Political turmoil in the Euro zone", Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

This move was also supported by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, who said in Rome that Italy "needs reforms, not elections" ("Euro zone crisis: Markets and Italian MPs applaud arrival of 'Super Mario'", The Guardian, 12 November 2011). Moreover, the Financial Times reported that the expected resignation of Silvio Berlusconi as Italian prime minister and the swift passage of austerity and reform measures in Rome were also welcomed in German political circles. According to The Times, the prospect of a non-party Italian prime minister such as Mario Monti was seen in Berlin as potentially able to restore market trust ("Germans confident of Euro's survival", Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

Monti's appointment was indeed seen as a response to the EU's expectations to introduce austerity measures and reform. The Times reported that "[a] technocrat dubbed 'Super Mario' was installed as Prime Minister of Italy last night to carry out reforms demanded by the European Union" ("Super Mario takes charge to save Italy and the Euro", The Times, 14 November 2011).

Nevertheless, it was pointed out that his democratic government ran the danger of the lack of political support and cooperation from other political parties. “[A]greeing the reforms may prove a great deal easier than implementing them, particularly for a government lacking a popular mandate” (“Draghi's work has only just begun; Wighton on Saturday”, The Times, 12 November 2011). Eventually, however, markets shrugged off the questions still surrounding the prospective Monti administration.

The spread – the gap between the yields on Italian and German benchmark bonds, which is a measure of the extra risk of an Italian default - shrank to 4.6 percentage points. The interest rate on its 10-year BTP bonds fell below 6.5 per cent - uncomfortably high, but well below the psychologically crucial 7 per cent level that has triggered a bailout for other troubled Euro zone states (“Euro zone crisis: Markets and Italian MPs applaud arrival of 'Super Mario'”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

However, the exclusively technocratic government of Mario Monti did face a problem of democratic legitimacy and a shorter life expectancy than one in which all or most of Italy's political parties would be represented (“Euro zone crisis: Markets and Italian MPs applaud arrival of ‘Super Mario’”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

German newspapers insisted that Italy had the capacity to get out of the crisis with its own strengths without a need to bail it out.

There is no fund that would be sufficient to save Italy. Italy can and must save itself. Any reasonable economist could write on a piece of paper what is needed to be done there in five minutes. If a credible announcement came from Italy that it is doing its homework, the financial markets would really respect that (*own translation*, “Italien kann sich selbst retten”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).¹⁵

The Süddeutsche Zeitung further argued that Italy did not need a bailout, which would in fact be harmful for the process of reforms.

Italy does not need financial help. The more countries rely on being saved, the less the internal pressure to reform is. Italy has considerable gold reserves. One should think about that before communitising currency reserves. Many things are going in the wrong direction. The discussions revolve around the size of the bailout, levers, even bank licenses. If the problems are not

¹⁵ org. German: “Es gibt keinen Fonds, der ausreicht, um Italien zu retten. Italien kann und muss sich selbst retten. Jeder vernünftige Ökonom könnte in fünf Minuten auf einem Papier aufschreiben, was dort zu unternehmen ist. Wenn eine glaubwürdige Ankündigung käme, dass Italien seine Hausaufgaben macht, würden die Finanzmärkte das wirklich honorieren.”

addressed at the root, no umbrella will help (*own translation*, “Italien kann sich selbst retten”, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2011).¹⁶

Additionally, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* pointed out that the crisis might have a positive effect on Italy as it forced the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi and raised hopes for the future improvements of the Italian economy and Italy as a state:

One of the strangest thoughts could come to one’s mind these days that the Euro turbulences also have a good impact. After all, the crisis did what the Italians have failed to do for 17 years: to remove Silvio Berlusconi from power. The longest ruling Italian prime minister ever leaves a record of horror. If ex-EU Commissioner Mario Monti is indeed at the forefront and not one of Berlusconi's protégés, the country gets what it badly lacks: an internationally respected economist who is incorruptible not only in his judgments (*own translation*, „Bank gegen Rudel“, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2011).¹⁷

Situation in Greece

In the shadow of the governmental shifts in Italy, the newspapers also commented on the political changes in Greece, which faced the crisis before it hit Italy. As the main country that was blamed for the crisis, the reports on the situation in Greece were present in the press stories and provided the background for the assessment for the events in Italy.

Greece faced the crisis in October 2009 when the information that previous data on debt levels and deficits had been falsely reported by the government was released and Greece asked the International Monetary Fund for financial help. This led to a crisis of confidence in the Greek economy, bond yield spreads increased and the cost of risk insurance on credit default swaps rose compared to the other Euro zone countries, particularly Germany (Kundera et al. 237).

¹⁶ org. German: “Italien braucht keine finanziellen Hilfen. Je mehr sich Länder darauf verlassen können, dass sie gerettet werden, desto geringer ist der Reformdruck nach innen. Italien besitzt erhebliche Goldreserven. Daran sollte man denken, bevor man Währungsreserven vergemeinschaften will. Vieles läuft in die falsche Richtung. Die Diskussionen kreisen um die Größe des Rettungsschirms, um Hebel, sogar um Banklizenzen. Wenn die Probleme nicht an der Wurzel angegangen werden, hilft aber kein Schirm.”

¹⁷ org. German: “In diesen Tagen könnte einem der seltsame Gedanke kommen, dass die Euro-Turbulenzen auch ihr Gutes haben. Immerhin vermag die Krise, was den Italienern in 17 Jahren misslang: Silvio Berlusconi von der Macht zu trennen. Der am längsten herrschende italienische Premier aller Zeiten hinterlässt eine Bilanz des Grauens. Sollte tatsächlich Ex-EU-Kommissar Mario Monti an die Spitze rücken und nicht einer von Berlusconis Protegés, bekommt das Land, was ihm schmerzlich fehlt: einen international geachteten Ökonomen, der nicht nur in seinen Urteilen unbestechlich ist.”

Similarly to Italy, Greece welcomed a new technocratic government of Lucas Papademos on 11 November 2011 which was expected to introduce reforms in the country. The Guardian saw in it a “historic page” turned by Greece “as a new unity government led by Lucas Papademos, a technocratic economist, was ushered into power after weeks of political turmoil that has cast doubt over the nation's Euro zone membership” (“Euro zone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011). According to the newspaper, similarly as in Italy, the former central banker’s government was sworn in “with a promise to implement the reform measures and spending cuts demanded of the country as part of the latest international bailout package agreed in Brussels earlier this month” and hence bring stability to the country (“Prepare for the worst, warns prime minister”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

The task would not be easy. Prime Minister Papademos has an ambitious agenda as he was expected “to get a controversial 130 billion Euro bailout programme approved by the parliament, convince international lenders to release 8 billion Euro in rescue loans, push through a 2012 budget that was tougher than any seen until then and enforce a draconian new tax law and launch an ambitious 50 billion Euro privatisation drive” (“Eurozone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

In this context, The Times emphasised the extraordinary qualifications of Prime Minister Papademos, whose profile also resembled the international experience of Mario Monti’s in Italy.

His credentials include serving as vice-president of the European Central Bank 2002-10. Like the current ECB president, Mario Draghi, he studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is credited too with having spotted the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US as early as 2005. His academic work has been on crisis management. When he got the call from Mr Papandreou, for whom he has acted as an informal adviser, he was preparing a Harvard lecture on policy responses to the global financial crisis. ‘He stands for a policy of confidence building,’ said Janis Emmanouilidsi, a political scientist (“A banker in charge, sneers protester as academic forms interim cabinet”, The Times, 11 November 2011).

Western education, prior links to EU institutions and academia were especially strongly emphasised as assets of the new Prime Minister. Accordingly, there were also high hopes and expectation associated with him.

Greeks are hoping that after days of high drama, capped by the intense political wrangling that preceded his appointment, the 64-year-old, US-educated and a former European Central Bank vice-president will exert a quiet calm over Athens's highly charged political scene and put the economy back on track. Almost two years after Greece's debt crisis erupted, there is a lot at stake. ... With elections due in February, the new government has approximately 100 days to implement painful reforms that will ram home the message that even in its near-bankrupt state the country is intent on remaining in the Euro zone (“Eurozone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

However, the press highlighted his weaknesses too as being in charge of the Greek central bank when the nation joined the Euro. As David Marsh, author of *The Euro: the battle for the new global currency*, noted in *The Times*: “He managed, somewhat remarkably, to sidestep any blame for his country's economic misdemeanours before and after joining the single currency” (“A banker in charge, sneers protester as academic forms interim cabinet”, The Times, 11 November 2011).

Moreover, in Athens, some associated him with the price rises that accompanied the introduction of the Euro in Greece. “When I think about Papademos, I think above all that a bottle of mineral water that cost 50 drachmas suddenly cost the equivalent of 170 drachmas,” as reported in *The Times* (“A banker in charge, sneers protester as academic forms interim cabinet”, The Times, 11 November 2011). It has been feared that these reservations could make it difficult for him to convince the Greek people to austerity.

On the other hand, some pundits feared that as a soft-spoken and thoughtful individual he might not be able to impose strong will. “He is neither a seasoned bruiser capable of imposing his will on Greek politicians nor a public presence commanding enough to extract more sacrifices from the hard-pressed masses,” reported *Financial Times* (Barber, Tony. “Enter the technocrats: Political turmoil in the Euro zone”, Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

Additionally, sceptics warned that he would not be able to achieve much within the short period of 100 days he was given ahead of elections due in February 2012. “Not since Napoleon will a leader have served a more pointless 100 days,” predicted the *Financial Times* (“100 days of solitude”, Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

In this respect, there are several parallels to the representation of the situation in Italy. Both countries installed technocratic governments, whose Prime Ministers were well-regarded

economists with prior experience on high posts in the EU and who had links to the most renowned universities in the world.

The main difference was that Greece was considered a small, peripheral EU member state that cheated in its financial reports and brought the crisis upon itself. In this context, Greece was also depicted as being the one responsible for its own problems and that it should, therefore, solve them on its own: “Many people say that the debtor countries have lived at the expense of others and should now cope with it on their own” (own translation; Balsler, Markus, and Markus Zydra. “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011).¹⁸

This view was further emphasised by Süddeutsche Zeitung, which claimed that it was a mistake to admit Greece to the Euro zone in the first place.

Greece is a special case in every respect. It has gained accession to the currency zone. It has also masked its mistakes afterwards in the statistics. ***It was obviously wrong to accept the country in the Euro zone*** (emphasis added) (own translation, “Italien kann sich selbst retten”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).¹⁹

In a similar vein, the Guardian heavily criticises the circumstances of Greece acceptance to the Euro zone. “There is no point in European Union acolytes loftily opining that ‘it was a pity’ ***Greece was admitted to the Euro. It was more than a pity, it was a crime***” (emphasis added; “A 50-year fiction is over. A new Europe must be built on the ruins of the old”, The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

While Italy was one of the world’s top ten economies, and therefore the EU was, on the one hand side reluctant to lose it, and on the other, reluctant to offer it a bail out, with regard to Greece, the possibility of giving up on the Euro currency and returning to the national Drachma was often mentioned, which was also evident in the qualitative analysis. As a result, in many reports, Greece was represented as an irresponsible spender and unreliable partner: “Greece has recklessly consumed all the benefits of being in the EU, from participating in the

¹⁸ org. German: “Viele Menschen sagen, die Schuldenstaaten hätten auf Kosten der anderen gelebt und sollten die Suppe nun gefälligst allein auslöffeln.”

¹⁹ org. German: “Griechenland ist in jeder Hinsicht ein Sonderfall. Es hat sich den Beitritt zur Währungszone erschlichen. Es hat seine Fehler auch danach in den Statistiken verschleiert. ***Es war offenkundig falsch, das Land aufzunehmen*** (emphasis added).”

Euro zone. All that has been left is a debt and a disastrous image” („Bardzo słabe twarde jądro”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).²⁰

It has never adhered to the Stability Pact and always ignored its problems. Then Europe admitted aid under certain conditions, and these conditions were never fulfilled. Now, the finances need to be cleaned up and solid growth needs to be created. (*own translation*, “Italien kann sich selbst retten”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).²¹

At the same time, to make the situation even more complicated while financial markets and EU leaders welcomed Papademos's appointment, Greece's anti-austerity protesters denounced the decision as “the embodiment of *the ‘logic of banks and markets’* (emphasis added)”, suggesting the reforms will benefit financial markets but not the citizens of the countries touched by the crisis (“National: Euro zone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

The peripheries of the EU are further infantilised and represented as immature and in need of guidance, as in the interview in Süddeutsche Zeitung with Beatrice Weder di Mauro, a professor of economics at the University of Mainz, a member of the German Council of Economic Experts (2004 - 2012) responsible for advising the German government on economic issues: “So more pressure as in parenting? ... Definitely rules that are enforced. So far it has been the case that the teenager came home too late in the evening and never did their homework. But no one admonished him” (own translation; Balsler, Markus, and Markus Zydra. “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011).²²

Roots of the Euro Crisis

The roots and the solutions, the past and the future of crisis, are the most important elements of the construction of the discourse on the Euro crisis. The way in which they are discussed in the media has a strong impact on the public opinion's view on the crisis. It is, therefore,

²⁰ org. Polish: “Grecja skonsumowała lekkomyślnie wszystkie pożytki z bycia w UE, uczestnictwa w strefie euro. Został z tego tylko dług i katastrofa wizerunkowa.”

²¹ org. German: “Es hat kein einziges Mal den Stabilitätspakt eingehalten und seine Probleme immer ignoriert. Dann gab Europa Hilfen unter Auflagen, die Auflagen wurden nicht erfüllt. Nun müssen die Finanzen saniert und solides Wachstum geschaffen werden.”

²² org. German: “Also mehr Druck, wie in der Kindererziehung? Weder di Mauro: Auf jeden Fall Regeln, die durchgesetzt werden. Bisher war es so, dass der Jugendliche abends zu spät nach Hause kam und die Hausaufgaben nie machte. Aber niemand hat ihn ermahnt.”

important that this debate reflects the broadest possible variety of various opinions among experts and politicians.

According to the research of David Cross, there are at least three perspectives in the social sciences that seek to explain how and why crises happen: systemic/structural, behavioural and sociological. The systemic/structural perspective argues that crises result from “unfolding events that enable destabilising forces in the international system to disturb the routine patterns, undermine institutions, and ultimately threaten the nature of the existing structure” (Davis Cross 27). This argument underlines the unpredictability of the crisis and the role of decision makers to find a way to reinstate stability. This approach assumes also that “crises are objective phenomena, which originate from structural factors built in a system and represent a threat to it. The structural/systemic approach tends to discount the role of the human perception and reaction to events in understanding the causes of crises” (Davis Cross 27).

The behavioural approach, on the other hand, prioritises the behaviour of individuals as they relate to the system around them. It emphasises individual cost calculation and scientific measurements of events that led to the crisis assuming, at the same time, that on this basis there is a measurable point at which an event becomes a crisis. Similarly to the systemic approach, the behaviouralist approach tends to undermine the complex social and cultural processes in the construction of crises (Davis Cross 28).

A third major perspective on crises draws upon social constructivism and “subjectively perceived” nature of a crisis. It assumes that what brings crises into existence are shared narratives. Within the sociological perspective, the question of which part of society plays the most crucial role in the construction of the crisis becomes central. Classic Marxist theories tend to emphasise the power of elites in creating crises to serve their own purposes and to draw public attention away from the real issues of concern. From this elite perspective, the media echo elite-constructed narratives. However, interest groups also play a role in constructing crises. Contemporary crises in particular seem to have a heavily media driven component whether the crisis emphasises the view of elites, the regular public or interest groups, in most cases an event comes to be defined as a crisis for the first time in news coverage (Davis Cross 29-30).

Economists are divided as regards the causes and methods of getting out of crises. For some a crisis is a part of a self-regulating mechanisms of the market, while for others, on the

contrary, it is a result of limiting market's self-regulating mechanism (Kundera et al. 11). The various common explanations in academic literature for the emergence of the Euro crisis comprise three scenarios. The first argument suggests that the Euro crisis was a part of the 2008 global economic crisis and thus its roots can be traced back to the fragile structure of the global financial system. It underlines inherent flaws of market fundamentalism – the belief that markets are naturally efficient and governments should not interfere in their forces – which made the financial crisis in Europe possible due to high level of deregulation over the decades. The argument assumes that the nature of the financial system has been deeply problematic since the 1980s when market fundamentalism became the philosophy guiding economic policy of Ronald Reagan and Margharet Thatcher (Davis Cross 163-5). In short, this perspective argues that neoliberalism was the problem.

A second argument highlights the flaws in the design of the Euro currency itself that was inevitably leading toward a crisis. This second perspective, which is common among economists as well as some political scientists and politicians, focuses on institutional design flaws in the initial setup of the monetary union and suggests that this was the root cause of the crisis for Europe. There are two strands to this perspective. The first one argues that (1) the core and periphery member states were too imbalanced when they adopted the Euro and, the second one that (2) the structure of the monetary union has built-in problems in its design. Proponents of this view argue that a serious currency crisis was inevitable. Frequently mentioned problems include: (1) no common responsibility for the public debt, (2) banking system remained national while the monetary union was supranational, (3) no lender of last resort, and (4) weak mechanisms for enforcing fiscal discipline in the member states (Davis Cross 166–68).

Similarly, in the opinion of Kundera, the structural factors of the crisis arise from the structure of the economies of Member States, their flawed economic policies and the development of the EU integration. The roots include: firstly, the structural imbalance in the world economy, where certain countries achieve consistently a positive balance of payments and increase reserves while others remain in negative; secondly, these imbalances are present also within the EU where central Member States developed a surplus in foreign trade (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium) while peripheries record a deficit (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland but also France and Italy); thirdly, the Euro zone crisis is the crisis of the excessive public debt, and fourthly, institutional weakness of the EU and its dysfunctional

economic mechanism based on a centralised monetary policy and decentralised fiscal policies of the individual Member State, as well as the position of the European Central Bank, which lacks the powers of being the lender of last resort. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the crisis is a result of faulty political decisions accepted in the Euro zone countries which did not fulfil the criteria (Kundera 34–38; Kundera et al. 233–37).

Thus the crisis has its roots in structural factors arising from the weakness of the economies of the Member States but also in flawed economic policies, especially in the banking sector. Many of the causes are also rooted in the way the EU integration developed (Kundera 154).

The third perspective recognises Greece's economy and poor governance as the main problem. However, although the economic problems were indeed centred on Greece, the crisis developed momentum when a general crisis of confidence in the entire European economy was created due to a variety of other weaknesses surfaced in other member states (Davis Cross 163–64, 173, 223).

As illustrated by the quantitative analysis in this thesis, the roots of the Euro crisis were addressed in only about 7 per cent of the news stories in the selected sample of the Polish press, in 18.7 per cent in the British press and in 35.8 per cent of press stories analysed in the German sample. Altogether, the roots of the crisis occurred in about 20 per cent of articles in the sample. It is therefore important to analyse how they were constructed and represented.

Additional questions in this chapter are (1) whether and, if so, which of the above three perspectives is the one mostly present in the press reports and (2) whether the media amplify the crisis narrative of south-north division. It is also necessary to pose the question of why the roots of the crisis were present only in so few stories and absent from so many, and what consequences this has for the whole discourse. According to Van Leeuwen, “[t]he representations of social practices ... include or exclude social actors (and actions) to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended. Some of the exclusions may be “innocent,” details which readers are assumed to know already, or which are deemed irrelevant to them; others tie in closely to the propaganda strategies” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 28). Therefore, exclusion has rightly been an important aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis as the decision not to mention a certain event or action usually has a purpose in discourse. A special attention will be given to exclusion as a legitimisation strategy when talking about the roots of the crisis.

In the sample under scrutiny, one direct cause of the Euro crisis is seen in the violation of the rules of the Stability Pact that led to the financial markets losing confidence in the economies of particular countries (“Violation of stability pact first caused crisis of confidence”, Financial Times, 14 November 2011; “Barroso's twisted logic is anathema to Britain”, The Times, 11 November 2011) as is also the case in the following quotation in The Times:

The big problem was that the rules designed to prevent governments building up dangerous levels of debt were flagrantly broken, by nations including Germany (emphasis added). The rules can be toughened and automatic sanctions introduced for breaches. This would reduce the likelihood of future problems without Euro zone members ceding much more fiscal autonomy than they did under the original Maastricht treaty (“The solution to the Euro crisis lies in Alabama”, The Times, 14 November 2011).

However, more fundamental reasons were found in the faulty construction of the currency union and the democratic deficit of the European Union as a whole. On 12 November 2011, the Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published an interview with a Nobel Prize Laureate in economics, Paul Krugman, and a former chief economist of the European Central Bank (ECB), Otmar Issing, in which they both agree on the structural roots of the Euro crisis. Various aspects of the construction of the Euro zone were pointed out in this context.

Both Krugman and Issing diagnose the structural problem of the lack of common guidelines and regulations as well as the diverse strengths of member states' economies.

The Euro crisis is not just a debt problem for individual countries, but ultimately a problem for the whole Euro zone ... That is precisely the problem when you share the currency but go separate ways in politics - and when the countries that share the currency vary more than is required for a stable monetary union (own translation, „In der Diagnose vereint, in der Therapie getrennt“, Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).²³

Jose Manuel Barroso, then President of the European Commission, admitted in The Times that the crisis of the Euro currency originated in a construction which did not take into account the level of the interdependence of EU member states. The relevant political arrangements were not in place and as a result Europe was much too closely integrated

²³ org. German: “Wenigstens die Diagnose fällt den weisesten Wissenschaftlern der Wirtschaftslehre leicht. Dass die Euro-Krise nicht nur ein Verschuldungsproblem einzelner Euroländer, sondern letztlich ein Problem des Währungsraums ist ... Das sei eben das Problem, wenn man die Währung teilt, in der Politik aber getrennte Wege gehe - und wenn die Länder, die sich die Währung teilen, stärker variieren als für eine stabile Währungsunion erforderlich.”

economically, while there is too little democratic independence of the Union as a whole (“Barroso's twisted logic is anathema to Britain”, The Time, 11 November 2011).

The Polish Gazeta Wyborcza likewise pointed to the “construction failures of the single currency which is lacking support from the common budgetary policy” (own translation, „Bardzo słabe twarde jądro”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).²⁴ On the other hand, the German economic daily Handelsblatt drew attention to the fact that the crucial elements of the common currency have always been missing and member states did not follow the rules:

Essential elements of a functioning monetary union were missing (emphasis added). The majority of Member States did not fulfil the conditions laid down by the agreement. It was promised to remedy the institutional deficits in the further course and to reduce the overdraft. That was, however, not ensured. The project was a bet against the Bundesbank and economics, against previous experience and European common sense (own translation, „Die deformierte Kultur“, Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).²⁵

In this way, the structural problems of the Euro currency exposed the democratic deficit of the EU -- a part of a wider crisis of the European Union as a political project which faces a difficulty in reaching common political decisions due to different aims related to the membership by different member states, as The Guardian claims (“Our mature patriotism”, The Guardian, 14 November 2011). This became seen as the main root of the current crisis -- “left and right, the accusation of a democratic deficit is heard across the EU (“Our mature patriotism”, The Guardian, 14 November 2011). Additionally, in Süddeutsche Zeitung the deputy of the German FDP, Hartfrid Wolff, claimed that a growing European economic integration has overstretched the overall democracy in the institutional fabric of the EU long before the debt crisis of the Euro zone.

Indeed long before the debt crisis, growing European integration had weakened rather than strengthened democracy (emphasis added). Above all, the power accumulation in the European Council, which consists solely of representatives of the governments, complains Wolff. Here an

²⁴ org. Polish: “*Wady konstrukcyjne wspólnej waluty* (emphasis added) pozbawionej wsparcia we wspólnej polityce budżetowej.”

²⁵ org. German: “*Wesentliche Elemente einer funktionsfähigen Währungsunion fehlten* (emphasis added). Die Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten erfüllte nicht die vertraglich festgelegten Voraussetzungen. Man versprach zwar, die institutionellen Defizite im weiteren Verlauf zu beheben und die Überschuldung abzubauen. Sicher war das nicht. Das Projekt glich einer Wette gegen die Bundesbank und die Wissenschaft, gegen bisherige Erfahrungen und den europäischen Common Sense.”

‘over-legislative’ emerged, which diminished national parliaments. ‘A single federal minister with his colleagues at the European level can enforce guidelines, which are binding and must be transposed into the national legal systems’ (own translation, „Demokratische Rückkopplung. Vorstoß aus der FDP für Reform der EU-Verfassung“, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 November 2011).²⁶

Handelsblatt goes even further to say that in order to create a united Europe the principles of democracy had to be given up such as the symmetry between the executive and legislative branches. This ultimately resulted in the EU becoming an elite project.

It is not capitalism that has expropriated democracy. Democracy itself has abandoned some of its own principles so that Europe could be created (emphasis added). In the EU, the decisions are taken asymmetrically. The elected national governments have significantly more power in European affairs than the elected European Parliament. The EU Commissioners appointed by the Heads of states and governments are more important than the elected national European politicians. For years, this was justified with the claim that Europe was an *elite project* (emphasis added). If you had asked a citizen, he/she would have said yes neither to the European Union nor to the Euro. Only because there were visionaries who did not rely on majorities has Europe made any progress (own translation, „Die Rache der Demokratie“, Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).²⁷

One of the problems that was very often underlined was the failure to, or choice not to, use democratic tools to consult the citizens or ask for their decision in the democratic vote. Handelsblatt claims that “it has been included in the European tone not to ask people when it comes to Europe (own translation)” („Die Rache der Demokratie“, Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).²⁸ In one interview, Ursula Weidenfeld, a German business journalist, says: “It is determined by the fact that the great Europeans among European politicians have never

²⁶ Org. German: “*Doch lange vor der Schuldenkrise habe die wachsende europäische Integration die Demokratie geschwächt statt gestärkt* (emphasis added). Vor allem die Machtballung im Europäischen Rat, der allein aus Vertretern der Regierungen besteht, beklagt Wolff. Hier sei eine „Über-Legislative“ entstanden, welche die nationalen Parlamente einenge. „Ein einzelner Bundesminister kann mit seinen Fachkollegen auf europäischer Ebene Richtlinien durchsetzen, die bindend in nationales Recht umgesetzt werden müssen.“

²⁷ org. German: “*Es ist nicht der Kapitalismus, der die Demokratie enteignet hat. Die Demokratie selbst hat eines ihrer eigenen Prinzipien preisgegeben, damit Europa überhaupt entstehen konnte* (emphasis added). In EU Europa wird asymmetrisch entschieden. Die gewählten nationalen Regierungen verfügen über deutlich mehr Macht in Europa-Angelegenheiten als das gewählte europäische Parlament. Die von den Staats- und Regierungschefs eingesetzten EU-Kommissare sind bedeutender als die gewählten nationalen Europa-Politiker. Jahrelang wurde das mit der These gerechtfertigt, dass Europa ein *Elitenprojekt* (emphasis added) sei. Wenn man den Bürger gefragt hätte, hätte es weder ein Ja zur Europäischen Union gegeben noch eines zum Euro. Nur weil es Visionäre gegeben habe, die nicht auf Mehrheiten angewiesen waren, sei Europa vorangekommen.”

²⁸ org. German: “Man könnte aber auch auf dem Standpunkt stehen, dass es nur zum europäischen Ton gezählt hat, die Menschen lieber nicht zu fragen, wenn es um Europa geht.”

trusted the many small Europeans to decide in a European way” (*own translation*, „Die Rache der Demokratie“, Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).²⁹ She further argues that political elites have been looking for ways to justify the lack of democratic accountability by means of the discourse of the inevitability and unavailability of the European project in order to embrace the peace of the continent.

Although Europe's Union is made up of democratic countries, Europe itself has always functioned in a democratic way up to a certain extent (emphasis added). Most of the political decisions were made without seeking the vote of the electors. “Europe is a question of war and peace.” “If the Euro dies, Europe dies.” With such martial sayings the destiny of Europe was determined. *Europe was rhetorically removed from the sphere of democratic decisions* (emphasis added, *own translation*, „Die Rache der Demokratie“, Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).³⁰

The Times too noticed that decisions in Brussels seemed to be made far from the European voters and the democratic mandates of member states. “It is taking power from the people and is handing it to unelected people who use words such as neo-functionalism at dinner parties” (“Politics and the Crisis”, The Times, 12 November 2011).

Indirectly, The Guardian suggested that structurally, the Euro project was designed to serve the European elites:

The Euro project meant huge transfers from one economy to another. ... And it assumed that, in the end, power would be held by the central bankers and commissioners. The European Parliament has never managed to break through to become, as it should be, the dominant part of the EU structure. So, far from genuine vigorous democracy being strengthened, it was too often subtly undermined by a new elite of “good Europeans” (“How Europe propped up the buffoon Berlusconi”, The Guardian, 14 November 2011).

Consequently, what is suggested is that one way to bring back democracy and democratic legitimacy to the EU is by asking citizens directly for their opinion through referenda. However, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quotes the German philosopher, Juergen

²⁹ org. German: “Es wird dadurch bestimmt, dass die großen Europäer unter Europas Politikern den vielen kleinen Europäern noch nie zugetraut haben, europäisch zu entscheiden.”

³⁰ org. German: “*Europas Union besteht zwar aus demokratischen Ländern, doch Europa selbst funktioniert seit jeher nur eingeschränkt demokratisch* (emphasis added). Die meisten der politischen Entscheidungen wurden getroffen, ohne das Votum der Wahlbürger dafür einzuholen. ‘Europa ist eine Frage von Krieg und Frieden.’ ‘Stirbt der Euro, stirbt Europa.’ Mit solchen martialischen Sprüchen wurde das Schicksalhafte Europas beschworen. *Europa wurde rhetorisch der Sphäre schnöder demokratischer Abstimmungen enthoben* (emphasis added).”

Habermas, questioning the efficiency and adequacy of referenda in all situations, especially complex economic questions. Habermas suggests that a referendum is not necessarily the best tool to bring back the democratic legitimacy to the EU.

The contradictory attitude of the Greek population - yes to the Euro, no to the austerity package - shows the dubiousness of referenda, which result in very different outcomes depending on the way the question is asked (emphasis added). A plebiscite may be useful for manageable local problems to involve all stakeholders in concrete decision-making. They are not suitable for such complex questions as the membership of Greece to the Euro area and the associated sacrifices (own translation, „Auch Habermas sollte sich an die Fakten halten.“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011)³¹.

The democratic deficit of the EU is explained by the Guardian with the weakness of European democracies for which the purpose of joining the EU was to be a guarantee of the political order which implicitly underlines the exceptionalism of old British democracy and statehood.

All round Europe, democracies are still young and often weak: Greece, with the shadow of the colonels; Portugal and Spain, whose aged fascist leaders were still there in living memory; never mind the new European nations emerging from communism (“How Europe propped up the buffoon Berlusconi”, The Guardian, 14 November 2011).

On the other hand, for others, the EU was a purely strategic and economic endeavour. As claimed in The Guardian, for the generation of fifty-sixty year olds in Britain, a primary cause that resonated emotionally and provided rationale to join the EU was keeping peace in Europe. Later, that emotional cause was complemented by a more rational one: “that *being part of Europe would help reverse Britain's post-war decline and boost prosperity* (emphasis added)” (“Our mature patriotism”, The Guardian, 14 November 2011).

Handelsblatt also reminded its readers about the economic roots of the EU, which was created after the Second World War as an economic community based on principle of liberalism, in the belief that countries who traded together would not go to war against each

³¹ org. German: “*Die widersprüchliche Haltung der griechischen Bevölkerung - Ja zum Euro, Nein zum Sparpaket - zeigt die Fragwürdigkeit von Referenden, die bei ein und demselben Problemkomplex je nach Fragestellung zu ganz unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen führen* (emphasis added). Volksabstimmungen mögen bei überschaubaren lokalen Problemen sinnvoll sein, um alle Beteiligten in die konkrete Entscheidungsfindung einzubinden. Für so komplexe Fragen wie die Zugehörigkeit Griechenlands zur Eurozone und die damit verbundenen Opfer taugen sie nicht.”

other. Only now, according to the newspaper, had many realised that the democratic element was lacking in the designed structure.

Europe has so far mainly been legitimised economically (emphasis added). It was good for the economy to be European. It was good for the jobs to stand up for Europe. It was important for the export that the Euro comes. *Only now many notice that it would be better for Europe if it had also been more democratic* (emphasis added). Only now it becomes painfully clear that the economic legitimation turns into its opposite, as soon as Europe no longer pays off (own translation, „Die Rache der Demokratie“, Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).³²

On the same note, The Times brings Jean Monnet’s idea of neo-functionalism to the debate, which assumes that one piece of integration inevitably leads to another. The Euro crisis is claimed to be a crisis of the notion of neo-functionalism, which met its limits in the process of the European integration. *“It has become obvious that the Euro cannot succeed without fiscal union and that fiscal union requires political union, exactly as Monnet would have seen it. But political union is so unpopular that it is almost impossible to achieve without strife* (emphasis added) (“Politics and the Crisis”, The Times, 12 November 2011).

There’s also another side to the story about the roots of the crisis, quoted mainly by those on the political left in Europe, such as Janis Varoufakis, the Greek Minister of Finance in the time of the crisis, who argued that the situation of the Greek economy was not only the fault of Greek people themselves and false reporting, but also a result of European banks, often located at the European core, which were giving cheap loans without proper security. This line of argument, however convincing, does not come up in the analysed sample very often. It is only the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that briefly mentions that “corrupt bankers are the murderers because they have ruined Greece with ‘bad loans’” (“Irrsinn mit Kurzzeitgedächtnis”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011)³³. FAZ also notes the anger of the Greeks towards banks for causing the situation (“Der Ärger über die Banken wird größer.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011), quoting the calls from

³² org. German: *“Europa hat sich bislang vor allem ökonomisch legitimiert* (emphasis added). Es war gut für die Wirtschaft, Europäer zu sein. Es war gut für die Arbeitsplätze, sich für Europa starkzumachen. Es war wichtig für den Export, dass der Euro kommt. *Erst jetzt fällt vielen auf, dass es besser für Europa wäre, wenn es auch demokratischer gewesen wäre* (emphasis added). Erst jetzt wird schmerzlich klar, dass sich die ökonomische Legitimation in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt, sobald Europa sich nicht mehr rechnet.”

³³ org. German: “Korrumpierte Banker sind die Mordopfer, weil sie Griechenland durch ‘faule Kredite’ ruiniert haben.”

the protests of “Break the power of banks and corporations” (own translation, “”Kniefall.“
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2011)³⁴.

This tendency is rather worrying as it suggests that the press subscribes to the dominant story about the roots of the Euro crisis that is being presented by leading European politicians. The media tends not to question that with which they are uncomfortable. Neither do they devote much space to the alternative scenarios of what could have caused the crisis, e.g. brought up, for example, by anti-austerity protesters in Greece, who as *The Guardian* reports were “led by an increasingly virulent bloc of leftists and militant unionists [and] have denounced the economist [Papademos] as the embodiment of *the ‘logic of banks and markets’* (emphasis added)” (“Euro zone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister”, The Guardian, 12 November 2011). As a result, it can be argued that media reporting indirectly supported the dominant neoliberal ideology presented by the political decision makers.

In a support of this thesis, the Polish right-wing *Rzeczpospolita*, quotes a Member of the European Parliament Konrad Szymański (PiS), who stressed that the crisis was inherently written into the Euro project with the aim to strengthen certain member states on the expense of others: “the crisis was inscribed in a purely political rather than an economic project such as the Euro. An event was consciously built into the system, it was not as a result of a mistake” (own translation, „Europoseł Szymański o kryzysie strefy Euro”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).³⁵

The above Polish article stands out from the sample analysed. It is the only example in the data where the creators of the Euro currency are accused of exploiting the project for their own benefit through creating a political construct destined to fail and cause the crisis. It is implied that there are certain actors who would benefit from this situation without naming them explicitly. That brings into the discourse, even though indirectly, the dichotomy of the EU core vs. peripheries. This statement is also an early example of the eurosceptic attitudes which became popular in Europe in the years following the crisis, and which became especially strong in Poland with the Law and Justice’s parliamentary election victory in 2015 which adopted an anti-EU rhetoric, especially in view of the refugee crisis of 2015.

³⁴ org. German: “Brecht die Macht der Banken und Konzerne”), „Banks to the cupboards“ (own translation, org. German: “Banken in die Schranken.”

³⁵ org. Polish: “Kryzys był wpisany w wyłącznie polityczny, a nie ekonomiczny projekt, jakim jest euro. Świadomie, a nie w wyniku błędu, zbudowano system, w którym za jakiś czas miało dojść do przesilenia.”

From the analysis of the sample, the structural approach, suggesting the flaws in the institutional design of the EU and the Euro currency which led to the democratic deficit in the EU as main roots of the Euro crisis, seems dominant. Little place was dedicated to investigation potential alternative causes than the one reported by the leading European politicians. On the other hand, the relative exclusion of the roots in the newspaper stories could also support the neoliberal idea that the crisis is a natural occurrence and an indivisible part of the economic cycle.

Solutions to the Euro Crisis

As regards the possible solutions to the crisis, economists point to three main approaches: (1) firstly, cutting expenses and tightening fiscal discipline - the so called austerity measures, which should restore budgetary balance and reduce the level of public debt; (2) secondly, on the contrary, an increase in budget deficit and public debt, following the belief that additional public expenditure will support demand and investments; and (3) thirdly, to address the supply side and include measures such as structural reforms of the public sector, financial and capital market and tax policy (Kundera 42).

To combat the crisis in the Euro zone, Member States applied austerity programmes to the countries most hit by the crisis with the aim to restore internal and external balance through cutting budgetary deficits, reducing public debts and applying deep structural reforms (Kundera 231–32). Overall the transformation programme prepared for the countries most hit by the crisis including Greece contained three main elements: fiscal consolidation (increasing taxes and cutting spendings to reduce public debt), structural reforms (privatisation, improving the flexibility of labour markets and deregulating professions to spur growth), and banking sector reform (Kundera 232–36).

Reforms

In the analysed sample, the general view of the economic situation in the Euro area and its prospects for the future was rather grim, as reflected in the following quote from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. A solution to the problem was largely seen in the economies in trouble adopting structural reforms.

From the European countries, Greece and Portugal are already in the midst of a recession. Others are at their beginning. In Italy, for example, this is hard to avoid. Spain and France must expect

stagnation, which may turn into a slight recession. The reasons are the same in all countries. *In order to get a grip on the debt crisis, it is necessary to implement far-reaching structural reforms* (emphasis added, own translation, “Übertriebene Rezessionsfurcht.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2011).³⁶

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the short-term solution the EU adopted to the crisis in both Greece and Italy involved the replacement of political leaders with technocratic experts, trusted in Brussels to pass economic reforms (Barber, Tony. “Enter the technocrats: Political turmoil in the Euro zone.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011). It was crucial, according to the discourse created by the newspapers, that the new governments stick to the reform plan. Otherwise, the situation would get only worse.

The Euro zone is undoubtedly in recession. ... What shall we do? The coalition government must stick to its *austerity plan* (emphasis added) if it does not want to lose its credibility. Europe, the UK's most important export market, is in intensive care. We have to prepare for an uncomfortable time with barely noticeable growth. In the worst case with a decline (own translation, “Der Euro als Träger gewaltiger Unsicherheit.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2011).³⁷

Experts quoted across the newspapers agreed that the Euro zone crisis would not subside until the weaker economies had become more competitive. The Financial Times claimed that successful reform would require three things, all of them painful: “*reducing fiscal deficits* (emphasis added) so as to reduce demand, including demand for imports,... *reducing real prices* (emphasis added) in the export sector through ‘internal devaluation,’ and introducing substantial *reforms* of the markets for labour, goods and services” (“Three ways - all painful - to increase competitiveness.” Financial Times, 15 November 2011). In order to reach the desired effect, it was necessary that a proper set of reforms is implemented. The correct definition of the scope of reforms and its effective action was the most difficult part fro the

³⁶ org. German: “Von den Ländern Europas sind Griechenland und Portugal bereits mitten in einer Rezession. Andere stehen an ihrem Anfang. In Italien etwa ist das kaum zu vermeiden. Spanien und Frankreich müssen mit einer Stagnation rechnen, die eventuell in eine leichte Rezession übergeht. Die Gründe dafür sind in allen Ländern gleich. *Um die Schuldenkrise in den Griff zu bekommen, müssen zum Teil tiefgreifende Strukturreformen umgesetzt werden* (emphasis added), die zu einer Dämpfung der Binnennachfrage für einige Jahre führen werden.”

³⁷ org. German: “Die Eurozone steckt zweifellos in einer Rezession. ... Was können wir tun? Die Koalitionsregierung *muss an ihrem Sparplan festhalten* (emphasis added), will sie nicht ihre Glaubwürdigkeit verlieren. Europa, der wichtigste Exportmarkt Großbritanniens, liegt auf der Intensivstation. Wir müssen uns auf eine ungemütliche Zeit mit kaum merklichem Wachstum einstellen. Schlimmstenfalls mit einem Rückgang.”

government (own translation, “Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).³⁸

According to Andrzej Koźminski, a Polish economist quoted in Rzeczpospolita, the solidarity principle, ‘fair distribution’ and redistribution, would be crucial in redistributing the burdens of the crisis.

One can and must appeal to the sense of solidarity of Europeans by limiting the income differences and taxing the higher income groups a bit higher, as well as introducing the principle of co-payment for better off families in the areas of health and education services. This requires a change in thinking. There is no doubt that rich Western societies have *long lived beyond their means* (emphasis added) and they need to count with reduced standards of living. In this situation, a fair distribution of burdens is of particular importance (own translation, “Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).³⁹

Undoubtedly, the reforms that were deemed necessary – increase of taxes and retirement age, serious cuts in the expanded public sector – will meet a fierce opposition from several social groups that will be affected (“Nowy rząd na kryzys.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁴⁰

Greece in particular, which was considered to be solely responsible for the troubles it was faced by having provided false data to the ECB, was strongly pushed to accept the reforms.

In the case of Greece, it is not true that politicians "blame the banking crisis on over-indebted states". Greece was over-indebted long before this crisis, and stalked its entry into European Monetary Union with fake statistics. If austerity programs are "forced" on this country, it is only right that the Greeks *no longer live beyond their means* (emphasis added) and become a "bottomless pit" for European taxpayers (own translation, “Auch Habermas sollte sich an die Fakten halten.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁴¹

³⁸ org. Polish: “Sztuka rządzenia polega dziś na prawidłowym określeniu tego zakresu i zgodnym z nim skutecznym działaniu.”

³⁹ org. Polish: “Można i trzeba odwołać się do poczucia solidarności, ograniczając różnice dochodowe i opodatkowując nieco wyżej grupy o najwyższych dochodach oraz wprowadzając zasadę współpłaty rodzin lepiej uposażonych za świadczenia w obszarze służby zdrowia oraz edukacji. Zmiana filozofii. Nie ma wątpliwości, że bogate społeczeństwa Zachodu od dawna żyły ponad stan i czeka je obniżenie poziomu życia. W takiej sytuacji szczególnego znaczenia nabiera sprawiedliwe rozłożenie ciężarów.”

⁴⁰ org. Polish: “Podniesione zostaną podatki, wiek emerytalny, poważne cięciauderzą w rozbudowany sektor publiczny.”

⁴¹ org. German: “Im Falle Griechenlands stimmt es nicht, dass die Politiker "die Bankenkrise den überschuldeten Staaten in die Schuhe schieben". Griechenland war vielmehr schon lange vor dieser Krise überschuldet und hat sich seinen Eintritt in die Europäische Währungsunion mit gefälschten Statistiken erschlichen. Wenn diesem Land nun Sparprogramme "aufgenötigt" werden, so ist dies nur recht und billig, um

In above extract from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Greeks are once again presented as irresponsible spenders who, even when they accepted the reform package, would have to be monitored to ensure whether they implemented it correctly.

On the other hand, The Guardian has pointed out that structural reforms were the only prescription the Euro zone had ever given for the sovereign debt crisis: ***“punishing austerity to drive down debt in the short term, supply-side reforms to restore fiscal balance over the long term. The IMF has done this in many countries in the past”*** (“Slouching towards Bethlehem: The Euro crisis.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

It was with no doubts crucial that Europe could reach an agreement on a strong plan to restore financial stability. However, there were also voices that could be found in the the left-leaning the Guardian opted to transmit, which brought up the other side of these methods and claimed that “the current chaos in Greece bears out that this medicine does not work economically, is unjust socially, and can lead to ungovernability” (“Slouching towards Bethlehem: The Euro crisis.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

Fiscal and Political Union

The correct implementation of reforms and austerity measures, and ultimately the policy of tightening belts should have been, according to the Handelsblatt, supervised by an external body. In practice, that would mean the creation of a fiscal union responsible for fiscal regulations within the Euro zone and protecting the fiscal stability of the EU member states. This required a Treaty change, which Germany advocated for.

Since the Euro states seem unable to limit themselves, they need a common institution to help them in their efforts. This institution is an independent financial agency. Because it was missing so far, it came to the Euro crisis (emphasis added). As an independent institution, it is legitimised by the Treaties and the European Parliament. It ensures fiscal stability and monitors the stability policy of the monetary union (own translation, “Die deformierte Kultur.” Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).⁴²

dafür zu sorgen, dass die Griechen nicht länger über ihre Verhältnisse leben und für die europäischen Steuerzahler zu einem ‘Fass ohne Boden’ werden.”

⁴² org. German: ***“Da es den Euro-Staaten offenbar nicht gelingt, sich zu begrenzen, brauchen sie eine gemeinsame Institution, die sie bei ihren Anstrengungen unterstützt. Diese Institution ist die eigenständige Finanzagentur. Weil sie bisher fehlte, kam es zur Euro-Krise*** (emphasis added). Als unabhängige Institution ist sie durch die Verträge und das Europaparlament legitimiert. Sie sorgt für finanzpolitische Stabilität und überwacht die Stabilitätspolitik der Währungsgemeinschaft.”

The creation of such a body would, as a consequence, require a stronger political cooperation among the member states which for European elites, despite the accusation of the democratic deficit in the EU, could be achieved by stronger European integration and the transfer of *more* powers to Brussels. This would go against those governments, such as the UK, which advocated for returning more powers to the nation states.

There have been two reactions to the Euro crisis. Some eurosceptics believe Britain could use its bargaining power to insist on a recovery of national powers. The opposite view, which President Barroso takes, is that the crisis underlines *the need to transfer further powers to Brussels* (emphasis added). As he put it: ‘One of the issues we have to address is this: how can we have a more effective way of responding to this situation? For that, *more integration and more discipline at the European level is needed*’ (emphasis added) (“Barroso's twisted logic is anathema to Britain.” The Time, 11 November 2011).

Additionally, the fiscal union was legitimised as a security mechanism enforcing reform on peripheral countries by Brussels to guarantee that local politicians would follow a designed course of action.

The response to the Euro zone crisis must be a kind of straitjacket imposed from Brussels and with enforced budgetary rigors, and even interference in the overall economic policy ... Without this muzzle assisted through the internal statutory barriers of the country's debt, the habit of living beyond one's means will be renewed because it is convenient for politicians (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).⁴³

Countries which suffered most from the crisis are thus represented as wild, irresponsible, unable to discipline themselves and in need of some form of external help from Brussels to temper them.

The Times also mentioned long-term dangers related to the potential Treaty change and warned of the consequences of Europe's leaders wrangling about a treaty while their economies went to ruin which open up the space for populists and eurosceptics.

People will lose even more faith in the political classes of Europe and it will be an open invitation to demagogues, populists, xenophobes and chauvinists to fill the gap. If history teaches us one thing in Europe it is that when political elites lose touch with their people at a time of economic

⁴³ org. Polish: “Odpowiedzią na kryzys euro musi być swoisty kaftan bezpieczeństwa w postaci narzuconych z Brukseli i surowo egzekwowanych rygorów budżetowych, a nawet ingerencji w całość polityki gospodarczej ... Bez tego kagańca wspomaganego ... przez wewnętrzne ustawowe bariery zadłużania kraju nawyk życia ponad stan będzie się odnawiał, bo jest wygodny dla polityków.”

insecurity, the people who benefit are nasty extremists (Watson, Roland. "How a decision to quit smoking is helping Clegg avoid burnout." The Times, 12 November 2011).

On the other hand, there were speculations that Berlin and Paris were working on the establishment of a "core Euro zone" in which only Germany, France, Finland, Austria and the Benelux countries would participate. The rumours are vehemently denied in Berlin (Hulverscheidt, Claus. "Nicht mit meiner Zentralbank." Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011). The idea was strongly criticised by Süddeutsche Zeitung as the so called "North Euro" would take the union back to decades ago:

Rather, it is said that the creation of a "core Euro zone" would inevitably be accompanied by a chaotic development around them, which in turn would have dramatic economic repercussions for the remaining members of the monetary union. They would also lose their competitive strength because the "North Euro" would be valued against the new old weak Southern European currencies (own translation, Hulverscheidt, Claus. "Nicht mit meiner Zentralbank." Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁴⁴

The only alternative to reforms, which would serve as a guarantor for the necessary savings, as quoted in Süddeutsche Zeitung, was the return of Italy and Greece to their national currencies which many would fear:

The beneficiary countries such as Italy or Greece would have to accept that Europe sets their austerity and reform packages. This is a restriction of national sovereignty, but indispensable, because otherwise *the desire for saving could disappear* (emphasis added). The alternative to this risky plan is for Europe to give up the Euro (own translation, "Bank gegen Rudel." Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁴⁵

Return to National Currencies

The return to national currencies was referred to as a grave threat and the inevitable outcome if reforms were not implemented properly. In Germany, it was suggested that the union did not need the trouble brought by the undisciplined members of the club who did not follow the

⁴⁴ org. German: "Vielmehr, so heißt es, ginge die Gründung einer „Kern-Euro-Zone“ zwangsläufig mit einer chaotischen Entwicklung um sie herum einher, die wiederum dramatische ökonomische Rückwirkungen auf die verbliebenen Mitglieder der Währungsunion hätte. Auch verlören diese ihre Wettbewerbskraft, weil der 'Nord-Euro' gegenüber den neuen alten südeuropäischen Schwachwährungen kräftig aufwerten würde."

⁴⁵ org. German: "Die profitierenden Staaten wie Italien oder Griechenland müssten akzeptieren, dass Europa ihre Spar- und Reformpakete festlegt. Das ist eine Einschränkung der nationalen Souveränität, aber unverzichtbar, weil sonst der Willen zum Sparen erlahmen könnte. *Die Alternative zu diesem durchaus riskanten Plan ist, dass Europa den Euro aufgibt* (emphasis added)."

rules and would be better off either with their former currency, or in a narrower club of those who coped well. “It is better to look the truth in the face now. It would be necessary to enable those countries whose economies cannot stand on the market under the Euro to leave” (own translation, “Der liberale Stabilitätsmechanismus.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2011).⁴⁶

Also the Financial Times quoted surveys by pollster Maurice de Hond that “show[ed] over 50 per cent of the Dutch public think Greece should be kicked out of the Euro zone, and almost 60 per cent think the Netherlands should have stuck with the Guilder” (Steinglass, Matt. “Dutch right clamours for return of the guilder.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011).

Threatening to be removed from the Euro zone based on alleged wrongdoing reveals a conservative attitude that only those who cope well deserve to be a part of the club. Consequently, those who do not should be expelled on moral grounds as this means they were not disciplined enough. It reveals a worldview that values discipline, hard work and honesty. According to George Lakoff, this is typical of conservative neoliberal moral stand that values being prosperous as moral and sees it as a fruit of hard work and discipline (see Lakoff, *Whose Freedom?*).

This revengeful attitude does not seem to have real grounding. However, the Financial Times warned that many who put forward the idea of Greece and Italy going back to their national currencies have actually no idea of what a member country's departure from the Euro means in legal or operational terms (Dizard, John. “Empty threats of Euro expulsions.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011).

The Süddeutsche Zeitung further addressed the possible dire consequences of the return to national currencies by an EU member states. In an interview with Weder Beatrice di Mauro, a professor of economics at the University of Mainz and at the time Member of the German Council of Economic Experts, explained using the example the reintroduction of Drachma for Greece could have for the whole Euro zone:

A reintroduction and severe devaluation of the Drachma would mean that all debts that were in Euro would be many times higher and could not be repaid. The state, the banking system and large parts of the corporate sector would be bankrupt. As the savings would be devalued, that

⁴⁶ org. German: “Besser, man schaut der Wahrheit jetzt ins Gesicht. Man müsse denjenigen Ländern, deren Volkswirtschaften unter dem Euro nicht am Markt bestehen könnten, einen Ausstieg ‘ermöglichen’ (emphasis added).”

would hit the little savers hard. Therefore, a run on the banks would begin long before the currency conversion. Chaos and economic collapse would be inevitable. That must be off set against the gain in competitiveness of exports (own translation, “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011).⁴⁷

Weder di Mauro further commented on the dire consequences of the suggestion that many in Germany also longed for the return of the Deutsch-Mark. As quoted in the Süddeutsche Zeitung,

That too would have unmanageable consequences. The appreciation shock would affect German exports, which would suddenly become much more expensive internationally. The competitiveness, which has been restored with great effort, would have been destroyed in one fell swoop. On the other hand, the German plants would be devalued abroad and would have to be written off in part. This, in turn, would burden the German financial system (own translation, Balsler, Markus, and Markus Zydra. “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011).⁴⁸

The Financial Times also claimed that expelling Greece from the Euro zone would go against the EU *acqui*. “If Greece comes out of the Euro area, it has to be done in breach of the Treaty. And when Mrs Merkel threatens Greece with expulsion, she has to know she was making a threat with an unloaded gun” (Dizard, John. “Empty threats of Euro expulsions.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011).

The danger related to the so called ‘Grexit’ from the Euro zone, a blend of the words Greece and exit that became popular in the media discourse, was used as a departure point to speculate of the possible further repercussions and follow up in the Financial Times:

The Euro zone can survive the debt restructuring and exit of a small country such as Greece or Portugal. But if Italy or Spain were to do this, it would effectively break up the currency union. Unfortunately this is now increasingly likely. *Only if the ECB became an unlimited lender of*

⁴⁷ org. German: “Eine Wiedereinführung und starke Abwertung der Drachme würde bedeuten, dass alle Schulden, die auf Euro lauten, um ein Vielfaches höher wären und nicht zurückbezahlt werden könnten. Der Staat, das Bankensystem und weite Teile des Unternehmenssektors wären damit bankrott. Da die Ersparnisse entwertet würden, würde das die kleinen Sparer hart treffen. Deshalb würde ein Run auf die Banken lange vor der Währungsumstellung einsetzen. Chaos und wirtschaftlicher Kollaps wären unvermeidbar. Das muss man dem Gewinn an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Exporte entgegen stellen.”

⁴⁸ org. German: “Auch das hätte unüberschaubare Konsequenzen. Vom Aufwertungsschock wären zumeinen die deutschen Exporte betroffen, die plötzlich international viel teurer würden. Die unter großen Mühenwiedergewonnene Wettbewerbsfähigkeit wäre mit einem Schlag zunichte gemacht. Zum anderen würden die Deutschen Anlagen im Ausland entwertet und müssten teilweise abgeschrieben werden. Dies würde wiederum das deutsche Finanzsystem belasten.”

last resort and cut policy rates to zero - combined with a fall in the Euro to parity with the dollar; fiscal stimulus in Germany and the Euro zone core; and austerity in the periphery - could we perhaps prevent disaster (emphasis added) (“Why Italy's days in the Euro zone may be numbered”, Financial Times, 11 November 2011).

“Grexit” has not yet been realised, but it laid the ground for the discussion on leaving the Union by particular member states, which later resulted in the Brexit referendum in the UK. As the background to this deliberation, the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) became especially important.

Role of the European Central Bank

In the long run, the crisis was to be resolved through a combination of austerity measures in the countries in crisis and bond purchases by the ECB (“Britain's small investors suffer pounds 9 billion loss as European fund values plummet”, The Guardian, 11 November 2011). The debate on the role of the European Central Bank as a key actor in solving the Euro crisis took a prominent place in this discussion.

This crisis at first focused on the smaller countries — Ireland, Portugal and Greece. There is one power that had the resources and trust to have stopped this first phase before it moved on to Italy and Spain. That country is Germany, which took a negative view of the prompt and substantial assistance by the European Central Bank that alone could have forestalled the crisis. ... Whether because of memories of inflation or the pressure of politics, Germany has not done the job as competently as it performs most commercial dealings. ***The incompetence of Germany is the main EU defect in this crisis*** (emphasis added)” (“Barroso's twisted logic is anathema to Britain.” The Time, 11 November 2011).

According to The Times, the European Central Bank had the necessary powers to keep the crisis from spreading. However, Germany prevented the ECB from using this power and was, therefore, blamed for incompetence in handling the crisis. The structural flaw of the Euro currency, which did not have support from a national bank as a guarantor for the currency other national currencies did, could be corrected by making the ECB a lender of last resort in the eyes of experts and politicians (“Super Mario takes charge to save Italy and the Euro.” The Times, 14 November 2011).

Also, according to the Polish liberal Gazeta Wyborcza, the only way to avoid a catastrophe from happening and hence the only solution that could prevent the Euro from collapse was the help of the countries in a good financial situation („Katastrofa kolejowa w zwolnionym

tempie.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011). This help could come in the form of European Central Bank intervention through, as the Times suggested, the purchase of unlimited amounts of Italian and Spanish debt (“The solution to the Euro crisis lies in Alabama.” The Times, 14 November 2011).

However, Germany was reluctant to make the ECB a lender of last resort, despite many experts and governments arguing that this would help to protect their economies.

Many international leaders, led by Nicolas Sarkozy and Barack Obama, believe that they are long holding in their hands the miracle weapon (Bazooka), which is so fiercely demanded in the financial markets and that only Merkel and Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann prevent their colleagues from pressing the trigger. *The bazooka with which the presidents want to go to battle is the European Central Bank (ECB). It must, according to the ideas of Sarkozy, Obama and their supporters, who make it absolutely clear that in the defence of Italy, Spain, and ultimately the entire monetary union, it will, if necessary, take any sum in hand* (emphasis added). Since the ECB theoretically has unlimited funds, it would make it obsolete to gamble on a break-up of the Euro area (own translation, “Nicht mit meiner Zentralbank.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁴⁹

In this way, the European Central Bank, perceived as the most powerful weapon (a ‘bazooka’ - a shoulder-fired missile developed by the Americans during the Second World War) in the arsenal of available tools for efficiently fighting the crisis, was put under pressure too to help defend the countries in crisis. As the Guardian metaphorically put it in an interview with Paul Krugman, a distinguished American economist, comparing printing money to a free flow of water, it was expected to *“to open the money taps to help Italy* (emphasis added)” (“ECB pressure.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

Getting government finances under control and at the same time generating higher economic growth ... Italy, which has now come into focus, can do both if it wants to. Especially Krugman doubted however that there would be enough time for that. *As the only way out, he sees ... [is] a more courageous intervention and a fundamental change of role for the European Central*

⁴⁹ org. German: “Viele ausländische Staatenlenker, allen voran Nicolas Sarkozy und Barack Obama, glauben nämlich, dass sie die an den Finanzmärkten so vehement geforderte Wunderwaffe (Bazooka), längst in den Händen halten – und dass nur noch Merkel und Bundesbankpräsident Jens Weidmann ihre Kollegen hindern, den Abzug zu betätigen. *Die Bazooka, mit der die Präsidenten in die Schlacht ziehen wollen, ist die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB). Sie muss nach den Vorstellungen Sarkozys, Obamas und ihrer Unterstützer unmissverständlich klar machen, dass sie zur Verteidigung Italiens, Spaniens und letztlich der gesamten Währungsunion notfalls jede Summe in die Hand nehmen wird – sei sie noch so gewaltig* (emphasis added). Da die EZB theoretisch über unbegrenzte Mittel verfügt, würden Wettgeschäfte auf ein Auseinanderbrechen der Euro-Zone damit obsolet.”

Bank. *"The ECB must be a lender of last resort for the Euro countries,*(emphasis added) I do not see another option." In practice, this would mean that the central bank will print money and buy up government bonds from Euro zone countries with financial difficulties. And this ... in theoretically unlimited scope (own translation, "In der Diagnose vereint, in der Therapie getrennt." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁵⁰

The key in assuming the role of a lender of last resort, the ECB would have to "frame its monetary policy in a way that recognises the recession risks in Europe and thus provide liquidity to the system in the same way that the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have done" ("Italy turmoil triggers sharp swings in stocks." Financial Times, 12 November 2011), says the Financial Times.

The same opinion was confirmed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, "the ECB must become the lender of last resort for the Euro zone countries - such as the Fed for America and the Bank of England for Great Britain" (own translation, "In der Diagnose vereint, in der Therapie getrennt." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁵¹

The Financial Times delivered the additional argument that the ECB intervention would provide the necessary stability for investors to remain in Italy which in turn would help the country to pull out of the crisis.

For most investors, Italian debt has become a no-go zone and, traders say, the ECB is now in effect the only buyer. But for reasons of German politics, European law and conservative economic theory, the central bank is reluctant to intervene on an unlimited scale in debt markets. Since May 2010 the ECB has bought at least €183bn of Greek, Italian and other Euro zone debt. But it has resisted appeals to declare itself a "lender of last resort" like the US Federal Reserve and Bank of England – a role that some economists think it must adopt, because only a central bank has sufficient financial firepower to stand behind a nation's or region's sovereign debt (Barber, Tony. "Enter the technocrats." Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

⁵⁰ org. German: "Die Staatsfinanzen in den Griff bekommen und zugleich höheres Wirtschaftswachstum erzeugen, ... Das nunmehr in den Fokus gerückte Italien könne beides auch schaffen, wenn es wolle. Besonders Krugman bezweifelte allerdings, dass dafür genug Zeit bleibt. **Als einzigen Ausweg sieht er, ... ein beherzteres Eingreifen und einen grundlegenden Rollenwechsel der Europäischen Zentralbank. "Die EZB muss Geldgeber letzter Instanz (lender of last resort) für die Euroländer sein** (emphasis added), eine andere Option sehe ich nicht." Praktisch würde das bedeuten, dass die Zentralbank Geld druckt und damit Staatsanleihen von Euroländern mit Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten aufkauft. Und dieses ... in theoretisch unbegrenztem Umfang.

⁵¹ org. German: Dennoch müsse die EZB Geldgeber letzter Instanz für die Euroländer werden - so wie die Fed für Amerika und die Bank of England für Großbritannien."

The reluctance of Germany to intervene was ascribed to its 'conservative economic theory,' but it should, however, have accepted that a currency union could work only if there was a mechanism for transferring funds and debts across national boundaries, according to The Times.

Having resolved to cede the Bundesbank's monetary authority to the ECB 12 years ago, Germany needs now to accept the logic of that decision. A currency union can work only if there is a mechanism for transferring funds across national boundaries, from thriving economies to weak ones. That means creating a fiscal union in which the ECB acts as lender of last resort. Such policies contradict the ECB's historic stance but the precedent has been set. In May last year the ECB for the first time bought the debt of Euro zone governments in an effort to unfreeze the debt markets. It is continuing to support indebted Euro zone economies by acquiring the debt instruments of governments with huge fiscal problems that urgently need Euros ("Berlin's Choice." The Times, 11 November 2011).

According to The Times, while "the rescue of the Euro zone is in the hands of the ECB, the ECB's hands are tied by Germany," which opposed the ECB's programme of bond-buying from heavily indebted Euro zone member states on the ground that this compromises the independence of the bank ("Berlin's Choice." The Times, 11 November 2011). This has also been confirmed by Steffen Seibert, Mrs Merkel's spokesman, said on 12 November: "We have not changed our view. The ECB is independent and has the role of guarding our currency and to keep price stability" ("Germany's tough talking threatens to widen divisions." The Times, 12 November 2011).

An extensive explanation of the German reasoning is delivered by the Süddeutsche Zeitung:

The resistance in Berlin and Frankfurt against a large-scale deployment of the ECB as a crisis fire brigade is similarly vehement. Such a so-called "monetary state financing" is out of the question from the German point of view, because it would not solve the underlying problems in Greece, Italy, Spain and elsewhere - excessive debt, lack of competitiveness, crusted structures. On the contrary, as the example of Italy has just shown, governments' willingness to reform is sinking just as the ECB rushes to the rescue with billions. In addition to this economic argument, there is also a legal aspect: from the point of view of the Federal Government and the Bundesbank, state financing would be a clear violation of the applicable EU treaties, because the central bank's mandate to ensure price stability in the Euro zone would be in fact being thwarted. Also, the independence of the ECB would be ultimately endangered. "In a constitutional state, you can not

solve problems by violating the law," states the Federal Government (own translation, "Nicht mit meiner Zentralbank." Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁵²

This time, the ECB was metaphorically referred to as a 'Krisenfeuerwehr', a crisis fire brigade. The decision is legitimised with an economic and legal argument, and the decreasing willingness to introduce reform as mentioned again as a main concern keeping Germany from firing its 'bazooka'.

Even though British commentators saw the logic of German justification regarding inflation costs, they predicted the costs of the lack of action on the side of the ECB would be much greater, also for the German economy.

It is not only a matter of the appalling history of hyper-inflation and its political costs in the Weimar era. Inflation has real economic costs. It makes decision-making by consumers and businesses more difficult and it acts as a tax on savers. Prudent German taxpayers have reasonable objections also to bailing out the governments of countries with records of profligacy. ***But the costs of inaction will be greater*** (emphasis added). If the Euro collapses under a cascade of bad debts, Germany's economy will lose heavily. Its inevitable exchange-rate appreciation would price German goods out of world markets. There is no attractive solution, but only the logic of an inflexible monetary union that has wreaked damage through yoking together a group of diverse economies. ... Europe's best chance is that, in the choice between inaction and inflation, Germany chooses the latter and lets loose the ECB ("Berlin's Choice." The Times, 11 November 2011).

In newspapers, Britain strongly supported the idea of turning the European Central Bank into a lender of last resort. The Guardian quoted Prime Minister Cameron saying: "Italy is the third largest country in the Euro zone. Its current state is a clear and present danger to the Euro zone and the moment of truth is approaching. If the leaders of the Euro zone want to save their currency then they, together with the institutions of the Euro zone, must act now." ("UK Treasury prepares for 'economic armageddon'." The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

⁵² org. German: "Ähnlich vehement ist der Widerstand in Berlin und Frankfurt gegen einen großräumigen Einsatz der EZB als Krisenfeuerwehr. Eine solche so genannte „monetäre Staatsfinanzierung“ kommt aus deutscher Sicht nicht in Frage, weil sie die zugrundeliegenden Probleme in Griechenland, Italien, Spanien und anderswo – zu hohe Schulden, mangelnde Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, verkrustete Strukturen – nicht lösen würde. Im Gegenteil: Wie das Beispiel Italien gerade erst gezeigt habe, sinke die Reformbereitschaft der Regierungen just in dem Moment, in dem die EZB mit Milliarden zur Hilfe eile. Zu diesem ökonomischen Argument kommt noch ein juristisches hinzu: Eine Staatsfinanzierung via Notenpresse wäre aus Sicht der Bundesregierung und der Bundesbank ein klarer Verstoß gegen die geltenden EU-Verträge, weil der Auftrag der Notenbank, die Preisstabilität in der Euro-Zone zu gewährleisten, geradezu konterkariert würde. Auch geriete die Unabhängigkeit der EZB letztlich in Gefahr. „Sie können in einem Rechtsstaat Probleme nicht dadurch lösen, dass Sie gegen das Recht verstoßen“ heißt es in der Bundesregierung."

The Times and the Guardian countered Germany's reservations to protect the independence of the European Central Bank and prevent increasing inflation as well as the influence on the reform implementation process.

Britain is growing increasingly impatient with Berlin for blocking a French plan for the ECB to guarantee the Euro zone bailout scheme, the European financial stability facility. Berlin believes it would be wrong for the central bank to act as a lender of last resort because that would jeopardise its independence and fuel inflation ("UK Treasury prepares for 'economic armageddon'." The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

Downing Street has grown increasingly alarmed at the failure of the ECB to step into the debt crisis, held back by a fear of stoking inflation and concerns that bailing out countries such as Italy and Greece would excuse them from reforming economies. Some around Mr Cameron hope that with a new Italian Government promising far-reaching structural reforms, Ms Merkel is more likely to allow the ECB to weigh in. Vince Cable and Tony Blair issued explicit calls yesterday for the German Chancellor to drop her resistance to ECB intervention ("MPs urge Cameron to protect City interests." The Times, 14 November 2011).

Moreover, the Financial Times supported the view that the restraint from the ECB is purely ideological.

A lack of technocratic solutions is not the problem with the Euro zone. The European Central Bank can finance an Italian bail-out if it wants, without even taking on Italian sovereign credit risk. Its founding treaty would allow it to lend directly to the IMF or possibly to a trust fund within the IMF, which would then lend on to Italy and take the credit risk. ***The problem is ideological*** (emphasis added). The ECB, under heavy pressure from the Bundesbank, has so far fundamentally refused to accept that Italy might need large-scale financing to prevent it spiralling to default, and that it itself is very likely the only institution big enough to do it ("Special drawing rights enjoy rare moment in limelight." Financial Times, 14 November 2011).

The Süddeutsche Zeitung argued, additionally, that the ECB would offer protection for the investors and that would be a signal that the EU would not give in to speculators who might try to use the crisis for the own benefits.

A central bank is the only institution that has such a huge financial power that any investors could not compare. A transformation of the ECB into the lender of last resort would be a signal that

Europe will not sacrifice the Euro for the speculators (own translation, “Bank gegen Rudel.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁵³

The above-mentioned quotation does not mention explicitly who the potential speculators might be, but actors on financial markets might gain from betting on a particular country.

The Süddeutsche Zeitung referred to certain accusations that, as a rich country, not so prone to the crisis, Germany was reluctant to show its solidarity with the weaker members, a claim which appeared in the press in relation to German capacity to handle the crisis situation.

It is suggested that the Euro crisis put Germany in a difficult spot. On one hand, the crisis was seen as a moment when it was Germany’s responsibility to pay back its historical debt and offer its economic power to rescue Europe. At the same time, however, it had to be careful not to fall its historical role as Europe’s dictator.

[N]ow Germany will no longer be perceived only through the prism of war, but as a country with the power to save Europe. British commentators, however, see Angela Merkel only in the dilemma. If she takes the leadership that Europe so desperately needs, and drives the ECB to action and the rest of Europe on Germany’s fiscal course, Berlin runs the risk of being perceived not only as the strong man but the bully of Europe. If she leans back, Germany will be seen as a weakling that does not live up to its historical responsibility. ... Phrases like these can be heard in the British pub as well as on the underground or even by British opinion makers: Germany owes it to the world to stop the crisis or Germany can only benefit from this disaster (own translation, “Mein Deutschland.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁵⁴

The key lesson from the Euro crisis is the need for deeper policy coordination among the EU partners. In addition to austerity measures applied in Member States most hit by the crisis, the EU should be reformed towards a new institutional arrangement, ultimately a political union which will involve policy coordination of the entire Euro area. This coordination should not

⁵³ org. German: “Eine Notenbank verfügt als einzige Institution über eine so gewaltige Finanzkraft, dass ihr kein noch so großes Investorenrudel gewachsen ist. Eine Transformation der EZB zum letzten Kreditgeber wäre das Signal, dass Europa den Euro nicht den Spekulanten opfert.”

⁵⁴ org. German: “Perverserweise empfand ich daher die Eskalation der Euro-Krise fast als erfrischend. Denn nun wird Deutschland nicht mehr nur durch das Prisma des Krieges wahrgenommen, sondern als ein Land mit der Macht, Europa zu retten. Britische Kommentatoren allerdings sehen Angela Merkel nun in der Zwickmühle. Übernimmt sie die Führung, die Europa so dringend braucht, treibt die EZB zum Handeln und den Rest Europas auf Deutschlands fiskalischen Kurs, läuft Berlin Gefahr, nicht nur als der starke Mann, sondern der Bully Europas wahrgenommen zu werden. Hält sie sich zurück, wird Deutschland dagegen als Schwächling gesehen, der seiner historischen Verantwortung nicht gerecht wird. ... Sowohl im britischen Pub als auch in der U-Bahn oder sogar von britischen Meinungsmachern sind Phrasen wie diese zu hören: Deutschland schuldet es der Welt, die Krise zu stoppen oder Deutschland kann von diesem Desaster nur profitieren.”

include only monetary affairs but first and foremost fiscal and structural policy. Therefore, as Kundera points out, the most desired solution for the Euro zone would be to implement an arrangement composed of all the three: a banking union, a fiscal union and a political union, which would provide institutional competence to shape an optimal economic policy for the entire Euro zone (Kundera 395–402; Kundera et al. 278–79).

To conclude, the solutions to the crisis proposed in the sample period reflected the findings of the quantitative analysis (entry phase analysis) and were largely seen in adopting structural reforms of the economies in trouble, including austerity measures, and putting forward a strong plan to restore financial stability, through establishing a fiscal union. In this context, the European Central Bank played a central role as a lender of last resort. An alternative to the proposed reforms could be a return of countries in financial difficulties to their national currencies. This proposed course of action reflected a neoliberal stance towards the crisis.

Consequences of the Euro Crisis

“The crisis has caused many countries to blame the immigrants, trying to restore the border controls within the EU” („Kryzys musi nas jednoczyć nie dzielić.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).

Due to the crisis, support for the EU fell across the member states. Even in Germany, which “has been at the forefront of Europe’s enthusiasm” and has traditionally remained strongly pro-European since the creation of the Community, this fall was “dramatic” as Süddeutsche Zeitung reported (own translation, “Italien kann sich selbst retten.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).

Moreover, the troubles of the Euro zone presented an opportunity for eurosceptic voices to surface and they found fertile ground. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that “many people have become more sceptical at the moment, have a tendency to favour less Europe and therefore are more receptive to national tones” (own translation, Braun, Stefan. “Ein klares Signal für eine Lohnuntergrenz.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011).⁵⁵

⁵⁵ org. German: “Wir wissen, dass viele Menschen zur Zeit eher skeptischer geworden sind, eher eine Tendenz haben zu weniger Europa und deshalb eher empfänglich sind für nationale Töne.”

The debate about the future of Europe also gave rise to a wave of euroscepticism. Referring to the democratic deficit of the EU project certain right wing parties started to underline that the EU has been designed as a project directed at and benefiting only a specific group of people, the European elites as reported Handelsblatt: “European unification has so far been the project of the elites. The citizens were never asked of their opinion.” (own translation, “Die Rache der Demokratie.” Handelsblatt, 14 November 2011).⁵⁶

The more eurosceptic voices emerged, the more acceptable it became across Europe to express the anti-European opinions and to depart from the underlining principle of solidarity between the EU members. The eurosceptics have also picked up of the narrative to expel countries most hit by the crisis from the Euro zone. “Now that *it is acceptable, even conventional, to be a eurosceptic* (emphasis added), there is a lot of facile chatter about how Greece, or Italy, or ‘peripheral Europe’ generally can be expelled from the Euro area” (Dizard, John. “Empty threats of Euro expulsions.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011). Even though, as mentioned above, before the actual start of the Brexit negotiations many did not have a clear idea what a member state's departure from the EU means in legal or operational terms.

A particularly radical stand was expressed by the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) led by Geert Wilders who metaphorically described the Euro as “a failed project that has cost barrels full of money” (“Dutch right clamours for return of the guilder.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011). The Financial Times described the party’s shift from anti-immigration to anti-Europeanism with the following words:

The eurosceptic position of Mr Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) is not new - it has opposed every Euro zone rescue package so far. But Friday's announcement marked the latest step in a strategic shift: as the Euro zone crisis has intensified, the PVV is concentrating less on its anti-Muslim rhetoric and more on its opposition to Europe. The party's press releases, once dominated by denunciations of Islam and immigration, now increasingly attack aid to Greece and hammer *the "political elite in Brussels"* (emphasis added) (“Dutch right clamours for return of the guilder.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011).

Eurosceptics and populists thus shifted their rhetoric onto the Greek people and the Brussels elites, holding both responsible for the worsening situation.

⁵⁶ org. German: “Die europäische Einigung war bisher ein *Projekt der Eliten*. Die Bürger wurden kaum gefragt.”

The British Labour party joined the chorus opposing any further transfer of power to Brussels and proposing any Treaty change sought by Germany in response to the Euro crisis as an occasion to review the balance of powers in the EU and its nation states (“Britain needs a new EU policy for a new era, says Labour.” The Guardian, 14 November 2011).

In regards to this, populists also initiated and spinned a debate on immigration in response to the migration crisis in 2015. Viviane Reding, Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship commented on this in an interview for Rzeczpospolita:

The crisis has caused many countries to blame the immigrants, trying to restore the border controls within the EU. ... These actions are not in line with EU rules and can be stopped. But the problem is deeper. Extreme right-wing parties are coming to the fore and they have begun to influence the internal politics of the member states. Political leaders must be able to explain that closing borders does not solve any problems. Instead of building walls, we have to cooperate more closely (own translation, „Kryzys musi nas jednoczyć nie dzielić.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁵⁷

This eurosceptic debate, which evolved in response to the Euro crisis, increased and gradually culminated in 2015 with the rising number of refugees arriving in Europe escaping the war in Syria. It further resulted in the British membership referendum held on 23 June 2016, in which British voters decided to leave the EU, which came as a shock to the EU and populist parties winning elections in several European countries in 2017 and 2018.

As demonstrated above, neoliberal policies as regards roots and solutions to the crisis, in particular the democratic deficit in the EU and the introduction of austerity measures, created a fertile ground for populists and their anti-EU rhetoric.

Temporal and Spatial Representations of the Euro Crisis

Representation of Time

An important aspect of the analysis of the medial representation of the Euro crisis lies in disentangling its temporal dimension. Van Leeuwen recalls that “[t]he distinction between

⁵⁷ org. Polish: “Kryzys spowodował, że wiele krajów zaczyna winić imigrantów, próbuje się przywracać kontrole na granicach. ... To nie są działania zgodne z unijnymi zasadami i można je powstrzymać. Ale problem jest głębszy. Do głosu dochodzą partie skrajnie prawicowe, które zaczynają mieć wpływ na wewnętrzną politykę. Przywódcy polityczni muszą umieć wytłumaczyć, że zamykanie granic nie rozwiązuje żadnych problemów. Zamiast budować mury, musimy bliżej współpracować.”

‘location’ and ‘extent’ which underpins Halliday’s account of time circumstantial (1985) goes back to the ancient distinction between *kairos*, the ‘point in time’ of an event or activity, and *chronos*, its duration” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 76). As mentioned earlier in the Introduction, crisis originally meant a point in time that required a decision about the future but the Euro crisis became characterised by protracted state of affairs

The description of the crisis in the press remained faithful to the original definition of the crisis deriving from the medical field where it meant a decisive point, ‘critical moment’ in a disease at which the future of a patient is being decided (“Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011). A certain feeling of urgency and significance was evoked in phrases such as “*A last wake-up call*”, “*The moment of truth*”, “*A crucial crossroads*”, in the descriptions of the Euro zone meltdown delivered by the EU’s top economic policymaker Olli Rehn, David Cameron, and Greece’s prime minister, Lucas Papademos, respectively (“Slouching towards Bethlehem: The Euro crisis.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011) or the following quotation in the Financial Times:

The crisis in Europe remains the central challenge to global growth. ***It is crucial that Europe move quickly*** (emphasis added) to put in place a strong plan to restore financial stability ... this week ***it sounded more urgent than ever*** (emphasis added) (Barber, Tony. “Enter the technocrats: Political turmoil in the Euro zone.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

On the other hand, expressions of duration were also present as the following excerpt from the Polish Rzeczpospolita show: „the crisis in the Euro zone is far from being over” (own translation, “Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁵⁸

Additionally, in an interview for the Financial Times, European commissioner for monetary affairs, Olli Rehn, noted that “the probability of a more protracted period of stagnation is high. A deep and prolonged recession complemented by continued market turmoil cannot be excluded” (Pignal, Stanley. “Growth pessimism triggers warning of recession.” Financial Times, 11 November 2011; also quoted in Watson, Rory. “Europe faces threat of renewed recession as growth figures fall.” The Times, 11 November 2011).

In the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza, the then Budget Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski when asked whether the crisis caused the state of emergency in the EU confirmed that the Union was governed in the crisis mode around the clock: “Has the crisis caused a state of emergency

⁵⁸ org. Polish: “Kryzys w strefie euro daleki jest od zakończenia.”

in Europe? ... We have 24/7 crisis management” (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 November 2011).⁵⁹ As mentioned earlier in this thesis, such a permanent *state of emergency* is often instrumentalised by the governments who seek to introduce emergency measures as the norm, and is the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics and the way to govern (see Introduction).

Representation of Space

Space is represented through the agentialisation and personification of the crisis, which is in turn depicted as a force that touched countries across the Union, big and small, weak and strong, peripheries and in the centre. The vast geographical scope of the impact of the crisis is well presented in the following quotations from *Gazeta Wyborcza* with several Member states mentioned within a relatively short text passage:

Berlusconi, who is leaving the position of the prime minister of Italy, is the latest victim of the crisis. In February, the Prime Minister of Ireland, conservative Brian Cowen, had to leave, in June the crisis finished off the Portuguese Prime Minister, a socialist Jose Socrates, and in October it brushed away the notorious Slovak centre-right government of Prime Minister Iveta Radieova ... He [Greek Prime Minister Papandreou] also due to his mistakes ... and under the pressure of financial markets had to share power with the opposition and leave. Perhaps Papandreou or Berlusconi will not be the last prime ministers overthrown by the financial markets ... It seems certain that the Spanish left will lose the early elections ... On the banks of the Seine, it is believed that the right-wing [French] President Nicolas Sarkozy will not defend himself in next year's elections (own translation, “Kryzysowa miotła.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 November 2011).⁶⁰

The article suggests, therefore, that the crisis covers the entire Union without exceptions. It “has managed to break from the periphery to the core (of the EU) itself - through Greece,

⁵⁹ org. Polish: “Czy kryzys sprawił, że mamy stan wyjątkowy w Europie? ... Mamy stan całodobowego zarządzania kryzysem.”

⁶⁰ org. Polish: “Berlusconi, który odchodzi ze stanowiska premiera Włoch, to najnowsza ofiara kryzysu. W lutym musiał odejść premier Irlandii, konserwatysta Brian Cowen, w czerwcu kryzys wykończył premiera portugalskiego, socjalistę Jose Socratesa, a w październiku zmiotł rykoszetem nieźle sobie radzący słowacki centroprawicowy rząd premier Ivety Radieovej. ... On [Papandreou] także wskutek błędów ... i pod presją rynków finansowych musiał się podzielić władzą z opozycją i odejść. Zapewne Papandreou czy Berlusconi nie będą ostatnimi premierami obalonymi przez rynki finansowe ... Wydaje się pewne, że hiszpańska lewica z kretesem przegra przyspieszone wybory ... Nad Sekwaną wietrzą, że prawicowy prezydent Nicolas Sarkozy nie obroni się w przyszłorocznych wyborach.”

Ireland, Portugal, Spain and now Italy” (own translation, “Katastrofa kolejowa w zwolnionym tempie.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).⁶¹

According to Gazeta Wyborcza, the crisis not only “*span[ned] across the continent*” but also “*penetrates in depth*” (emphasis added) leaving scars on the economy, political systems and the European society: This crisis reaches exceptionally deep and therefore it will leave irreversible traces - not only on the economy, but also in the mechanisms of the EU and collective consciousness” (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).⁶²

In this chapter, I demonstrated how the roots, solutions, consequences and spatial and temporal dimensions of the Euro crisis are represented in the sample under analysis, situating it in the context of the political and economic situation in Italy and Greece. The main aspects covered correspond to the finding of the quantitative analysis. I deconstructed the debate and disentangled main arguments as regards roots, solutions, and consequences of the Euro crisis, pointing to the elements of neoliberal ideology salient in the reports. Temporal and spatial representations empowered the crisis as a key actor which will be further explored in the following chapters.

⁶¹ org. Polish: “Kryzys zadłużenia zdołał się przebić od peryferii do samego jądra - przez Grecję, Irlandię, Portugalię, Hiszpanię, a teraz Włochy.”

⁶² org. Polish: “Wyjątkowo głęboko sięga ten kryzys i dlatego zostawi nieodwracalne ślady - nie tylko w gospodarce, ale także w mechanizmach UE i świadomości zbiorowej.”

VII. Social Actors in the Euro Crisis

“Agency ... as a sociological concept, is of major and classic importance in critical discourse analysis: in which contexts are which social actors represented as ‘agents’ and which as ‘patients’?” (Van Leeuwen, Discourse and Practice 23)

Investigating ideological bias, it has been important for Critical Discourse Analysis to analyse the role of social agents who inevitably carry stance towards what is reported. In the present chapter, I will analyse the representation of social actors following van Leeuwen's framework that demonstrates the possible asymmetrical patterns of representation with sets of binary categories, such as activation vs. passivation, association vs. dissociation, genericisation vs. specification, nominalisation vs. categorisation, functionalisation vs. identification, individualisation vs. assimilation, personalisation vs. impersonalisation or inclusion vs. exclusion (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors”).

Van Leeuwen introduces “a *sociosemantic* inventory of the ways in which social actors can be represented” (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 32) which help to reveal systematic omissions and distortions in representations. As he points out, the most fundamental transformation in the text is the substitution of elements of social practice with other semiotic elements. “[S]ome participants are *particularised* and *nominated*, others *generalised* and *aggregated*, and some actions are *objectivated* through nominalisation, while others are *spatialised*. What kinds of substitution occur depends on the context *into* which a practice is recontextualised” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 17).

Below, I will identify and analyse key elements of representation of social actors by firstly investigating the roles that social actors are given to play, namely who is represented as an “agent” (assigned an active role) and who as a “patient” (performing a passive role) in the Euro crisis and by which linguistic means this has been achieved. In the analysed sample, the Euro crisis is represented as the most important and activated actor, personified and endowed in enormous power. Active roles are also assigned to governments of EU member states, experts quoted in the news and the Greek people when blamed for causing the crisis. The

question of the role media outlets and journalists perform in the discourse remains to be discussed.

Crisis as a Major Activated Actor

Representations can arrange social relations between discourse participants and assign roles empowering social actors as active or disempowering them performing passive roles. “[T]he roles that social actors are given to play in representations are an aspect of representation which plays a significant part in the work of many critical linguists: who is represented as ‘agent’ (‘actor’), who as ‘patient’ (‘goal’) with respect to a given action?” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 32). This distinction will become particularly important in analysing actors involved in the representation of the Euro crisis and indeed the crisis itself as an actor.

According to Van Leeuwen, “[a]ctivation occurs when social actors are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity, *passivation* when they are represented as ‘undergoing’ the activity, or as being ‘at the receiving end of it’” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 33; (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 43–44). Additionally, passivation introduces yet another distinction: *subjection* and *beneficialisation*. Social actors which are subjected are treated as objects, whereas social actors undergoing beneficialisation are other people or parties who benefit from a represented activity (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 44).

The Euro crisis is represented as the most important and activated actor in the analysed sample. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, it penetrated the whole continent reaching unprecedented depths. Together with the financial markets, it was personified particularly strongly with a powerful metaphor of a sweeping broom that could clean political scene, meaning bring to power or remove the unsuitable and badly performing governments (own translation, “Kryzysowa miotła.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 November 2011).⁶³

The Euro zone crisis *sweeps out sharply* (own translation, emphasis added, *org. Polish*: „Kryzys strefy Euro *wymiata ostro* (*emphasis added*) (“Kryzysowa miotła.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 November 2011).

⁶³ org. Polish: “Kryzys wyniósł do władzy.”

Tusk's government can also be reached by the crisis broom (own translation, *org. Polish*: „Rząd Tuska też może osiągnąć kryzysowa miotła” (“Kryzysowa miotła.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).

Gazeta Wyborcza noted that “the crisis brought down the Portuguese Prime Minister”, “swept away the Slovak government” (own translation, “Kryzysowa miotła.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011)⁶⁴, and „removed the governments of Ireland and Portugal” (own translation, “Kryzysowa miotła.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).⁶⁵ It cleaned both on left and right sides of the political scene disregarding of the performance and achievements.

The Euro zone crisis is *sweeping heavily* (emphasis added). Left and right. Conservatives and Socialists. Good and bad prime ministers. Politicians with charisma and populists. And even such ones as Silvio Berlusconi, who survived 53 votes of confidence, and lasted despite scandals of corruption and morals (“Kryzysowa miotła.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).⁶⁶

As in Gazeta Wyborcza, financial markets were also personified as key political players in times of crisis (“Kryzysowa miotła.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011)⁶⁷ which often had to be convinced, healed, calmed down or regain trust as exemplified in the following quotes:

“to convince the markets” (own translation, *org. Polish*: “Przekonać rynki,” “Game over, Silvio, G-Pap.” Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)

“to heal the markets” (own translation, *org. Polish*: “Uzdrowić rynki,” “Game over, Silvio, G-Pap.” Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)

“the introduction of economic reforms that will calm down the markets” (own translation, *org. Polish*: “wprowadzenie reform gospodarczych, które uspokoją rynki finansowe,” “Game over, Silvio, G-Pap.” Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)

⁶⁴ *org. Polish*: “Kryzys wykończył premiera portugalskiego. The Polish word in the original version ‘wykończył’ means more ‘finished’ in a general context and could be understood in this context as deprived of life or function against the struggle of the victim.”

⁶⁵ *org. Polish*: “Kryzys zmiotł rządy Irlandii i Portugalii.”

⁶⁶ *org. Polish*: “Kryzys strefy euro wymiata ostro. Lewicę i prawicę. Konserwatystów i socjalistów. Premierów dobrych i złych. Polityków z charyzmą i populistów. I nawet takich jak Silvio Berlusconi, który przetrwał 53 głosowania nad wotum zaufania i mimo skandali korupcyjnych oraz obyczajowych trwał.”

⁶⁷ *org. Polish*: “ryunki finansowe, które w kryzysie stały się kluczowym graczem politycznym”

“the formation of new governments in Greece and in Italy may calm the markets down” (own translation, org. Polish: “Formowanie się nowych rządów w Grecji i Włoszech może uspokoić rynki finansowe,” “Game over, Silvio, G-Pap.” Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)

“to regain the trust of the markets” (own translation, org. Polish: “odzyskać zaufanie rynków,” “Game over, Silvio, G-Pap.” Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)

“Markets are not convinced” (“Italy turmoil triggers sharp swings in stocks.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011)

“the fear from the reaction of the stock exchange” (own translation, org. Polish: “strach przed reakcją giełd,” “Nowy rząd na kryzys.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011)

Governments as Activated Players

In particular, in the description of economic situation in the news stories, the fear of the future is the most dominant sensation. Puls Biznesu reported that in the second half of 2011 the economic situation in the world was worse than it had been predicted. The EU was entering stagnation or even a shallow recession (“Teraz obligacje, akcje w 2012 r.” Puls Biznesu, 11 November 2011).⁶⁸ Non-Euro zone countries, even though not directly bounded with the Euro, feared the contagion effect as financial markets are linked and interdependent.

In addition to trade links with the Euro zone, the Eastern European countries are exposed through the banking system. Most of the largest lenders in the region are owned by western European banks, and shocks from the Euro zone periphery could *spill over* (emphasis added) to Eastern Europe through tighter lending (“Austria and Hungary catch debt crisis infection.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

Therefore, the contagion effect was expected among others in Poland where it was believed that “[t]he situation in Europe will surely be reflected on Polish economy” (own translation, “Minister finansów szykuje Polskę na kryzys.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).⁶⁹ Even though the Polish economic situation was relatively good which could offer hope that it would resist the crisis and put metaphorically “wait out the storm of the global crisis on a relatively green island” (own translation, “Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą.”

⁶⁸ org. Polish: “Sytuacja gospodarcza na świecie jest gorsza niż wydawało się to jeszcze w pierwszym półroczu. ... W UE mamy do czynienia ze stagnacją lub nawet płytką recesją.”

⁶⁹ org. Polish: “Sytuacja w Europie na pewno odbije się na Polskiej gospodarce. Tego oczekują od nas rynki.”

Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011),⁷⁰ in an interview for Gazeta Wyborcza, the then Polish Minister of Economy, Jacek Rostowski, reported in rather grim words that “the situation was changing dramatically and *the politicians in the Euro zone did not control it* (emphasis added). The uncertainty around Greece and Italy would have influence on the economic situation in Poland,” he prognosed (“Minister finansów szykuje Polskę na kryzys.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).⁷¹ On the other hand, different views in Poland suggested that by counting with a certain decline in internal demand caused by the end of large infrastructural projects financed by the EU, budget cuts and unemployment, a lot would depend on the strategy adopted by the Polish government (own translation, “Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁷² Therefore, it was the government’s policy that was considered decisive when facing the crisis: “It will depend on the *strategy adopted by Tusk’s old-new government* (emphasis added) whether Poland is *armoured* (emphasis added) for the hard times” (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).⁷³ As a result, member states’ economies appear passive expecting what the crisis will bring, while governments of member states are activated in the text vis a vis the crisis and expected to take actions against it even though these actions, as in the opinion of Jacek Rostowski, might not be efficient.

Similarly, politicians in the United Kingdom were concerned about the impact the crisis would have on the British economy. British Prime Minister, David Cameron, warned that “Britain’s economy would be hit hard by further turmoil in the Euro zone” (“Prepare for the worst, *warns prime minister* (emphasis added).” The Guardian, 12 November 2011). Press stories contained mainly reports of worsening economic conditions referring to “the fragile state of Britain’s economy,” “increasing pressure on the *government to take urgent action* (emphasis added) to boost economic growth” or “blame events across the Channel for the

⁷⁰ org. Polish: “przeczekanie burzy światowego kryzysu na w miarę spokojnej zielonej wyspie.”

⁷¹ org. Polish: “Sytuacja zmienia się dramatycznie. Politycy w strefie euro nie panują nad kryzysem – powiedział Rostowski. Nie wiadomo, co będzie z Grecją i Włochami i jaki wpływ zawirowania mogą mieć na sytuację ekonomiczną Polski.”

⁷² org. Polish: “W Polsce trzeba się też liczyć z pewnym spadkiem popytu wewnętrznego spowodowanego zakończeniem realizacji wielkich projektów infrastrukturalnych współfinansowanych ze środków unijnych, nieuniknionymi cięciami budżetowymi i utrzymującym się dość wysokim bezrobociem. Nie są to jednak zagrożenia o wymiarze katastrofy. Występuje bowiem wiele specyficznie polskich czynników łagodzących siłę uderzenia i wiele specyficznie polskich zagrożeń.”

⁷³ org. Polish: “Od strategii jaką przyjmie stary-nowy rząd Tuska, zależeć będzie czy Polska opancerzy się na trudne czasy.”

deteriorating economic outlook” (“Prepare for the worst, warns prime minister.” The Guardian, 12 November 2011). Even stronger formulations were used by The Guardian:

The Treasury and Bank of England *are making contingency plans* for "*economic armageddon*" (emphasis added) if the Euro falls apart, business secretary Vince Cable said yesterday as the European Commission slashed its growth forecasts and predicted that the continent could be *plunged back into recession* (emphasis added) next year. With *David Cameron warning* (emphasis added) that *the moment of truth* (emphasis added) was approaching for the Euro zone, ministers are resigned to a severe downgrade of UK growth and public finances when the Office for Budget Responsibility reports this month. *Brussels officials said* (emphasis added) the outlook for the UK economy had *deteriorated significantly* (emphasis added) throughout 2011 (“UK Treasury prepares for 'economic armageddon'.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

Although, in British eyes, not being a member of the currency union mitigated the consequences of the contagion, it could not have been avoided completely. The Euro crisis has been instrumentalised and politicians activated again when entering the anti-EU rhetoric, suggesting it is the EU that forces Britain to join the monetary union, as illustrated in the following quotation from The Times:

The common view in Britain is that we are fortunate not to be equally involved in the Euro crisis, because we did not choose to become members of the Euro zone. But *President Barroso denies* (emphasis added) that Britain had a permanent right to opt out of the Euro. He said that all European countries “have a legal duty to join”; there is, for him, no such thing as a permanent legal right to an opt-out. Perhaps the Barroso doctrine can best be summed up in his statement that “the Euro is the norm for Europe” (“Barroso's twisted logic is anathema to Britain.” The Time, 11 November 2011).

Further deepening the fear, The Times said that “European countries *crossed the Rubicon* (emphasis added)” (“After Italy, the sovereign debt crisis crosses border to France.” The Times, 12 November 2011), which historically means that the Euro zone countries passed the point of no return and were now at “the brink of total economic chaos” (“Hope or despair?” The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

The analysed news stories also provide accounts of the difficult situations in other member state of the Euro zone such as France which “was under pressure ... to reassure markets that it can *cope with the deteriorating situation in the Euro zone* (emphasis added), after official figures showed a *slump* (emphasis added) in industrial production that could *wipe out any*

chance of growth (emphasis added) next year” (“Europe in crisis: Gloomy figures put pressure on France to tighten belt again.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

Additionally, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung drew attention to the fact that spreading unreasonable fear would only drive the economies down as consumption would fall. This “armageddon narrative” as it was referred to by The Guardian (“UK Treasury prepares for 'economic armageddon'.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011) was an efficient tool in drawing a picture of a severe economic situation, suggesting an imminent danger or a threat, and ultimately justifying to the public the government’s policy and decisions, often taken without democratic legitimacy, such as unpopular reforms and austerity measures, thus governing through the so called emergency politics as defined by Agamben earlier in this thesis (see Introduction).

Van Leeuwen divided the representations of social actors into those that either perform the representation in terms of their unique identity -- *nomination*, or in terms of identities and functions they share with others -- *categorisation*. Discourse participants depicted as nameless characters fulfil only functional and passing roles in texts and thus do not become points of identification for the reader or make an impact on the story (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 53). Similarly, the choice between *generic and specific reference* is another significant factor determining to represent actors as classes or as individuals. Genericised actors most often are symbolically removed from the readers’ immediate experience and thus treated as distant ‘others’ (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 44, 48). Additionally, social actors can also be referred to as individuals (*individualisation*) or as groups (*assimilation*). It is crucial for Critical Discourse Analysis to investigate which social actors in a given discourse are assigned which features (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 41).

As demonstrated in various examples above, the governments of the EU member states were often individualised and nominated, rarely backgrounded or referred to generically, and most of the time personified in the person of the prime minister. The main actors mentioned in the sample who are nominated with their names and functions are the leading European politicians, such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the Greek Prime Minister Papademos, and the British Prime Minister David Cameron as well as Christine Lagarde, the French head of the International Monetary Fund,

and Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission. Besides Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos, a politician who was most often mentioned in the analysed stories was the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was also referred to in the Times as “the face of the Euro bail-out disaster of 2011” (Rumbelow, Helen. “The fairer face of the Euro bail-out crisis.” The Times, 14 November 2011).

Angela Merkel is having her moment, along with Christine Lagarde, the French head of the International Monetary Fund. Both have sensible haircuts (“I want something that doesn't take long to dry, I have the world economy to sort out”) and views on financial prudence (Rumbelow, Helen. “The fairer face of the Euro bail-out crisis.” The Times, 14 November 2011).

With this, the Times suggested that people who are most capable and best equipped to deal with the Euro crisis are pragmatists and professionals devoted to their jobs, which goes hand in hand with conservative views on the economy.

On the other hand, the Süddeutsche Zeitung evoked a negative picture of Merkel circulating in Europe as a sort of monster eating up malperforming governments. Similarly to the Euro crisis, as demonstrated above, German Chancellor is endowed with the power to remove governments and shape the continent as she wishes:

Chancellor Angela Merkel is no longer content to eliminate her rivals in the party. Her hunger had grown bigger, she is now *eating up whole governments* (emphasis added). This week it was Italy, last week Greece, before that Slovakia, Ireland and Spain. *Merkel, the picture suggests, uses Germany's economic power to shape the continent in the Euro crisis in her own image* (emphasis added). If you do not fit in, you have to go. This picture is *as false as it is dangerous* (emphasis added), even if it says a lot about Europe's imbalances and in its simple logic caresses many guilty souls, especially in the European debtor countries. In Greece, for example, a photo is enough to make the people's soul cry: The Chancellor is standing in front of the now retired Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou, she with raised finger, he with clasped hands and a humble bowed head (*own translation*, Kornelius, Stefan. “Volkes Helden.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁷⁴

⁷⁴ org. German: “Kanzlerin Angela Merkel begnüge sich nicht mehr damit, ihre Rivalen in der Partei wegzubeißen. Ihr Hunger sei größer geworden, sie verspeise nun ganze Regierungen. In dieser Woche sei Italien dran gewesen, vergangene Woche Griechenland, davor schon die Slowakei, Irland und Spanien. *Merkel, so suggeriert das Bild, nutze Deutschlands Wirtschaftskraft, um in der Euro-Krise einen Kontinent nach ihrem Bild zu formen* (emphasis added). Wer da nicht reinpasst, der muss weg. Dieses Bild ist so falsch wie gefährlich, auch wenn es viel über eine Schiefelage der Kräfte in Europa aussagt und in seiner simplen Logik viele geschundene Seelen gerade in den europäischen Schuldenländern streichelt. Dort, etwa in Griechenland,

This quotation is particularly significant in regards to how Merkel is represented in the debtor countries -- activated and nominated, imposing on them painful reforms and expecting to implement them (austerity measures). On the other hand, it spells out how these demands are being justified for the public at home, namely as “false,” “dangerous,” and irresponsibly designed to address the hurting peripheries and to push the blame away. The reasoning whether such a perception of the situation might or might not be justified is absent from the report.

Furthermore, adding to the negative image of the Chancellor, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* argues that the real reason behind the scaremongering in Germany was the will of the Chancellor to manipulate the public while in fact there was no reason to be concerned about the state of the German economy.

There is nothing to worry about in the country. Tax revenues are ballooning, the German deficit is likely to be less than one per cent of economic output next year, the economy will continue to grow, German banks are back in stable shape, companies report record profits, the job market is booming and the number of employees is higher than ever before, the interest rate as low as ever. ***Merkel is aiming for something else. The Chancellor wants to scare people into the fear that the Euro threatens their assets*** (emphasis added) (own translation, “Inflationsunion.” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 November 2011).⁷⁵

In the above quotation, again German Chancellor Angela Merkel is activated as the one who wants to ignite fear in people that their assets are endangered to be able to justify and easily implement her government’s policy.

Both the Polish *Gazeta Wyborcza* and the German *Süddeutsche Zeitung* brought to the light the special role of the Franco-German co-operation in the fight against the crisis which directs the EU policy though not always acting lawfully, calling the duet of Merkel and Sarkozy - “Merkozy” (Kornelius, Stefan. “Volkes Helden.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2011).

reicht schon ein Foto, um die Volksseele zum Weinen zu bringen: Die Kanzlerin steht vor dem nun ausgeschiedenen Ministerpräsidenten Giorgos Papandreou, sie mit erhobenem Zeigefinger, er mit gefalteten Händen und demütig gesenktem Haupt.”

⁷⁵ org. German: “Im Land gibt es keinen Grund zur Sorge. Die Steuereinnahmen sprudeln, das deutsche Defizit dürfte im nächsten Jahr weniger als ein Prozent der Wirtschaftsleistung betragen, die Wirtschaft wird weiter wachsen, deutsche Banken sind wieder in stabiler Verfassung, Unternehmen vermelden Rekordgewinne, der Arbeitsmarkt brummt, die Zahl der Beschäftigten ist höher als jemals zuvor, der Zins so niedrig wie noch nie. Merkel zielt auf etwas anderes. Die Kanzlerin will den Leuten die Angst nehmen, dass der Euro ihr Vermögen bedroht.”

The measure of this uniqueness is the extraordinary role played by the Merkel and Sarkozy duet, which is able to suspend the rules of the Treaty of Lisbon. They both meet in critical moments to agree a position that for the rest, and especially for the members of the Euro area, becomes a proposal difficult to reject (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 November 2011).⁷⁶

In the opinion of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, “the Merkozy duet – the German chancellor and the French President as her adjutant rules the continent in an autocratic manner” (own translation, Kornelius, Stefan. “Volkes Helden.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2011)⁷⁷ and are suspected not to protect the interests of the Community but rather the national interest of Germany and France in the EU.

How it [the Euro currency] will be saved, how Europe will be governed, is now determined by Germany and a little bit by France. ... It is a permanent step backwards to a more nationalistic policy ... Although this new policy is designed for cooperation, it works according to the old rules: everyone looks out for oneself first, since otherwise he or she would lose in the free play of forces. If the European treaties are to be changed, the key thing will be to ensure the interests of Germany and France. No trace of community action. When Angela Merkel calls for ‘more Europe’, *she is deceiving* (emphasis added) the audience. Berlin is now becoming the new Brussels (own translation, Kirchner, Thomas. “Der Auszug aus Brüssel.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 November 2011).⁷⁸

In this duet, according to *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Germany is the leader who sacrifices the principle of solidarity for national gains and the Chancellor is again presented as deceitful to make national achievements. It was suggested that the centre of the EU had been moved from Brussels to Berlin.

To sum up, the governments of the EU member states were often individualised and nominated, and most of the time personified in the person of the prime minister, president or

⁷⁶ org. Polish: “Miarą tej wyjątkowości jest nadzwyczajna rola odgrywana przez duet Merkel - Sarkozy, zawieszająca niejako zasady traktatu lizbońskiego. Oboje spotykają się w krytycznych momentach, by uzgodnić stanowisko, które dla reszty, a zwłaszcza dla strefy euro, staje się propozycją trudną do odrzucenia.”

⁷⁷ org. German: “Duo ‘Merkozy’: Die deutsche Kanzlerin mit dem französischen Präsidenten als Adjutanten herrscht quasi autokratisch auf dem Kontinent.”

⁷⁸ org. German: “Wie er [der Euro] gerettet, wie Europa regiert wird, das bestimmen jetzt Deutschland und ein bisschen Frankreich. ... Es ist ein dauerhafter Rückschritt zu einer mehr nationalstaatlichen Politik ... Diese neue Politik ist zwar auf Zusammenarbeit angelegt, funktioniert aber gemäß den alten Regeln: Jeder schaue zuerst nach sich selbst, sonst würde er ja verlieren im freien Spiel der Kräfte. Wenn nun die europäischen Verträge geändert werden sollen, geht es im Kern darum sicherzustellen, dass geschieht, was Deutschland und Frankreich wollen. Keine Spur von gemeinschaftlichem Handeln. Wenn Angela Merkel das „mehr Europa“ nennt, täuscht sie das Publikum. Berlin wird das neue Brüssel.”

chancellor. The main actors mentioned in the sample, who were nominated through their names and functions, are the leading European politicians.

Moreover, what can be observed is that high-status social actors, such as governments and experts, are *functionalised*, that means referred to in terms of activity as opposed to *identification* (reference in terms of what they are) (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 54, 59). ‘Experts,’ whose role in the discourse will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter were also often *individualised*, which allowed their titles, credentials and institutional affiliations to be showcased, such as for instance in the case of Beatrice Weder di Mauro, economic advisor to Chancellor Angela Merkel (Balser, Markus, and Markus Zydra. “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2011).

Passivation of Greeks

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, in the context of representation of social actors, exclusion is an important aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis. According to Van Leeuwen, “[r]epresentations include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended. Some of the exclusions may be ‘innocent,’ details which readers are assumed to know already, or which are deemed irrelevant to them; others tie in closely to the propaganda strategies” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 28; Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 38). In other words, the decision who should be included and who excluded in a text can be used to suit the ideological purposes of the author. I will claim that in the analysed sample as well exclusion has been used with the purpose to transfer a specific point of view on the actors in the Euro crisis.

Van Leeuwen identified two types of exclusion: *suppression* and *backgrounding*. In the case of suppression, the reference to the social actor(s) in question does not appear in the text. In the case of backgrounding, the exclusion is less radical or partial: social actors may not be mentioned in the immediate context of a specific activity, but they appear elsewhere in the text, or another part of the discourse. In the case of backgrounding, the social actors are, therefore, not so much excluded as de-emphasized or, in other words, pushed into the background (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 29).

As demonstrated above, the governments of EU Member States are mostly individualised with their leaders portrayed as strong personalities. On the other hand, the Greek people,

besides being categorised and passivised as a public and the receiver of the decisions of the politicians, are also represented as an undifferentiated, generic group. Van Leeuwen labels this phenomenon as *association*, which describes “groups formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors which are never labelled in the text” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 38). This often leads to *impersonalisation* (as opposed to personalisation; see Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 60), which can have several effects: “it can background the identity and/or role of social actors; it can lend impersonal authority or force to an action or quality of a social actor; and it can add positive or negative connotations to an action or utterance of a social actor” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 47). In case of the inhabitants of the peripheral countries, the impersonalisation aimed to present them as a uniform group, distant from the reader. It avoided creating an emotional attachment that, for instance, a human story would invoke and instead created a negative connotation. As nameless characters, it was more difficult for these groups to become points of identification for European readers as in the following example:

If the austerity programs are “imposed” on this country, then ***it is only right*** (emphasis added) to take care that ***the Greeks*** (emphasis added) no longer live beyond their means and become a “bottomless pit” for European taxpayers (“Auch Habermas sollte sich an die Fakten halten.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁷⁹

Similarly to other examples mentioned elsewhere in the study, the above excerpt of associating all Greek people with a negative connotation of excessive spending and living beyond their means suggests also a conservative evaluation of this behaviour (“it is only right”) and introduced a deserved punishment in form of austerity measures to discipline them (Lakoff, *Whose Freedom?*; Lakoff, *The Political Mind*; Lakoff, *Moral Politics*).

On the contrary, the Europeans and particularly the Greek people were foregrounded and activated as those who caused the crisis but repeatedly backgrounded and presented as a passive receiver of the anti-crisis measures prepared for them in Brussels and imposed by local politicians “***selling austerity to the Greeks*** (emphasis added)” (“A banker in charge, sneers protester as academic forms interim cabinet”, The Times, 11 Nov 2011). The reactions

⁷⁹ org. German: “Im Falle Griechenlands stimmt es nicht, dass die Politiker ‘die Bankenkrise den überschuldeten Staaten in die Schuhe schieben’. Griechenland war vielmehr schon lange vor dieser Krise überschuldet und hat sich seinen Eintritt in die Europäische Währungsunion mit gefälschten Statistiken erschlichen. Wenn diesem Land nun Sparprogramme ‘aufgenötigt’ werden, so ist dies nur recht und billig, um dafür zu sorgen, dass die Griechen nicht länger über ihre Verhältnisse leben und für die europäischen Steuerzahler zu einem ‘Fass ohne Boden’ werden.”

of Greek people directed against these policies are largely backgrounded and not explicitly mentioned in the news (as mentioned in Chapter VI Solutions to the Euro Crisis).

These findings complement the results of the quantitative analysis which investigated main beneficiaries and sufferers from the Euro crisis. The in-depth analysis of the sample period confirmed the relative exclusion of beneficiaries while focusing on the sufferers of the crisis – Greece and southern countries hit by the crisis.

Implications on the Role of Social Actors in the Euro Crisis

The analysis of the ways social actors are represented in discourse can infer ideology, identity, and power structures. In this context, this chapter uncovered the strategies applied to represent social actors in the discourse on the Euro crisis. The results highlighted that in the media debate on the Euro crisis it is the crisis itself that remains the main actor while the governments of member states are highly activated and rarely backgrounded or referred to generically. On the contrary, they are often individualised, nominated and personified in the person of the head of state or head of government. The present study also tracked down how the Greeks are passivised, often backgrounded and referred to generically, which helps to distance the reader from the group as a receiver of the austerity measures designed to combat the crisis. Assimilation helped to represent the Greek people as a large homogenous group rather than as fellow human beings in specific life situations which might have rationalised their behaviours.

Van Leeuwen's model provided a good framework for the analysis and the patterns emerging from the selected categories and pointed out that representations of social actors and their practices may serve to legitimise or delegitimise certain actions (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 38; Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 38) such as in the case of the Euro crisis the legitimisation of neoliberal policies designed to remedy the crisis and applied in Greece. In the following chapters, I will take a more detailed look at other legitimisation strategies applied in the discourse.

What remains to be investigated in further research is the role of the authors of the news reporting as social actors in the discourse. In the sample period under analysis, references to the authors were most of the time suppressed aiming at the neutrality of the text and suggested through the representation attributed to sources other than the writer himself, for instance experts (Van Leeuwen, “The Representation of Social Actors” 69). Doudaki

reminds, however, that the news on the economy often fail to investigate complex phenomena, connect events into structures and provide the context of economic processes. Instead journalists tend to present events related to economy such as crises within narrow frames and often not provide the reasons or consequences of economic phenomena (Doudaki et al. 427). Reese noted, additionally, that media professionals largely adopt the frames created for events by politicians and marginalise voices that fall outside of the dominant ideology (Reese 394). One reason for that can lie in news organisations being part of the political and corporate establishment with which they share similar interests and viewpoints reflected in their reporting (Doudaki et al. 428). That would point to an important role of media as a social actor in “translating” events to the public. This aspect is, however, beyond the scope of this study and should be addressed in future research.

VIII. Policy Legitimation in the Euro Crisis Discourse

“Every system of authority attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.”
(Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 105).

In their representations of social practices, journalists and media outlets often provide reasons as to why a given social practice must take place and is shaped in a particular way. Therefore, not only do they represent social practices, but they also explain, critique and (de)legitimise them. One aspect of analysing the language of legitimation involves, as Habermas put it, “demarcating types of legitimate authority” according to the forms and contents of legitimation in public communication (Habermas qtd. in Hart and Cap 69). The role of legitimation in texts varies in importance as some texts may deal almost exclusively with legitimation of a social action or actors, while in others it will play a less important role or be absent altogether (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 20).

In the following chapter, I will discuss argumentation schemes employed in the discourse on the Euro crisis with the use of van Leeuwen’s major categories of legitimation, in particular authorisation, moral evaluation and rationalisation (Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication”). My aim will be to disentangle the way arguments are constructed and to identify legitimation strategies they are a part of.

Van Dijk underlines that “legitimation is one of the main social functions of ideologies” as it provides explanation and justification to social actions (van Dijk, *Ideology* 255; Doudaki 2). Berger and Luckmann refer to the same elements defining legitimation as “a process of explaining and justifying salient elements of the institutional tradition [...] by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings and [...] justify[ing] [it] by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives” (111). It is important, therefore, to distinguish justifications from explanations. The latter do not try to justify or defend the claim, but to make it comprehensible. In other words, while justification attempts “to convince the listener of the acceptability of a standpoint with respect to a proposition, an explanation is aimed at increasing the listener’s understanding of the proposition represented by the statement explained (explanandum)” (Snoeck Henkemans 240 qtd. in Hart and Cap 73).

Language is, in view of scholars, the most important vehicle to legitimise or delegitimise social action. Berger and Luckmann have even argued that, in the end, all language has a legitimating function:

Incipient legitimation is present as soon as a system of linguistic objectification of human experience is transmitted. For example, the transmission of a kinship vocabulary ipso facto legitimates the kinship structure. The fundamental legitimating ‘explanations’ are, so to speak, built into the vocabulary (112).

Legitimation in CDA Research

Critical Discourse Analysis is particularly interested in the analysis of legitimation and focuses specifically on connecting the content, the linguistic realisations of this content and the strategies employed in an integrating framework. Therefore, besides being socially constituted as well as socially constitutive and context-dependent within specific fields of social action, discourse is also considered to be related to the argumentation about validity claims, which involves social actors with different perspectives (Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)” 89); Hart and Cap 69).

Where possible, CDA aims to distinguish between sound and fallacious argumentation. The normative basis for this distinction is – first and foremost – the pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion. According to Kopperschmidt, “argumentation serves the methodical challenging or justification of validity claims such as truth and normative rightness” (Kopperschmidt 59 qtd. in Hart and Cap 70). Kopperschmidt convincingly argues that argumentation is not an autonomous speech act per se – such as an assertion or a declaration, but that all types of speech acts can fulfil an argumentative function under certain specific conditions. Therefore, it is particularly important to take into account the context without which legitimation could not be studied (Kopperschmidt 59 qtd. in Hart and Cap 70; Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication” 92).

Finally, argumentation schemes can be reasonable or fallacious. The pragma-dialectical approach defines rules for rational and constructive disputes which allow discerning reasonable arguments from fallacies (see Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004). These rules, according to Wodak, include: “the freedom of arguing, the obligation to give reasons, the correct reference to the previous discourse by the antagonist, the obligation to ‘matter-of-factness’, the correct reference to implicit premises, the respect of shared starting

points, the use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentation, logical validity, the acceptance of the discussion's results, and the clarity of expression and correct interpretation" (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* 110). If they are not followed, fallacies occur. However, it is not always clear and straightforward how to distinguish unquestionably without a given context whether an argumentation scheme has been employed properly or not.

Neoliberal Legitimation of the Euro Crisis

The existing analysis of crisis legitimation in the Greek press (see Doudaki, Mylonas) points to the dominant neoliberal rhetoric in the discourse on the Euro crisis. In Doudaki's view, the media actively shaped the social construction of the Euro crisis. It exercised political agency by legitimating the bailout policies designed for Greece as the only appropriate course of action to combat the crisis and selectively omitted or discredited alternative and critical voices and interpretations of the events (Doudaki 1).

The mainstream media, in particular, are criticized for favouring and supporting the hegemonic discourse over the crisis, by privileging the political and economic elites in expressing their views and providing their framing and interpretations while marginalising or excluding counter-hegemonic or other alternative voices (Doudaki 1).

As a result, the representations of the financial crisis in the selected newspapers studied by Doudaki largely reflected the neoliberal policy and "strengthen[ed] the hegemonic discourse over the necessity and inescapability of the bailout policies, feeding the 'masterframe' of the neoliberal vision of the crisis" (Doudaki et al. 426).

Mylonas' study of the Greek press supported this claim by emphasising the hegemonic depoliticised naturalisation of the economic crisis by the "free market" ideology. Such an explanation, in his view, perceived the capitalist character of economic processes and market relations as "natural" and thus made it impossible to question it as this was regarded as the only valid way to move forward. Moreover, it led to the representation of the crisis as largely produced by the European South (Mylonas 646).

Doudaki also pointed to the "discursive mechanisms of naturalisation and objectivation" which led to the empowerment of the hegemonic neoliberal rhetoric (Doudaki 1). Naturalisation broadly concerned the ways in which the discussion on the financial crisis and the bailout agreements was normalised and in which it neutralised differing opinions and

ideas about the crisis. It was discursively constructed through symbolic annihilation (and its components of omission, trivialisation, condemnation), mystification and simplification (Doudaki 5, 14).

Objectivation, which according to Berger and Luckmann is “the process by which the externalised products of human activity attain the character of objectivity” (78) refers to the presentation and (re)construction of information and ideas as objective facts that cannot be further contested. In Doudaki’s view, it was constructed through institutional sourcing, expertise, quantification and reification which were used in the news “to fortify the hegemonic discourse on the necessity and superiority of the neoliberal bailout policy of strict austerity to the Greek governments over any other policy against the crisis” (Doudaki 5, 10).

Doudaki’s findings supported Mylonas claim that the hegemonic discourses that provided public explanations of the European economic crisis reproduced the neoliberal social order and supported the interests of the capitalist class where media are central for the cultivation of a neoliberal subjectivity. “The spectacle of the crisis normalises, reifies the capitalist crisis as a natural, taken for granted, object and produces public discipline to the new work ethics that the emerging form of capitalism requires” (Mylonas 667). Indeed Doudaki admitted that news about the economy frequently provided examples of simplistic or one-dimensional reporting of complex phenomena with the assumption that they needed to be reduced to familiar and simplified narratives to be accessible to the broader audience (Doudaki 9).

Categories of Legitimation

Authorisation

One frequent type of legitimation comes by means of reference to authority. In this argumentation scheme, the justification is expressed by a reference to a person or an institution in which authority is vested and personalised such as a parent, a teacher, a doctor, or an expert (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 104).

Authorisation can also occur in the form of *personal authority* because of the status or role of a person in a particular institution. In this case such *role model authority* does not need to invoke any justification for its opinions and recommendations. In contrast, in the case of *expert authority*, where legitimacy is provided by expertise rather than status, role models or

opinion leaders are followed without any specific legitimation (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 106-7).

A less often used forms of authorisation legitimation, is *conformity authorisation*, where legitimation rests in the common sense principle, which means that an action is legitimate when “everybody does it” or “everybody says so.” This is typically expressed through numerative elements in the relevant nominal group, such as “the majority of voters,” “most readers” (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 105). Finally, the authority may also be impersonal, vested in, for example, the regulations, the law, or the Bible (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 104).

Decisions and actions undertaken by politicians in reaction to the Euro crisis were legitimised in the newspapers chiefly by means of expert interviews. This is well exemplified by the introduction in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of the economy professor Beatrice Weder di Mauro:

Beatrice Weder di Mauro, 46, is considered *the most influential German economist* (emphasis added). Since 2004, the Mainz Professor has been a member of the German Government's Expert Advisory Council, making her *one of the most important advisors to Chancellor Angela Merkel* (emphasis added) (CDU). Weder di Mauro warns of a further escalation of the debt crisis and calls for a paradigm shift in politics: a hard, long-lasting debt reduction (own translation, Balsler, Markus, and Markus Zydra. “Der Zerfall Europas hat längst begonnen.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 November 2011).⁸⁰

The expert was first presented as “the most influential German economist” and “one of the most important advisors to Chancellor Angela Merkel.” Only then her recommendations followed.

Another example comes from the *Financial Times* that quoted Charles Proctor, a banking partner with the law firm of Edwards Wildman in London:

I have speculated in the past that it is possible for a country to use a section of the Treaty on European Union, namely Article 65, to impose exchange controls and, effectively, devalue the Euro within its banking system. ... If Greece comes out of the Euro area, it has to be done *in breach of the Treaty* (emphasis added). And when Mrs Merkel threatens Greece with expulsion, she has to know she was making a threat with an unloaded gun. It is clear from *the case law of*

⁸⁰ org. German: “Beatrice Weder di Mauro, 46, gilt als einflussreichste deutsche Ökonomin. Seit 2004 gehört die Mainzer Professorin dem achverständigenrat der Bundesregierung an und zählt damit zu den wichtigsten Beratern von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel (CDU). Weder di Mauro warnt vor einer weiteren Eskalation der Schuldenkrise und fordert einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Politik: einen harten, jahrelangen Schuldenabbau.”

the European Court of Justice (emphasis added) that any limits on the free movement of capital protected by *Article 63* (emphasis added) have to be construed very narrowly (Dizard, John. "Empty threats of Euro expulsion." *Financial Times*, 14 November 2011.)

In addition to the expert authority the quotation above made reference to the impersonal authority in the form of 'the law' by bringing in relevant parts of the Treaties in defence of Greece staying in the Euro zone.

An essential part of analysing authorisation consists of posing questions as to what role experts and economists play in the discourse, how they 'translate' their expert knowledge for lay people, and how reliable their statements are (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 40). Therefore, "expertise performs an exclusionary function, controlling who can speak authoritatively about an issue" (Seymour 2009, 4). Doudaki argues that the presence of experts in the news has increased significantly in recent years due to them being considered to be credible sources of information and views unattached to specific interests (Doudaki 11). In addition, Albæk claims that experts often serve as a "compensatory legitimation" as they are able to provide insights which journalists often lack or to confirm the conclusions they have already reached (Doudaki 11; Albæk 338).

In this respect, it is necessary to draw attention once more to the role the media play in the 'translation' of events for their audiences, who controls them, how market structures they are a part of, influence what validity claims of truth and normative rightness are explicitly made or presupposed in their statements or a broader discourse, and most importantly how these claims are related politically or ideologically (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* 40). The choice of experts is performed by the author and can be based on the possibilities available to him, his own convictions (in that case we could talk of the bias of the text) and point to journalistic practices (often very limited time for the preparation of a story) as well as the structure of the media system as a whole. Due to space limitations, this aspect is not directly the subject of this analysis and should be addressed by researchers in further studies.

Moral Evaluation

Moral evaluation is a form of legitimation by direct reference to values. The values that appeared repeatedly in the analysed sample refer to Greece and its false reporting that

allegedly led to the crisis, which is demonstrated below by the extract from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

In the case of Greece, it is not true that politicians “blame the banking crisis on over-indebted states”. On the contrary, Greece was over-indebted long before this crisis, and stalked its entry into the European Monetary Union with false statistics. If the austerity programs are “imposed” on this country, then *it is only right* (emphasis added) to take care that the Greeks no longer live beyond their means and become a “bottomless pit” for European taxpayers (“Auch Habermas sollte sich an die Fakten halten.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁸¹

The policy of austerity has been legitimised in the above quotation by simple “it is only right” referring clearly to moral values that assign indebtedness, false reporting and “living beyond one’s means” as a wrong behaviour for which one needs to bear consequences. The lack of discipline that this eludes to exposes a strongly conservative moral stance which in principle punishes lack of disobedience and discipline as morally wrong (see Lakoff, *Whose Freedom?*; Lakoff, *The Political Mind*; Lakoff, *Moral Politics*).

Rationalisation

According to van Leeuwen, rationalisation of an argument may be established in some form of common sense, or by the specialists in the field who elaborate on the developments. It may also refer to major religions and ideologies (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 105). In particular, *instrumental rationalisation* appears at first sight as a straightforward and rational justification by reference to the objectives or function of the social action, the needs it fulfills, or the positive effect it might have (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 105-106) as demonstrated in the following quotation by the Süddeutsche Zeitung:

The beneficiary countries such as Italy or Greece had to accept that Europe sets their austerity program and reform packages. This is a restriction of national sovereignty, but indispensable, because *otherwise the will to save might wane* (emphasis added). The alternative to this risky

⁸¹ org. German: “Im Falle Griechenlands stimmt es nicht, dass die Politiker ‘die Bankenkrise den überschuldeten Staaten in die Schuhe schieben’. Griechenland war vielmehr schon lange vor dieser Krise überschuldet und hat sich seinen Eintritt in die Europäische Währungsunion mit gefälschten Statistiken erschlichen. Wenn diesem Land nun Sparprogramme ‘aufgenötigt’ werden, so ist dies nur recht und billig, um dafür zu sorgen, dass die Griechen nicht länger über ihre Verhältnisse leben und für die europäischen Steuerzahler zu einem ‘Fass ohne Boden’ werden.”

plan is that Europe gives up the Euro (own translation, “Bank gegen Rudel.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 2011).⁸²

In this and other examples, austerity measures and reforms were directly linked to its purpose and larger goal – the necessity to make savings, which had to be imposed onto the Greek people through austerity programme to avoid the break-up of the Euro zone. The price for it was partially giving up on sovereignty. On closer inspection, however, such *prima facie* rational purposes usually turn out to trigger reference to positive or negative values, that is ‘moral concepts’. In the above quotation “the will to save” serves as a higher and moral purpose, a greater good for which certain sacrifices have to be made. In this case it is the “restriction of national sovereignty.”

In the case of such rationalisation through *moral abstraction* legitimation appears to be a straightforward description of the facts and the situation rather than an explicitly formulated argument, and it is therefore one of the least explicit forms of legitimation. The system of interpretation and the moral logic from which they derive is not immediately evident to the audience (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 105-106, 108) but it “let[s] morality in through the back door, to infiltrate whatever room for interpretation was left” (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 111).

Mythopoesis

The fourth major type of legitimation distinguished by van Leeuwen is conveyed through narratives rewarding legitimate actions and punishing non-legitimate actions. As in *moral tales*, the protagonists follow socially legitimate practices and are rewarded for this with a happy ending. In contrast, in *cautionary tales*, the hero or heroes engage in socially aberrant behaviours that result in dairy consequences or a punishment (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 110; Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 105-6; Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication”, 91-92).

This is not a form common for the news reporting and it has not been encountered within the analysed sample. It is more likely that it could be, however, found in tabloids in form of the

⁸² org. German: “Die profitierenden Staaten wie Italien oder Griechenland müssten akzeptieren, dass Europa ihre Spar- und Reformpakete festlegt. Das ist eine Einschränkung der nationalen Souveränität, aber unverzichtbar, weil sonst der Willen zum Sparen erlahmen könnte. Die Alternative zu diesem durchaus riskanten Plan ist, dass Europa den Euro aufgibt.”

human stories, which are intended to be read as standing for their country and their social groups. This remains to be investigated in a future research.

Combination of Legitimation Categories

All the forms of legitimation described above can occur separately or in combination as illustrated in the following extract where moral abstraction is mixed with authorisation pointing to the legal argument.

Such a so-called “monetary state financing” is out of the question from the German point of view, because it would not solve the underlying problems in Greece, Italy, Spain and elsewhere - excessive debt, lack of competitiveness, crusted structures. On the contrary, as the example of Italy has just shown, *governments' willingness to reform is sinking* (emphasis added) just as the ECB rushes with billions to the rescue. In addition to this economic argument, there is also *a legal aspect* (emphasis added): from the point of view of the Federal Government and the Bundesbank, *state financing would be a clear violation of the EU Treaties* (emphasis added, own translation, “Nicht mit meiner Zentralbank.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2011).⁸³

The above quotation is another example of justification of austerity measures pointing to the weakening of the “governments' willingness to reform” as bailouts are provided. What is referred to as an economic argument is in fact rationalised through moral abstraction, as we have seen earlier, linked further to authorisation in form of the legal argument pointing to the fact that state financing is forbidden by the EU legal code and would constitute a clear violation of the EU Treaties.

Gazeta Wyborcza also presents a pattern of justification through which the measures to address the crisis were repeatedly legitimised in the press.

There is a growing risk that Italy may soon lose access to financial markets. ... To overcome this, Italy, like other Euro countries in financial trouble, would have to return to its own currency, which would mean the gradual break-up of the Euro area. Unfortunately, *such a disaster ... is*

⁸³ org. German: “Eine solche so genannte ‘monetäre Staatsfinanzierung’ kommt aus deutscher Sicht nicht in Frage, weil sie die zugrundeliegenden Probleme in Griechenland, Italien, Spanien und anderswo – zu hohe Schulden, mangelnde Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, verkrustete Strukturen – nicht lösen würde. Im Gegenteil: Wie das Beispiel Italien gerade erst gezeigt habe, *sinke die Reformbereitschaft der Regierungen* (emphasis added) just in dem Moment, in dem die EZB mit Milliarden zur Hilfe eile. *Zu diesem ökonomischen Argument kommt noch ein juristisches hinzu* (emphasis added): Eine *Staatsfinanzierung via Notenpresse wäre aus Sicht der Bundesregierung und der Bundesbank ein klarer Verstoß gegen die geltenden EU-Verträge* (emphasis added).”

more and more likely. To prevent it (emphasis added) the following conditions would have to be implemented, *according to Roubini* (emphasis added): unlimited loans from the ECB, zero interest rates, a drop in the value of the Euro to the level of parity with the dollar, and fiscal stimulation in Germany and other countries of the Euro zone core, *while peripheral countries would introduce savings* (emphasis added). *The Economist also believes* (emphasis added) that *the only way to avoid a catastrophe* (emphasis added) of the Euro is the help from the countries in a good financial situation to others who need to carry out radical political, social and economic reforms. ... The European Central Bank could, after all, purchase the debt of the Euro zone countries in unlimited quantities on the secondary market. The trouble with this, writes the Financial Times, is that ECB options considered to be unlimited mean in fact printing money. And even though, *according to independent analyzes by Goldman Sachs and Citigroup* (emphasis added), the ECB has sufficient potential to print the Euro and buy all Italian and Spanish debts without increasing inflation in the long run, it is not that simple. It would mean that the potential of the bank, in which all the countries in the Euro zone participate in proportion to their GDP share, would be used only by countries in trouble. *The profits and benefits of the ECB's activities would cease to supply its largest shareholders* (emphasis added, own translation, „Katastrofa kolejowa w zwolnionym tempie.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 November 2011).⁸⁴

The use of words “disaster” and “catastrophe” brings to one’s mind a clear picture of a grave situation that is “more and more likely” to happen and therefore requires urgent action in order to be prevented. As a solution, peripheral countries should introduce savings as a higher moral goal. This is further justified through authorisation referring to economic expert and ‘independent analysis’ by banks Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. The potential interest of the banks in providing this recommendation is not discussed in the article, which makes an important omission. However, the last sentence of the quotation sheds light to an alternative

⁸⁴ org. Polish: “Rośnie ryzyko, że Włochy mogą wkrótce utracić dostęp do rynków finansowych. ... Aby temu zaradzić, Włochy musiałyby, podobnie jak inne kraje euro w tarapatkach finansowych, powrócić również do własnej waluty, co oznaczałoby stopniowy rozpad strefy euro. Niestety, taka katastrofa ... jest coraz bardziej prawdopodobna. Warunkiem zapobieżenia jej byłyby, *zdaniem Roubiniego* (emphasis added), nieograniczone pożyczki z EBC, zerowe stopy procentowe, spadek wartości euro do poziomu parytetu z dolarem oraz stymulacja fiskalna w Niemczech i innych krajach rdzenia strefy euro, podczas gdy kraje peryferyjne wprowadzałyby oszczędności. Również „Economist” uważa, że jedynym sposobem uniknięcia katastrofy euro jest pomoc ze strony krajów w dobrej sytuacji finansowej pozostałym, które muszą przeprowadzić radykalne reformy polityczne, społeczne i ekonomiczne. ... Europejski Bank Centralny mógłby przecież skupować dług krajów strefy w nieograniczonych ilościach na rynku wtórnym. Kłopot w tym, pisze „Financial Times”, że możliwości EBC uważane za nieograniczone oznaczają drukowanie pieniędzy. I choć według niezależnych analiz Goldman Sachs i Citigroup EBC ma wystarczający potencjał, by bez zwiększania długofalowo inflacji dodrukować euro i wykupić cały włoski i hiszpański dług, nie jest to takie proste. Oznaczałoby bowiem, że potencjał tego banku, w którym udziały mają wszystkie kraje strefy w proporcji do PKB, zostałby zużyty tylko przez kraje pogrążone w tarapatkach. *Zyski i korzyści z działalności EBC przestałyby zasilać największych jego udziałowców* (emphasis added).”

explanation of the decisions of policy makers. The involvement of ECB would mean, according to the author, that profits of the ECB, in which all the countries in the Euro zone participate in proportion to their GDP share, would not be spread proportionately and thus “supply its largest shareholders” with the biggest share. Instead the profit would be used only by countries in trouble. As a result, this would mean that the biggest EU members would provide bailouts to the peripheries. That is an important claim pointing to the other side of the dominant narrative but not discussed in the sample.

As mentioned earlier, legitimisation strategies can also be used to de-legitimise, and to critique (Van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication”, 91-92). In the following example, a fallacious and simplified argument has been constructed attempting to delegitimise democracies of peripheral countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain but also eastern Europe by attributing to them adjectives such as “young,” “weak,” and “new,” or referring to the fasci and communist past.

All round Europe, *democracies are still young and often weak* (emphasis added): Greece, with the shadow of the colonels; Portugal and Spain, whose *aged fascist leaders were still there in living memory* (emphasis added); never mind the *new European nations* (emphasis added) *emerging from communism* (emphasis added). The promise of the EU was that, merely by being a member, your democracy was secure (“How Europe propped up the buffoon Berlusconi.” The Guardian, 14 November 2011).

Pre-legitimation

Pre-legitimation is yet another important concept when speaking of key elements of discourses able to operationalise certain policies and ideologies, turning them into actions. Krzyżanowski coined the term to describe the use of the concept of a crisis in today public debate to legitimise not only something that has already happened or is happening, but to prepare the ground for future actions, often controversial or unacceptable policies (Samec et al. 69–71). In the context of the Euro crisis, Krzyżanowski refers to pre-legitimation as “legitimation already in the process of planning political and economic actions and practices” which is present in policy-making and in the process of shaping political and economic decisions (Samec et al. 70–71). Thus he confirms Agamben’s claim that policy makers purposefully use the concept of ‘crisis’ to legitimise controversial or unpopular decisions and policies.

[I]f one identifies certain action, practice, event or occurrence as a crisis, what happens is that it provides an excuse, it becomes legitimate to take special measures, and to undertake actions which otherwise would not have the necessary validity and which would not gain public support. Therefore, speaking about crisis is again ultimately related to the issue of power and ideology. (Samec et al. 70).

In Van Leeuwen's words, discourses not only involve "a field of objects" (Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*) but also "the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge in a given context" (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 6). As illustrated by the examples, discourse not only represent what is happening, but it also evaluates it, ascribes purposes to it, and justifies it.

The findings of this chapter confirm also conclusions of Doudaki's analysis of the Euro crisis legitimisation strategies which pointed to the dominant neoliberal rhetoric in the discourse. Opinions of experts present in the analysed sample widely converge irrespective of the member state concerned or the media. They confirm the decision of political leaders legitimising the introduction of austerity measures.

My analysis reflects that the discourse on the Euro crisis by mainstream media in Germany, Poland and the UK echoed these hegemonic neoliberal interpretations. I have demonstrated how van Leeuwen's four categories of legitimation are employed to legitimise the decision of policy makers along with the dominant ideology. The focus is, in particular, on discursive legitimation strategies that attempted to present the constructed practices in terms of discourses of moral values and thus to add a moral and value-laden dimension to the discourse. As demonstrated above, this form of legitimation is often linked to authorisation strategies defined by van Leeuwen and most commonly expert authorisation. The third most frequently identified legitimation strategy is instrumental rationalisation.

In the following chapter, I will demonstrate additionally how metaphors employed in the text were used to legitimise policy decisions.

IX. Metaphors of the Euro Crisis

The following chapter is based on and follows the methodology and theoretical background of an article which I co-authored and which has been published in a volume resulting from the international project “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU” hosted by the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford, United Kingdom (2010-2012): Joris, Willem, Liina Puustinen, Katarzyna Sobieraj and Leen d’Haenens. “The Battle for the Euro: Metaphors and Frames in Euro Crisis News.” The Euro Crisis in the Media: Journalistic Coverage of Economic Crisis and European Institutions, edited by Robert G. Picard, I.B. Tauris, 2015, pp. 125–45 and its Polish translation: Sobieraj, Katarzyna, et al. “Walka o euro: metafory i ramy metaforyczne w informacjach prasowych na temat kryzysu w strefie euro.” Tekst i dyskurs - Text und Diskurs, vol. 8, 2015, pp. 213–33. The analysis below takes into account only the three countries relevant for this dissertation – Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom -- and covers additional discursive elements that came to light during the textual qualitative analysis of the sample.

Lakoff and Johnson’s well-known *Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (1980) defines a metaphor as a linguistic device used to conceptualise and express one concept as or in terms of another concept of a different sort. It is “a structural mapping from one conceptual domain to another” (Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor.” 418). In other words, a metaphor is “a phenomenon whereby we talk and, potentially, think about one thing in terms of something else” (Semino 1). The authors suggest that metaphors are not just poetic features of language, but figures of speech that create images in peoples’ minds and facilitate the understanding of unfamiliar and complicated phenomena. They allow us to see events in a particular way by focusing on certain aspects while disregarding others. They work as building blocks of a common imagery and consequently form and influence how people structure information as well as how they talk and think about issues and states of affairs (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 125, 126; Sobieraj et al. 214). Metaphor is thus central to managing processes of perception including our everyday realities (Lakoff and Johnson 3; see also Lakoff and Turner; Lakoff, *The Political Mind*).

Metaphors, as specific linguistic structures, can also be related to bodily and spatial experiences (Lakoff and Johnson; Joris, d’Haenens, et al. 126). Therefore, the rhetorical

power of metaphors may impact behaviours and economic decisions of individuals or institutions (e.g. Williams; Williams et al.) and thus prompts further exploration.

Lakoff and Johnson's theory has been broadened by Charteris-Black's (2004) pragmatic approach to metaphor analysis which, additionally, points to the power of metaphors to manipulate decisions of others.

While Lakoff and Johnson assume that most people are not consciously aware of the metaphorical concepts that structure their perception, Charteris-Black argues that speakers use metaphorical concepts purposefully and in a goal-oriented way to persuade and manipulate. Metaphorical concepts thus serve as an instrument to realise rhetoric intentions and hence do not only reflect the metaphorical structure of the mind, but also actively constitute the organisation of human thought (Bickes et al. 428).

Drawing from that assertion, metaphor analysis can serve to identify discourse positions and legitimation strategies. Also, due to the metaphor's influence on the structuring of human thought, an intentional use of metaphorical concepts can influence and manipulate public opinion. Therefore, by analysing and deconstructing metaphors, some of the possible political implications and intentions behind the way a language is used can be revealed (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 125; Sobieraj et al. 214).

Within the political discourse, conceptual metaphors are often deployed by politicians in their speeches. The news media reiterate and reinforce them, and in some cases add new ones (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 126; Sobieraj et al. 215). Therefore, according to Lakoff and Johnson, political leaders, business leaders, and journalists, can introduce and impose metaphors on a particular situation which later become dominant views in the news media and work as part of social imaginary (Lakoff and Johnson 157–60; see also Taylor).

Metaphors have also been identified to be instrumental in the construction of frames in journalism (Millar and Beck) and are frequently used for explaining and justifying abstract and complicated social phenomena such as, for instance, climate change, healthcare (e.g. Schoen) and economy (e.g. Williams) but also, as in the following example, the crisis, thus supporting the legitimation of policies employed (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 125; Sobieraj et al. 214).

In this chapter, I will analyse metaphorical frames present in the sample and their use to legitimise the dominant ideology.

Metaphorical Frames in the Euro Crisis Discourse

Numerous studies have pointed out that the language of economics is highly metaphorical (see McCloskey, Donald N.; Charteris-Black and Ennis; Richardt; Skorczynska and Deignan; Wang et al.).

Frequently used conceptual metaphors in economic language are seeing the economy as a machine, a construction or a patient. A nation's economy and money are often visualised as liquid (swimming in money, need of liquidity) or as an orientation in space which may be up (more, positive) or down (less, negative); as activity, a nation's economy can be framed as a journey, sports or a war (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 127).

There is a long history of medical metaphors in economic domain, which have been used already in classic economic theory in the 1600s, along the development of modern medicine (Miettinen). In the context of economics, the newspaper language often uses metaphors of a living organism or a human being suffering from various health conditions, being referred to as "a patient" (see Horner; Peckham). Correspondingly, the economic crisis is often characterised as a disease, an illness (Charteris-Black and Ennis; Horner; Wang et al.), or a virus with a contagious effect (Peckham). It is, therefore, possible to speak of the medicalisation of economic discourse on the crisis (Miettinen 211–12 qtd. Joris, Puustinen, et al. 127).

Studies on mediated metaphors of the recent economic crisis point to a set of similar metaphors. The visual metaphors of the Euro crisis in editorial cartoons show the dominance of a catastrophe or natural disaster and an illness or death (Bounegru and Forceville) while in public discourse on the US banking crisis in 2008, the metaphors of illness, natural disaster and mechanical failure were most common (Horner). Esager's comparison of metaphors used in the reporting on the 2008 credit crunch in English and Danish economic newspapers identified movement, liquid (e.g. in a container), living being, medical treatment, war or sports, machine, building, journey, object, and a natural phenomenon as prevalent (Esager). On other occasions common metaphors also used in covering an economic crisis were war and natural phenomena (Charteris-Black and Ennis).

In a study of metaphorical frames across ten EU member states, Joris, Puustinen, et al. (2015) and Sobieraj et al. (2015) identified five most frequently occurring mutually exclusive frame packages: war, disease, natural disaster, construction, and a game. In their analysis, the war frame proved to be the most frequent frame in the sample as a whole and occurred in 9.4 per

cent of analysed articles, followed by the disease frame (7.7 per cent), the natural disaster frame (5.2 per cent), and the construction frame (4.0 per cent). The game and sports frame (1.3 per cent) was the least frequently occurring frame in the news stories under scrutiny.

In the extracted sample of the Polish, German, and UK newspapers, the proportions change in favour of natural disaster and disease frames as most common. The natural disaster frame represented European countries or institutions as hit by an unexpected natural phenomena or a catastrophe. The disease frame referred to the idea that the Euro crisis was caused by an illness that touched a particular country. The war frame, in turn, was constructed around battles, fights and conflicts between European leaders, financial markets and often also citizens (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 128, 133, 134, 136, 137, 139).

The natural disaster frame was the most prevalent one in Poland (43.2 per cent) and Germany (35 per cent) and the second most frequent in the UK (27.7 per cent). The disease frame was most often applied in the UK (36.2 per cent) and was the second most frequent in Poland (29.5 per cent). In Germany, the second most popular frames were the construction frame and the war frame with 22.5 per cent each. Altogether, the natural disaster and the disease frames accounted for 72.7 per cent in Poland, 63.9 per cent in the UK and 52.5 per cent in Germany.

Table 10. Occurrences of metaphorical frames across the analysed sample in Poland, Germany, and the UK (in per cent) based on Joris, Puustinen, et al.

Country	War	Disease	Natural disaster	Construction	Game and Sports
Poland	11.4	<u>29.5</u>	<u>43.2</u>	15.9	0.0
Germany	<u>22.5</u>	17.5	<u>35.0</u>	<u>22.5</u>	2.5
UK	15.5	<u>36.2</u>	<u>27.7</u>	15.0	5.6

Natural Disaster

The natural disaster frame in the sample analysed represented the crisis in terms of various natural phenomena and portrayed European countries or institutions as suffering from a natural catastrophe. Here the most common metaphor was fire as illustrated, for instance, in *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s "extinguishing other fires" (org. Polish: "Gaszenie innych pożarów" in: "Bardzo słabe twarde jądro." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 November 2011). Other weather-related phenomena, such as heavy weather, storm, tsunami and hurricane, as well as turbulent seas or rivers were also present in the reporting.

As Joris, Puustinen, et al. and Sobieraj et al. concluded, the frame of the natural disaster implies that Europe and the financial markets are endangered by a catastrophe, brought by an unexpected and unpredictable natural phenomena which implies that nobody contributed to causing it and nobody is expected to profit. Much damage and a large number of victims are expected from the crisis as a result. A common reaction to a natural disaster is drawing up a rescue plan, which also includes prevention measures for potential similar event in the future (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 136–37; Sobieraj et al. 222–23).

In Poland, Rzeczpospolita advocated for reform course comparing the crisis to a stormy sea and the countries touched by it to a sinking boat: “It is better not to rock the *boat on a rough sea* (emphasis added). However, to stop the water from getting in, a range of reforms is necessary” (own translation, “Między zieloną wyspą a czarną dziurą”, Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁸⁵ Puls Biznesu, on the other hand, compared it to a destructive wind referring to the Italian government which was “*blown off* by the crisis (emphasis added)” (own translation, „Game over, Silvio i G-Pap”, Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)⁸⁶.

Disease

The Euro crisis is often depicted as a contagion caused by a virus e.g. “the Euro zone's contagion vortex” (“French sovereign debt shaken by Italy aftershock.” Financial Times, 11 November 2011). Accordingly, the disease frame was constructed around the idea that the crisis was an illness of a member state or of financial institutions caused by a virus which can spread outside of Greece (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 134). Measures to isolate the Greek virus from infecting the rest of the financial system of Europe were, therefore, deemed necessary, such as in the following quote from Gazeta Wyborcza: “The debt crisis has managed to *break through* (emphasis added) from the periphery to the core” (own translation, emphasis added, “Katastrofa kolejowa w zwolnionym tempie.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).⁸⁷

Additionally, the contagion can infect different countries causing a threatening domino effect: “*Contagion* (emphasis added) is happening before people's eyes. If Italy goes down the tubes it will take France with it. This is scary stuff” (emphasis added, “After Italy, the sovereign debt crisis crosses border to France.” The Times, 12 November 2011).

⁸⁵ org. Polish: “Na wzburzonym morzu lepiej nie kołysać łódkę. Trzeba jednak powstrzymać nabieranie wody, a w tym celu niezbędny jest pewien zakres reform.”

⁸⁶ org. Polish: “zmięciony przez kryzys”

⁸⁷ org. Polish: “Kryzys zadłużenia zdołał *się przebić* (emphasis added) od peryferii do samego jądra.”

The financial system was, in this case, represented as a living organism touched by a life threatening disease such as in the Polish Rzeczpospolita which referred to Italy as an “indebted and *deadly sick man* (emphasis added) of Europe” (“Tysiąc Euro łapówki na głowę.” Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2011).⁸⁸ This disease could spread from the core to different peripheral parts of its body “*from* the Euro zone’s *fingers and toes into its beating heart* (emphasis added)” (Barber, Tony. “Enter the technocrats.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011). This evokes an association with, for example, gangrene and the inevitable risk of a necessary amputation to rescue life by removing Greece from the Euro zone as demonstrated earlier in Chapter VI on the Solutions to the Euro crisis.

As a result, the crisis was framed as an emergency situation caused by the damage of an organism. To cure the disease, which appeared in various strengths from an allergy, a virus, an infection, stress, to a cancer, and to prevent possible contagion, treatment, medicine, surgery or a proper therapy were recommended and the properly applied remedy could determine the future (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 135; Sobieraj et al. 220–21). This therapy was referred to as a fight of the doctors to save an organism – “front of *healing* the Euro (emphasis added)” (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011)⁸⁹ and built up a further “resistance to the crisis” for the future (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 November 2011).⁹⁰

The use of the disease frame might create in the reader’s mind the image of a problem requiring a well-tailored remedy and a specialist to prescribe the medication. If the disease is given an effective treatment, for example a financial injection referred to as “a drip” in Puls Biznesu (“Game over, Silvio i G-Pap.” Puls Biznesu, 14 November 2011)⁹¹ or the removal of ailing parts (i.e. particular member states such as Greece), further contagion may be avoided and a full recovery could be expected (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 135; Sobieraj et al. 221).

In the discussion on the legitimation of the crisis, it is important to underline that through the justification of policy decisions with an external necessity, both in case of the natural disaster and the disease frames, the Euro crisis was conceptualised as a problem arising unexpectedly without it being anybody’s fault, without anybody making profit on it and without anyone

⁸⁸ org. Polish: “zadłużony po uszy śmiertelnie chory człowiek Europy”

⁸⁹ org. Polish: “front uzdrawiania euro”

⁹⁰ org. Polish: “odporność na kryzys”

⁹¹ org. Polish: “kroplówka”

being responsible (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 144–45; Sobieraj et al. 229–30). Thus these metaphors confirmed deagentalisation of decision makers and their policies.

War

The war frame, which included metaphors of a battle or a clash between different actors, was often used in reporting to underline the divergent political interests of financial markets and the political world. Journalists frequently highlighted clashes between European leaders during summits due to conflicting interests of member states (Sobieraj et al. 221–222; Joris, Puustinen, et al. 133–34). In the data analysed, financial actors were portrayed as enemies against which the European Union or the European Central Bank needed to fight as in the following example from *Gazeta Wyborcza*:

Depending on the strategy adopted by the Tusk's old-new government, Poland may *arm itself* (emphasis added) for the difficult times to come (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 November 2011).⁹²

The crisis caused victims such as, for instance, Silvio Berlusconi referred to in *Gazeta Wyborcza* as “the most recent victim of the crisis” as he needed to resign from his function as Prime Minister (“Kryzysowa miotła.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 November 2011).⁹³ Terms referring to combats, battles, fights and weapons were recurrently used (Sobieraj et al.; Joris, Puustinen, et al.).

The war metaphor generated a network of entailments: there is an “enemy”, a “threat to the economic security”, and “weapons” which are needed in the “battle fronts” (see also Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 156), such as “a financial bazooka” (discussed in Chapter VI on the Solutions to the crisis).

Construction

The construction frame identified in the sample depicts the European economy or the economy of one of the countries as a building, such as a house, which needs renovation or which is in danger of collapsing, but also a vehicle, a train, a ship, an airplane, a motor or a

⁹² org. Polish: “Od strategii jaką przyjmie stary-nowy rząd Tuska, zależeć będzie czy Polska *opancerzy* (emphasis added) się na trudne czasy.”

⁹³ org. Polish: “[Berlusconi] najnowsza ofiara kryzysu.”

machine, experiencing mechanical failures and which forward motion is impeded (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 137-8; Sobieraj et al. 223; see also Horner 36).

The articles using this frame suggested that the design of the Euro currency was too ambitious and without solid foundations (as examined in detail in Chapter VI on the Roots of the Euro crisis). Consequently, there was a danger that the system might collapse, which would cause much damage. Therefore, its architecture must be reconsidered and adjusted (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 138; Sobieraj et al. 223). It was suggested that a fiscal union should be created to “save [the] country from default, the Euro from *collapse* (emphasis added) - and the world economy from depression” (“Markets and Italian MPs applaud arrival of 'Super Mario'.” The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

The construction frame was often used in the news coverage of the Euro Crisis mentioning a domino effect suggesting that the failure of the weakest part of the construction will put other parts at risk of collapse too (Sobieraj et al. 223–24; Joris, Puustinen, et al. 137–38). This type of construction frame is illustrated in a quotation from *Gazeta Wyborcza*: “The disaster of a long train happening in a slow motion becomes more and more likely” (own translation, “Katastrofa kolejowa w zwolnionym tempie.” Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 November 2011).⁹⁴

Overall, the use of the construction frame in describing the crisis triggered the image of construction fault and suggested that the foundations of the Euro or of the EU had been weak from the outset as demonstrated below.

The crisis was inscribed in a purely political and not an economic project such as the Euro currency. With purpose, and not as a result of a mistake, a system was built, in which a breakdown was inevitable (own translation, “Europoseł Szymański o kryzysej strefy Euro.” Rzeczpospolita, 14 November 2011).⁹⁵

Game and Sports

The least commonly used frame package in the analysed sample covering the Euro crisis was the game and sports frame. In contrast to the war frame, this frame assumed a fairly friendly competition between players of, for example, arm wrestling, soccer, chess or a race as in the

⁹⁴ org. Polish: “Katastrofa długiego składu kolejowego rozgrywająca się w zwolnionym tempie jest coraz bardziej prawdopodobna.”

⁹⁵ org. Polish: “Kryzys był wpisany w wyłącznie polityczny, a nie ekonomiczny projekt, jakim jest euro. Świadomie, a nie w wyniku błędu, zbudowano system, w którym za jakiś czas miało dojść do przesilenia.”

following example, “[t]he rescue is like a *race* (emphasis added) that politics cannot win” (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Germany, 14 November 2011).

As a result, for the one who loses the game the consequences are not as serious as when a war is lost. Moreover, the game metaphor allowed the freedom of voluntary participation. Generally, the game frame looked at the crisis as a natural part of everyday life, rather than a particularly critical point. The stakes that the players might have in the game were not as high either. As a result, the gravity of the crisis was downplayed as compared with the war frame (Sobieraj et al. 224–25; Joris, Puustinen, et al. 139).

Oriental Metaphors

In their famous book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), Lakoff and Johnson developed a concept of an orientational metaphor that throughout the years became classical in linguistic analysis. In contrast to structural metaphors, where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another, an orientational metaphor carries a system of metaphorical concepts organised with respect to one another. Most orientational metaphors assign to a concept a spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, or central-peripheral. These spatial orientations are not arbitrary but arise from our relationship to our bodies and their functioning in our physical environment and cultural experience (14).

Based on the analysis of numerous phrases from the English language, Lakoff and Johnson built up a system of physical polar oppositions in nature which are characteristic of Western culture according to which, for instance, being happy is oriented upwards as in the expressions “I’m feeling up today,” while being sad, on the contrary, is oriented downwards. Similarly, conscious is oriented up, while unconscious -- down, healthy and alive are up, while sickness and death are down, having control or force is up, whereas being subject to control or force is down; more is up, while less is down; high status is up, while low status is down; good is up, while bad is down; virtue is up, while depravity is down; and rational is up, emotional is down (Lakoff and Johnson).

In the sample on the Euro crisis analysed in this thesis, spatial metaphors expressing downward movement are particularly salient and widespread in relation to the value of the Euro currency in such phrases as “further falls,” “dramatic falls,” “plummeted in value,” “hardest hit” (“Britain’s small investors suffer pounds 9 billion loss as European fund values plummet.” *The Guardian*, 11 November 2011) or as in the *Financial Times*: “the value of

eastern European currencies [is] *spiralling down* (emphasis added)” (“Austria and Hungary catch debt crisis infection.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

Fall, plummet and spiral down or spiral out of control were the most common verbs and verb phrases. They expressed not only the movement directed downwards, but also conveyed that the motion was fast, sudden, and difficult to control. The reforms and austerity measures were remedies applied in the crisis in order to “save his country from default, the Euro from *collapse* (emphasis added) - and the world economy from depression” (“Markets and Italian MPs applaud arrival of 'Super Mario'.” The Guardian, 12 November 2011).

Other Metaphors

Whilst the above metaphors and frames predominated, there were other metaphors present that, although less frequent are nonetheless worth devoting attention. For example, the Financial Times compared the crisis to a funeral. “Many people display uncertainty about how to behave at a funeral. ... This is pretty much what the western world is now living through, even if it remains unclear what we shall end up burying, beyond some national leaders” (“‘Keep calm and carry on’ is not enough in a real crisis.” Financial Times, 12 November 2011).

This metaphor evokes the feeling of sadness that accompanies passing away of a loved one or a friend. With certain sarcasm, the author claims that even though there is a feeling that with the crisis something has been lost, it is not clear what exactly it was. It could be, for instance, the unity and solidarity of the member states that is visible in the way the crisis has been handled. On the other hand, this also relates to social situation when we are not sure what the proper way to behave is. Is it acceptable to cry publically at a funeral? When is the right time to offer condolences? The crisis evoked a feeling of awkwardness as nobody knew how to react.

Finally, financial assistance (money) is often conceptualised as water or a vital fluid when, for instance, speaking of the European Central Bank that has been put under pressure “to open the money taps to help Italy” (“ECB pressure.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011) or when the EU is described as “a failed project that has cost *barrels full of money* (emphasis added)” (“Dutch right clamours for return of the Guilder.” Financial Times, 14 November 2011). It is also a common way to metaphorically point to the liquidity of financial flows.

It is also important, in this context, to bring in research findings which suggest that the intensity of metaphors in the language strongly relates to the evolution of a crisis and increases in critical moments, while declining in calmer periods (Christl De Landtsheer 73–74). The more often the same metaphor is repeated, the more probable it becomes that its original meaning will become diluted. As a result, highly conventionalised metaphors may lose their heuristic value but still be powerful politically. They become taken for granted so that their conceptual value cannot be questioned (Hellsten; Joris, Puustinen, et al. 125).

Power of Metaphors

Metaphorical framing bears significant consequences as regards the legitimisation and more specifically the conceptualisation of the responsibility in relation to the crisis. In Germany, which was economically strong and therefore more “immune” to the European virus, newspapers tended in their coverage to present the crisis as a natural disaster, a construction failure or a war. The non-Euro zone countries, Poland and UK, framed the Euro crisis predominantly as a natural disaster or a disease that might spread onto their economies (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 141–43).

The metaphorical frames of war, construction and game involve human engagement and the responsibility of a party being an aggressor or a victim, a constructor of the house, or a player in a game. On the other hand, the two most frequently used metaphors -- natural disaster and disease -- eliminate agentisation as both disease and natural disaster are framed in our culture as phenomena occurring without anyone's fault. Therefore, with the use of such metaphorical devices in the news stories the agency for causing the crisis is removed. The audience is led to believe that no one is responsible for the crisis, as it came unexpectedly without a clear cause and, like a disease or a natural catastrophe, could not have been prevented and can affect anyone. These frames do not impose agency to political leaders or financial markets, and at the same time they portray the crisis as unpredictable and unexpected (Sobieraj et al. 228–30; Joris, Puustinen, et al. 143–45).

Following van Leeuwen's types of deagentisation (introduced earlier in Chapter VII on the Social Actors) it is, therefore, possible to speak of the *deagentisation* of the Euro crisis through *naturalisation* and *eventuation*, whereby in the case of *naturalisation* the crisis is presented as a natural part of economic cycle and through *eventuation*, “an action or reaction

is represented as an event that just ‘happens,’ without the involvement of human agency” (Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice* 66).

Metaphors that deagentilise the crisis have the hidden political aim or unreflected tendency to distance social actors from any claims for responsibility or blame, as the metaphor directs the understanding of the crisis as a “natural” part of the operating system (Joris, Puustinen, et al. 143–45; Sobieraj et al. 229). This concept is, however, disputed between different schools of economic thought. The neoliberal thought sees it as an indispensable part of the natural economic cycle in which the crisis appears to bring the balance in the economy. However, other views are equally possible (Samuelson and Nordhaus 95–106).

Miettinen, for example, sees crisis situations as resulting from the decisions of individuals in power, such as faulty policies in relation to private business sector and financial instruments (Miettinen qtd. Joris, Puustinen, et al. 145). The decisions of the European politicians, which e.g. involved too much risk could, therefore, remain hidden behind and by the metaphors. Peckham argues that representing financial turbulence as a form of disease creates fear and expectations of response and intervention from policy makers. There is a danger that that fear could displace critical analysis (Peckham 16).

This raises the question of whose discourse do the news media primarily give the stage to i.e. whether the press properly represents the varieties of opinions and views on the origins of the crisis in question or perhaps it gives emphasis to already existing ones in the public sphere and whether discourses other than the one presented are possible.

X. Conclusions

“This is the way the world ends, not with a bang but a cliché. Crisis spirals out of control and Armageddon moves to the brink of abyss. ‘Europe’ is too big to fail yet too big to succeed. Each newscast is a crash course in economics, each headline an incitement to suicide. But since we are not at war and few understand what is going on, the rest cannot believe it. As if watching the fall of Icarus, they sense the gods are angry but return quietly to the plough.”

*(“A 50-year fiction is over.” The Guardian,
11 November 2011)*

The EU has experienced crises before. But the crisis that began in 2008, although triggered by events far away from Brussels, quickly revealed the internal structural weaknesses of the European integration project. The EU has attempted to tackle the rapidly evolving situation, but the way Europe’s leaders have handled the crisis has been widely criticised. It reinforced the impression that the EU’s major problem is a lack of cohesion, vision for the future and trust, rather than just poor financial supervision (Zielonka 1-2, 12).

The crisis revealed structural weaknesses of the European Union and its common currency, which europeanised the discourse and triggered a transnational and transcultural public debate about the future of the European project (Wodak and Angouri; Hepp; Joris et al.; Sobieraj et al.). The discussions focused on the possible levels of integration and different models of relationship between member states and the EU. The Euro crisis thus became a *critical juncture* (Capoccia and Kelemen) and a *window of opportunity* (Saurugger and Terpan) marking a new era in the history of the EU.

The study of political discourse in the media is particularly important in times of social, political and economic turmoil. In the event of a crisis, media tend to report on the EU as a potential enemy or an adversary of the nation state. This is further reinforced by politicians who tend to blame Brussels for their own political mistakes (Krzyżanowski, *The Discursive*

Construction of European Identities 30). As Brexit referendum showed, understanding the communicative aspects of political debate is key to interpreting the reasons for electoral decisions. Among others, this work has pointed to some Brexit-relevant aspects of the debate that would nevertheless need further research. This was one of the motivations to study the debate on the Euro crisis – the first of an ongoing series of crises that the EU has been experiencing since 2008. As the most significant threat to the Union’s very existence since its formation, the crisis is of fundamental importance to the future shape of the European Union.

In this thesis, I have investigated the communicative construction of media discourse on the Euro crisis, and how it reflected and shaped the debate. I compared and contrasted the political debates in the media on the Euro crisis in selected EU member states. My investigation revealed that the communicative construction of the Euro crisis has been convergent. Despite the sample coming from different countries and newspapers of different political orientations, there was little discussion of alternative opinions on the origins of the crisis and of different possible ways to tackle it. On the contrary, the deconstructed hegemonic opinions and ideological positions present in the media discourse were narrowly clustered around neoliberal proposals and claims about the economy.

In my research, I have used Critical Discourse Analysis approach, which allowed me to combine methods from various disciplines and bridge the gap between communication, media studies and politics. Using a combination of quantitative content-based and qualitative text-based analyses, I have inductively investigated the discursive constructions of the crisis in a selection of daily newspapers throughout a chosen time period in three EU member states: Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom. In particular, I followed a three-step approach based on the discourse historical analysis. Having identified the specific *contents* or *topics* of the discourse (roots, solutions for and consequences of the crisis), I investigated *discursive strategies* (representation of social actors and legitimation strategies) as well as the most dominant *linguistic means* and the specific, context-dependent *linguistic realisations* (e.g. the use of metaphors) through which these strategies were expressed.

In order to embed the empirical material within the national, social and political contexts of production and reception of press texts in each member state under scrutiny, I have employed Ruth Wodak’s concept of *contextualisation*. This involved the political and economic background of the events in Italy and Greece, the character of the media in question and their role in disseminating social and political views (e.g. liberal vs. conservative), but also the

broader relation between the media system and the political system in each country (Wodak and Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* 63–94). Even though the UK, Germany and Poland are each characterised by the domination of different media systems – The Liberal model, the Democratic-Corporatist Model and the hybrid Central Eastern Europe Media Model respectively – this did not appear to have a clear effect on the content of the news stories on the Euro crisis. The coverage in all three countries has been largely convergent with regards to the topics (roots, solutions, consequences), the represented actors, the employed legitimisation strategies and, ultimately, the conveyed values. This is an indication that in the current transnational media world the media model becomes largely irrelevant for the dissemination of a news story of pan-European content.

Following the description of the methodology, I performed an entry phase analysis by comparing and contrasting the findings of the quantitative analysis of the project “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU” for the three member states under scrutiny. This analysis served to establish the limits of media discourse, main topics and key actors, which were then further used to identify analytical categories for the qualitative analysis: in particular, roots, solutions and consequences, temporal and spatial representations of the Euro crisis, as well as representations of social actors.

The main part of my thesis focuses on the textual analysis of a selected sample of articles. Based on the material from the newspapers and following the established analytical categories, I deconstructed the discourse around one of the major events in the development of the Euro crisis – that which gathered the largest coverage in the analysed media – namely, the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi from the position of Prime Minister of Italy and the appointment for this position of Mario Monti (12-13 November 2011).

With regard to the roots of the crisis, the main findings suggest that the majority of the press subscribed to the dominant story presented by politicians on the structural explanation of the crisis and the democratic deficit in the EU. Overall, the media rarely put into question the interpretations provided to it and little place was dedicated to the investigation of alternative causes of the crisis. Instead, the analysed press based its reports primarily on accounts received from global media outlets.

Adopting structural reforms of the economies in trouble was seen as the main solution to the crisis. It involved dismissing leaders in Greece and Italy and replacing them with technocratic experts, trusted by the EU to implement the economic reforms it deemed appropriate. This

was seen as crucial for being able to move forward quickly and put in place a strong plan to restore financial stability. The fiscal union was, therefore, legitimised as a security mechanism enforcing the reform on peripheral countries. The voices that claimed that these methods would not work in economic terms, were unjust socially, or could cause governability problems were largely excluded.

Countries which fell into the crisis were represented as wild, irresponsible, unable to discipline themselves and in need of some form of external help to temper them. The only alternative to the proposed reforms, which served as a guarantor for the necessary savings, was the return to national currencies. However, the concerns that this could effectively break up the currency union and the threat of the collapse of the entire Euro zone, if Greece left, brought to light the importance of the role of the European Central Bank (ECB).

In this context, the ECB was presented in the sample as having the necessary powers to keep the crisis from spreading. In the eyes of experts and politicians, the structural flaws of the Euro currency, which does not have support in the form of a national bank, could be corrected by making the ECB a lender of last resort. Germany, however, opposed this course of action.

Resisting the deployment of the ECB and monetary state financing, German leaders emphasised that it would not solve the underlying problems in Greece, Italy and elsewhere: notably the excessive debt, the lack of competitiveness and inflexible structures. This reasoning was rationalised through a reference to the EU legal base. According to the interpretation of the Bundesbank, state financing would be a violation of the EU treaties and would endanger the independence of the ECB.

In addition, the Euro crisis put Germany in a difficult position. On the one hand, it was represented as a country with historical responsibility to pay back its “debts” and to offer its economic power to rescue Europe. On the other hand, however, it had to avoid being seen as Europe’s dictator.

As a consequence of the crisis, the debate about the future of Europe gave rise to a wave of euroscepticism. Referring to the democratic deficit of the EU project, certain parties started to underline that the EU has been designed as a project directed by, and benefiting only, a specific group of people, namely the European elites. Even centre-left parties, e.g. the British

Labour party, viewed the treaty change sought by Germany in response to the Euro crisis as the opportunity to oppose any further transfer of power to Brussels.

This trope of an elite-led Brussels increased gradually and culminated in 2015 with the rising number of refugees escaping the war in Syria and arriving in Europe. Arguably, the nature of the debate might have contributed, among other things, to the British membership referendum being held on 23 June 2016 and its final outcome, as well as to populist parties winning elections in several European countries in 2017 and 2018.

When it comes to temporal and spatial representations, the construction of the crisis in the press remains faithful to the original definition of a crisis deriving from the medical field, where it meant a decisive point that urged for action, as at this “critical moment” in an illness the future of a patient was being decided. On the other hand, expressions of duration are also present, suggesting a protracted state of affairs allowing the decision makers to operate in a permanent *state of exception* and to justify their at times controversial decisions with regard to solving the crisis. Additionally, the crisis was presented not only as having spanned across the continent but also as having penetrated deep into economies, leaving irreversible traces.

The Euro crisis was also the key actor in the analysed sample. It was personified and endowed with enormous power, presenting a threat or an imminent danger. This image was ultimately used to justify to the public the government’s policy and decisions – such as the unpopular reforms and austerity measures – which were often taken without democratic legitimacy.

The governments of the EU member states were highly activated, often individualised and nominated, and most of the time personified in the person of the prime minister, president or chancellor. Thus the leading European politicians were the main actors mentioned in the sample, nominated through their names and functions. The Greeks, besides being passivised, often backgrounded and referred to generically, were associated as a public and receivers of the politicians’ decisions. The Greeks were also impersonalised, which resulted in backgrounding their identity and their role. The impersonalisation could have been aimed to present the Greek people as a uniform group, which would effectively distance them from the reader and prevent creating an emotional response. Being associated as nameless characters, it was more difficult for them to become points of identification for readers. The Greeks were also foregrounded as those who caused the crisis while, at the same time, being backgrounded as victims of economic policies of EU member states or financial markets. It should be also

noted that the beneficiaries of the crises appeared on average in only ten per cent of the news stories in the project and were practically excluded in the sample analysed.

The analysis of metaphors delivered further findings regarding the deagentalisation of policy makers through dominant metaphorical frames of disease and natural disaster. Metaphors, which are parts of argumentation and one of the elements supporting argument-making and claim-making, have been used in strategic ways to support neoliberal ideological positions. Crisis was naturalised and eventualised as a disease or a natural disaster, i.e. as something that 'just happens', a natural cause of development that comes unexpected and without anyone's fault, e.g. such as a natural part of the economic cycle. This research thus confirms Krzyżanowski's findings that a great deal of media discourse that we come across, especially discourse on neoliberalism, is increasingly deagentified (Samec et al. 66–67).

The press also predominantly legitimised the decisions of policy makers along with the dominant neoliberal ideology. The focus was on authorisation strategies and, in particular, expert authorisation. This was often linked to moral evaluation that attempts to present the constructed practices in terms of discourses of moral values. The policy of austerity was legitimised by reference to values that assign indebtedness, false reporting and living beyond one's means as wrong behaviours for which one has to bear the consequences. Stressing the lack of discipline, which this alludes to, exposes a punitive moral stance. Elsewhere, austerity measures and reforms were directly linked to the ability to save, which in turn constituted a value and a moral purpose.

At first sight, economic discourse might not seem to be something that can be easily deconstructed because it uses elements which are traditionally regarded as objective, such as numbers, tables, bullet points, and relies on various types of expertise. It frequently uses legitimisation through experts to appear objective. However, this logic reproduces the power of economic organisations. It is, therefore, necessary to keep in mind that the ways in which objective data are presented can serve the purpose of ideology (Samec et al. 66–67). Furthermore, the opinions of experts presented in the analysed sample converged in their recommendations irrespectively of the member state or the media concerned, confirming the decision of political leaders and giving them legitimacy.

Thus, the analysis of the selected sample reveals that the discourse on the Euro crisis was centred around and supported neoliberal stance and agenda in regards to the roots, solutions

and consequences of the Euro crisis. It deagentified the policy makers and legitimised their political decisions.

Alternative Stories of the Euro Crisis

In the economic area, crisis has been elevated into a historical meta-concept (*Oberbegriff*) through the prism of which the challenges of the century have been analysed. In the nineteenth century, the belief in the recurrence and the inevitability of crises became dominant and commonly attributed to technical innovations. From the 1840s on, however, the economically-based concept of crisis has been widely discussed in the socially and politically critical literature. Crisis was thought to be responsible for diverse social emergency and distress caused by industry, technology, and the capitalist market economy (Koselleck and Richter 391–92).

Neoliberalism as the political and ideological doctrine was developed to overcome the crisis of the 1970s (Harvey). Kotz argues that the characteristics of neoliberal capitalism – such as deregulation of economic activity, privatisation, reduction in social spending and in taxation of the wealthy, aggressive competition, and flexible labour conditions – resulted in economic growth. On the other hand, they also contributed to the development of processes that led to the Euro crisis, such as the growth of inequality, focus on speculative investments by the financial sector and asset bubbles (Kotz 307). Today, neoliberalism appears “hegemonic as a mode of discourse” and results in ideological and conceptual discursive constructions that create and legitimise an image of non-agentic or perhaps even invisible social change. This, according to Krzyżanowski, happens in both politics and the media:

One of the common fallacies about neoliberalism is that it was not a strategic or orchestrated cross-national project undertaken throughout several decades a specific set of social and political actors. What prevails – and is often legitimised – instead is a perception that neoliberalism was a certain “natural” development related to the logic of, in particular, late capitalism ... whose impact upon patterns of social organisation ... around the globe was in a certain sense “logical” too. This untrue image of neoliberalism as something that “just happened” creates its view as a certain bottom-up process. That view is sustained by public discourses ... in whose interest it is to move away the attention of the actual agentic role of political and media practices and organisations in advancing, sustaining as well as legitimising the neoliberal order (Krzyżanowski, “Recontextualisation of Neoliberalism and the Increasingly Conceptual Nature of Discourse” 310–11).

This simplistic conceptualisation and the objectification of particular countries as problematic legitimised the policies of structural reforms in media reporting on the Euro crisis, where neoliberalist capitalism has often become synonymous to the term “economy” and has been naturalised as something that does not require thought and critique (Mylonas 651).

Janusz Lewandowski, the former European Commissioner for Budget, admitted in an interview to *Gazeta Wyborcza* that there are at least two contradicting economic models existing in the EU (Nordic/Anglo-Saxon and Southern) and in his opinion the top-down imposition of the Nordic model favouring macroeconomic discipline has become a dominant practice in the crisis.

In the EU, there have long co-existed two economic cultures: the German macroeconomic discipline, manifested by the independent European Central Bank and the Stability and Growth Pact, and the Anglo-Saxon liberalisation creating a common market for goods, services, capital and labour. ... At present, the Anglo-Saxon and free-market dimension have come under the threat from the Euro zone. ... I am concerned about displacing the logic of integrating Europe through the common market for integration through top-down imposition of the Nordic macroeconomic discipline against the habits of the South (own translation, “Bardzo słabe twarde jądro.” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 November 2011).⁹⁶

The media discourse on economic governance in Europe has also largely failed to present a balanced view and was instead biased towards the neoliberal agenda of the economically stronger North. This was in turn reflected in austerity measures and reforms imposed on the economically weaker South. As a result of these policies, the new government in Greece was forced to implement painful reforms denounced by Greece’s anti-austerity protesters as the embodiment of the “logic of banks and markets” (“Euro zone crisis: Greece: Papademos sworn in as prime minister.” *The Guardian*, 12 November 2011).

Although such policies have been applied in many countries before, the reflection on downsides has been minimal. The *Guardian* reminded that “[u]p till now, the Euro zone has had one prescription for the sovereign debt crisis: punishing austerity to drive down debt in the short term, and supply-side reforms to restore fiscal balance over the long term.” The

⁹⁶ org. Polish: “W Unii od dawna spotykały się dwie kultury gospodarcze: niemiecka dyscyplina makroekonomiczna, której wyrazem jest niezależny Europejski Bank Centralny oraz pakt stabilizacji i wzrostu, oraz anglosaska liberalizacja tworząca wspólny rynek towarów, usług, kapitału i pracy. ... Obecnie wymiar anglosaski, wolnorynkowy, znalazł się w cieniu zagrożeń strefy euro, która odsłoniła wady konstrukcyjne wspólnej waluty. ... Martwi mnie wyparcie logiki integrowania Europy przez wspólny rynek na rzecz integracji poprzez odgórne narzucanie nordyckiej dyscypliny makroekonomicznej, wbrew nawykowi Południa.”

International Monetary Fund tested this in several countries in the past but the reactions in Greece proved that “this medicine does not work economically, is unjust socially, and can lead to ungovernability” (“Slouching towards Bethlehem: The Euro crisis.” The Guardian, 11 November 2011).

The EU’s approach to crisis management has been controversial and widely criticised from the beginning by both populist movements and expert organisations. Furthermore, while other views existed, such as those presented most vigorously by the economist and a former Greek Minister of Finance, Yanis Varoufakis, their presence in the media discourse of the major daily newspapers was scarce and did not reflect the criticism or the controversy around this approach.

The findings of this analysis confirm that the media also played its role in supporting the EU’s policies. As Doudaki stressed, the mainstream media remain privileged spaces where hegemonic actors reconstruct the main discourses presenting their interpretations on social reality and their views (Doudaki 3). The “media panic” over Greece between 2010 and 2012 has enhanced antagonisms and frustration among Europeans towards the Greek (Herzfeld; Tzogopoulos), while the “scandalisation” of the crisis and the specific notion of crisis that it put forward contributed to produce a very particular approach and policy (Kutter 447).

The media reports on European leaders’ decisions almost always had a negative spin. This suggests that the media were not only reporting on a story but also driving it. This dynamic is especially hard felt in case of economic crisis, since markets are fundamentally shaped and affected by perceptions. According to Davis Cross, the effects of international media coverage, in particular, served to amplify a sense of “integrational panic,” which eventually threatened the viability of the entire Euro zone. The widespread perception that the crisis would not be confined to Greece but could spread like a virus became a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to a contagion effect. The Greek debt crisis that represented only two per cent of the Euro zone economy was portrayed as a threat to the very survival of the Euro currency and possibly even the EU itself. With the media playing central role in feeding these fears, the EU has thus entered a downward spiral (Davis Cross 182, 188, 192).

However, although many political, economic and social developments can pose major challenges for Europe, only certain events become constructed as crises. The crisis narratives allow to bring to the surface undisclosed societal tensions which otherwise impede further integration. With critical junctures occurring periodically, many of EU’s crises, in fact,

contributed to facilitating European integration. Contrary to what was expected, the EU ultimately finds strength in them (Davis Cross 219–20).

As a result, it is worth noting that a European public sphere seems to be gaining strength over time, particularly in the process of resolving crises. The Euro zone crisis required a long period of recovery but after the crisis was resolved, identification with the EU among its citizens is exceptionally high according to the findings of Davis Cross (233):

[C]onsistently over time, Europeans continue to want the European project to work. They trust Brussels institutions more than their national governments. They identify increasingly not just with their own nations but with the EU as well. They especially support a stronger and more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy, and they do not want to give up on the Euro (Davis Cross 224).

Therefore, Davis Cross suggests that the existential crises in Europe tend to awaken the citizens and unite them around common issues of concern, even if it means voicing their criticism of certain aspects of EU integration. Overall with some notable exceptions, Europeans choose more Europe rather than less and resolve crises with renewed political will to extend integration into new areas (233-5).

Looking to the future, it is difficult to predict what new challenges Europe will face but certain events may create a fertile ground for crises to emerge such as the policies of Trump administration in the US, including its trade policy, Russian foreign policy and the UK leaving the EU. The accompanying discourse in the media will remain an important and constituting component of these crisis triggers that lie ahead of the EU.

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

Political scientists and media scholars follow different research agendas and address different audiences, using diverse methodologies, concepts and interpretative frames. As a result, most of the work done in the field of political discourse focuses on a single country and offers little comparative perspective. Additionally, most of the research comes from the liberal Anglo-American academic tradition (Zielonka 2). That is why I found it valuable to contribute to overcoming the divide between communication and media studies on the one hand, and comparative politics on the other, and place the European experience in a comparative context.

Additionally, my comparative analysis aims to point to research questions relevant to both political scientists and media scholars. My research on the relationship between media and politics in the context of the Euro crisis complemented the quantitative analysis with a qualitative component. Moreover, it took into account different media traditions specific to various European countries. A multidimensional approach, such as the one presented here, covers diverse media-based developments that contribute to the process of communicative construction of the crisis.

There are hundreds of books and articles across numerous fields of study devoted to conceptualising different kinds of crises. As it would have been impossible to survey this vast literature in detail here, I presented the definition of the crisis that I used as a basis and referred to a more comprehensive bibliography.

It has also been outside the scope of this dissertation to draw a detailed outline of political and economic developments during the Euro crisis. This has been elaborated on by economists and political scholars in numerous publications which were summarised, for instance, by the European University Institute in the “Bibliography of the Global Financial/Economic Crisis” (*Bibliography of the Global Financial/Economic Crisis*). Instead, I have focused on how the discourse on the Euro crisis has been communicatively constructed in the media.

Due to restrictions of the thesis, I did not examine shifts in the discourse over time or recontextualisation. This investigation would require a much larger sample that would go beyond the scope of what a single researcher can do but I see it as a promising subject for further research.

Moreover, since the economies of the analysed countries have not been severely affected by the Euro crisis, the selected sample could, in the future, be complemented by a southern perspective from countries that suffered the consequences of the crisis and austerity measures such as Greece, Spain or Italy. Such case studies could provide a relevant comparison.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that a comparative work involving text analysis and, in particular, metaphors in different languages carries a danger that some nuances in languages which are not native to the researcher, even if their command of those languages is excellent, might not be fully identified.

I hope that the analysis of the Euro crisis presented in this dissertation will be useful for discourse researchers, who will take it further, compare, contrast and investigate different regions and time periods. As the European Union is a project under continuous construction, the future will certainly provide more material for the analysis of EU crises.

XI. Bibliography

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Annex 2: Codebook

Codebook

Euro Crisis Project

Article Analysis Collection Sheet

Final Version

This codebook contains the categories and instructions for coding responses to each category.

It is used in conjunction with a coding sheet on which the actual answers are recorded. DO NOT RECORD ANSWERS ON THE CODE BOOK!

Use a separate coding sheet for each newspaper article and then transfer the data from the sheets to the project Excel data processing workbook.

If in doubt about the proper coding for a specific item, the coder should write a brief note about the doubts on the coding sheet for review by a supervisor to make the determination.

Coders should analyze only substantive articles. Do not code letters to editors, readers' comments, cartoons and illustrations or stand-alone photos. Articles that mention the Euro Crisis in passing—but are not specifically about it—should not be coded (Examples: an article about traffic difficulties during a summit of leaders addressing the crisis or a sports article about a football match between Germany and Greece that mentions the issue).

Use of "Other", code 98 or 980: A number of categories permit coding the answer "Other". Whenever the answer "Other" is used and entered as number 98/980, the coder should also write a specifying word/brief phrase indicating what the other refers to on the code sheet.

Note about Item 1, researcher number, page 3: Each team should assign a coder number to each person doing the coding (01, 02, 03, etc.) so supervisors can identify and contact them in event of questions or issues related to articles coded.

Note about coding portrayals in articles (Items 14-21): Code only *explicit* portrayals of roots, responsibilities, responses, etc. in the article. That is, code only answers that are clearly expressed and unambiguous. The coder should not have to infer the portrayal from vague, enigmatic or ambiguous language or article construction. If a portrayal is not clearly expressed, record number 99 (none). If more than one answer is present in the article, select the dominant (most discussed response or response given preferential coverage in the article).

Note about Item 14, root of the crisis, page 10: Because some partners wish to explore this item in greater depth, both a condensed and extended coding schemes are provided these are compatible for comparative purposes. The coder should use the scheme specified by the national research team.

Table of Content

1. Researcher number
2. Country of article
3. Newspaper in which the article appeared
4. Date of the coverage
5. Genre (type of story)
6. Topic of the article
7. Story impetus
8. Story source
9. Page placement of the article
10. Section placement of the article
11. Size of article
12. Type of sources quoted
13. Specific sources quoted
14. What does the article indicate is the main fundamental root of the crisis? [Roots of the crises]
15. Who does the article indicate should bear the main responsibility to solve the problem?
16. What does the article indicate should be the main specific mechanism for response to the crisis?
17. What does the article indicate should be the primary broader response needed to the crisis?
- 18a) What does the article indicate as the main benefit from the existence of the Euro currency?
- 18b) Country or region that is indicated as main beneficiary of the Euro currency
- 19a) What does the article explicitly indicate as the main harmful consequence from the existence of the Euro currency?
- 19b) Country or region that receives main harm from the Euro as a currency
- 20a) Who does the article indicate primarily benefits or will benefit (economically or politically) from the Euro crises?
- 20b) What country or region is portrayed as the main beneficiary of the Euro crisis?
- 21a) Who does the article indicate primarily suffers or will suffer (economically or politically) from the Euro crises?
- 21b) What country or region is depicted as primarily suffering the identified consequences of the Euro crisis?
22. Identity the main frame of the article
23. What is the main portrayal of European Commission/European Union/Euro zone institutions?
24. What is the main portrayal of European Central Bank?
25. Consequences of the rescue measures
26. Metaphors used

1. Researcher number

Enter the number assigned to the researcher doing the coding (needed if questions arise)

2. Country of article

Enter the number of the country of publication of the article being evaluated

Code list 2

01	Belgium	06	Italy
02	Finland	07	Netherlands
03	France	08	Poland
04	Germany	09	Spain
05	Greece	10	United Kingdom

3. Newspaper in which the article appeared

Enter the publication identification number

Code list 3

Belgium		Greece		Spain	
011	De Tijd	051	Naftemporiki	091	Expansion
012	De Standaard	052	Kathimerini	092	El Pais
013	De Morgen	053	To Bima	093	El Mundo
014	Het Laatste Nieuws	054	Ta Nea	094	ABC
Finland		Italy		United Kingdom	
021	Kauppalehti	061	Il Sole 24 Ore	101	Financial Times
022	Helsingin Sanomat	062	La Repubblica	102	Time
023	Kaleva	063	Il Giornale	103	Guardian
024	Iltalehti	064	Il Corriere della sera	104	The Sun
France		Netherlands			
031	Les Echos	071	Het Financieele		
032	Le Figaro		Dagblad		
033	Le Monde	072	NRC Handelsblad		
034	Libération	073	De Volkskrant		
		074	De Telegraaf		
Germany		Poland			
041	Handelsblatt	081	Puls Biznesu		
042	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	082	Gazeta Wyborcza		
043	Süddeutsche Zeitung	083	Rzeczpospolita		
044	Bild	084	Dziennik Gazeta Prawna		

4. Date of the coverage

Enter the date of the article publication (DD/MM/YYYY)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

5. Genre (type of story)

Enter the number that best describes the genre of the story being evaluated

Code list 5

- 01 news story (description of event, decision, action)
- 02 news analysis or background story (article primarily explaining the impact of an event or decision; what it means or does; explaining history of the developments; people/institutions involved; factors creating the issue)
- 03 feature story (human interest story tied to the news; describing the scene, effects on individual persons, or observations of how it came about)
- 04 editorial (the paper's opinion; written by editors)
- 05 opinion/commentary (giving authors' ideas or critique of the event or decision)
- 06 Interview

- 98 other

6. What is the topic of the article

Enter 6-10 words. Examples: Summit of European leaders; ratings agency downgrades Spanish bonds.

7. Story impetus

Enter the number that best describes the impetus of the article

Code list 7

- 01 event-based (meeting, summit)
- 02 request-based (application, request for aid)
- 03 decision-based (by government, government entity, political party/ies)
- 04 statement/pronouncement-based (by official in released statement or interview)
- 05 market development-based (stock prices, bond ratings, economic reports)
- 06 reports in other media

- 98 other
- 99 not tied to a specific event or development

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

8. Story Source

Enter the number that indicates who wrote or provided the story being evaluated, as indicated in the byline

Code list 8

- 01 domestic-based staff writer (originated with publication)
- 02 foreign-based staff writer (originated with publication by employed correspondent)
- 03 non-staff writer (Journalist freelancer/stringer, usually indicated by something like 'special to the Times')
- 04 newspaper itself indicated in the byline as producing the story
- 05 newspaper and news agency jointly indicated as producing the story (a localization of agency story by newspaper staff adding information.
- 06 news agency (AP, AFP, EFE, Reuters, etc)
- 07 expert writer (academic, politician, banker, economist)
- 08 reprinted from another publication
- 09 writer's affiliation not indicated

- 98 other
- 99 no writer/source indicated

9. Page Placement of the Article

Enter the number that indicates the page on which the article begins (1=01, 2=02...10=10)

10. Section Placement of the article

Enter number of the section of the paper in which the article appeared

Code list 10

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 01 domestic/national news section | 06 culture/society section |
| 02 international news section | 07 special Euro Crisis section |
| 03 business or finance news section | 08 supplement or insert |
| 04 political section | |
| 05 editorial/opinion section | 98 other |

11. Size of Article

Enter the length of the article (this is a relative measure based on estimation or approximation or word counts in databases)

Code list 11

- 1 short (fewer than 500 words; less than 1/3rd page)
- 2 medium (500-999 words; 1/3rd to 2/3rd of a page)
- 3 long (1000 words or more; more than 2/3rd of page)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

12. Type of Sources Quoted Enter the number that indicates the main affiliation, position, or professional background of the first 5 persons **quoted** in the story (direct quotes or reference to a quote or position). If fewer than 5 are quoted, record only those individuals. Record each individual only *once*. If no one is quoted enter 980. If you are not able to specify an actor using a subcategory within a category, please use the 100, 200, 300 etc. codes (Example: an article may read: “...Jim Yong Kim stated ...” ☒ please code 402 because he is the head of the World Bank. Another article may read: “...bankers agree...” ☒ please code 400. Whenever possible use the more specific source code, thus you would not code 400 in the Jim Yong Kim case because his position can be coded more specifically to 402).

Code list 12

100 Officials (non-elected) [Example: EU President, Commissioner, other EU officials, appointed government minister, aide to minister, persons identified as an “official”]

- 101 European Union official
- 102 unnamed European Union official
- 103 foreign government official
- 104 unnamed foreign government official
- 105 domestic government official
- 106 unnamed domestic government official

200 National Government Leaders

- 201 foreign prime minister
- 202 domestic prime minister
- 203 other foreign government minister
- 204 other domestic government minister

300 National Political Leaders (elected party head or parliamentarian, but not prime minister/minister)

- 301 foreign political leader
- 302 domestic political leader
- 303 foreign member of European Parliament
- 304 domestic member of European Parliament

400 Bankers/Financiers

- 401 European Central Bank official
- 402 World Bank/International Monetary Fund
- 403 foreign central bank official
- 404 domestic central bank official
- 405 foreign non-governmental banker or investment executive
- 406 domestic non-governmental banker or investment executive

500 Economists

- 501 foreign non-governmental economist (academic, organizations, banks, investment firms)
- 502 domestic non-governmental economist (academic, organizations, banks, investment firms)

600 Society representatives

- 601 foreign union leader or employee representative
- 602 domestic union leader or employee representative
- 603 foreign think tank, interest group, NGO
- 604 domestic think tank, interest group, NGO

- 605 foreign business representative (company executive, Chamber of Commerce, industry federation or association)
- 606 domestic business representative (company executive, Chamber of Commerce, industry federation or association)
- 607 foreign civil society, social movement/protester representative
- 608 domestic civil society, social movement/protester representative
- 609 foreign member of the public
- 610 domestic member of the public

- 980 other**
- 990 None (no person is quoted)**

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

13. Specific Sources Quoted

Enter the number corresponding specific major figures in the crisis quoted in the story (up to 5)

Code list 13

01	Silvio Berlusconi	12	Mariano Rajoy
02	José Barroso	13	Herman Van Rompuy
03	David Cameron	14	Olli Rehn
04	Mario Draghi	15	Nicolas Sarkozy
05	François Hollande	16	Dominique Strauss-Kahn
06	Jean Claude Juncker	17	Jean-Claude Trichet
07	Christine Lagarde	18	José Zapatero
08	Angela Merkel		
09	Mario Monti	98	Other (major players only)
10	Lucas Papademos	99	does not occur
11	Georgios Papandreou		

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

14. What does the article indicate is the main fundamental root or cause of the crisis? (select one)

If the article *explicitly* indicates a cause of the crisis, enter the number from the 8 major categories below that best describes the portrayal of the cause. If no cause is addressed, enter number 99. If the article broadly refers to one of the major categories (**or if condensed coding is being used**), enter that category number (10, 20, 30, etc). **If extended coding is being used** and the article more specifically refers to one of the subcategories, enter the sub-category number, e.g. 34).

Code list 14

10 Starting conditions and structure of the Euro system

- 11 Euro was a political project not based on following economic fundamentals
- 12 Incompatibility of one currency and fiscal and economic national sovereignty of nations
- 13** Crisis country not ready for Euro membership in economic and structural terms

20 National industrial policies and developments

- 21 Countries' with major sovereign debt problems inability to build up competitive industries
- 22 Countries' with major sovereign debt problems high wage increases compared to productivity gains
- 23 Germany's low wage increases
- 24 Germany's focus on exports
- 25** Spain's construction industry bubble

30 National fiscal and social policies

- 31 Overall high fiscal debt volume of all countries
- 32 Countries' with major sovereign debt problems lax debt policies
- 33 Countries' with major sovereign debt problems grant social benefits they cannot afford
- 34 Countries' with major sovereign debt problems lack of reforms of labor markets
- 35 Countries' with major sovereign debt problems voluptuous state's apparatus
- 36** Germany's low budget deficits/ lack of expansion policies

40 Banks' and financial institutions' policies

- 41 (National / international) banks having financed too much of fiscal and/or private debts
- 42 (National / international) banks unwillingness to further finance states debt / industries' investments
- 43 ECB's loose monetary policy, which helped to finance states and private debt
- 44 National bank supervisory authorities' inability / unwillingness to control national banks' behavior
- 45 Speculation against the Euro
- 46** Speculation against a country with sovereign debt challenges

50 Political roots

- 51 Unwillingness of nations to transfer power to the EU
- 52 Weakness of the central European institutions (European Council, European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission, Court of Justice)
- 53 Different political cultures
- 54** Failure of the political class in the problem countries

60 Maastricht Treaty

- 61 Maastricht Treaty concerning budget restrictions does not match economic necessities
- 62** Maastricht Treaty concerning fiscal restrictions and economic sanctions was softened over time leading to too high debt

70 European Central Bank (ECB)

- 71 ECB's restriction to avoid inflation / stable currency as the only goal does not match necessities / potential of monetary policy
- 72 ECB's prohibition of financing national sovereign debt not adequate in crisis situations/ this crisis

73 ECB's impossibility to fix one interest rate fitting the needs of all Euro countries (too low for some, too high for others)

80 General economic roots

81 the recession

82 influence of globalization and the global economy

98 Other

99 None (No cause indicated)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

15. Which does the article indicate should bear the main responsibility to solve the problem? (select one)

If the article *explicitly* indicates responsibility to solve the crisis, enter the number corresponding to which of the following is portrayed as being mainly responsible. If no clear responsibility is indicated, answer 99.

Code list 15

- 01 Countries with sovereign debt problems themselves
- 02 Countries without sovereign debt problems
- 03 Euro zone members as a group
- 04 The European Union (Commission, Parliament, Council)
- 05 European Central Bank
- 06 International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank
- 07 Banks, investors, and other lenders which hold debt

- 98 Other
- 99 None (no party indicated)

16. What does the article indicate should be the main (short-term) response to the crisis? (select one)

If the article *explicitly* indicates a response, enter the number corresponding to the main response portrayed. If no clear mechanism is indicated, answer 99.

Code list 16

- 01 Loans from other countries without supervision (troika, ESM, ESFS)
- 02 Loans from other countries with supervision
- 03 European Central Bank loans
- 04 Abatement of existing loan provisions (extension, reduced rates, haircut)
- 05 Reduce of budget deficits (tax increases , austerity measures)
- 06 Fiscal stimulus
- 07 Growth policies

- 98 Other
- 99 None (no mechanism indicated)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

17 a). What does the article indicate should be the primary broader (longer-term) response to the crisis? (select one)

If the article *explicitly* indicates a broader response, enter the number that best describes the response portrayed. If no clear mechanism is indicated, answer 99.

Code list 17

- 01 More EU power over national budgets
- 02 Nations with weak economies dropping the Euro (*if selected also answer 17b*)
- 03 Nations with strong economies dropping the Euro (*if selected also answer 17b*)
- 04 National structural reforms in nations with problems (labor markets, education, tax structures) (*if selected also answer 17b*)
- 05 Breaking up the Euro zone altogether

- 98 Other
- 99 None (no broader response indicated)

17 b) Nation that should drop the Euro

Please select the nation or region named to drop the Euro if you have chosen answer 2, 3 or 4 in category 17a

100 Single country

- 101 Austria
- 102 Belgium
- 103 Cyprus
- 104 Estonia
- 105 Finland
- 106 France
- 107 Germany
- 108 Greece
- 109 Ireland
- 110 Italy
- 111 Luxembourg
- 112 Malta
- 113 The Netherlands
- 114 Portugal
- 115 Slovakia
- 116 Slovenia
- 117 Spain

200 Country regions

- 210 Southern countries
- 220 Northern countries

990 No specific country or region to drop the Euro indicated

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

18 a) What does the article indicate as the main benefit from the existence of the Euro currency?

If the article *explicitly* indicates benefits accrue, enter the number from the major categories below that best describes the primary benefit received. Otherwise enter 99.

10 Beneficial consequences for the national economy *(if selected also answer 18b)*

- 11 Improves the competitiveness of national businesses *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 12 Improves the stability, operation, and competitiveness of national banks *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 13 Improves the position of national consumers *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 14 Improves national monetary stability *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 15 Lowers national interest rates *(if selected also answer 18b)*

20 Beneficial consequences for the European economy

- 21 Improves the competitiveness of European businesses
- 22 Improves the stability, operation, and competitiveness of national banks
- 23 Improves the position of European consumers
- 24 Improves European monetary stability
- 25 Lowers European interest rates

30 Beneficial national political consequences *(if selected also answer 18b)*

- 31 clarifies principles used in monetary policy *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 32 reduces ability of governments to manipulate monetary policy *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 34 reduces pressures on government created by currency fluctuations *(if selected also answer 18b)*

40 Beneficial European political consequences

- 41 Advances European political integration
- 42 Advances the harmonisation of economic policies and taxation
- 43 Advances the harmonisation of regulation
- 44 Advances the creation of a single market
- 45 Strengthens the geopolitical position of Europe

50 Beneficial national social consequences *(if selected also answer 18b)*

- 51 Improves living standards and general well-being *(if selected also answer 18b)*
- 52 Reduces social inequality within the country *(if selected also answer 18b)*

60 Beneficial European social consequences

- 61 Improves living standards and general well-being
- 62 Reduces social inequality between member states
- 63 Makes travel easier

98 Other

99 None

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

18 b) Country or region that is indicated as main beneficiary of the Euro currency

Please select the country or region of the main beneficiary in category 18a if you answered 10-15, 30-34, or 50-52

100 Single country

101	Austria	115	Latvia
102	Belgium	116	Lithuania
103	Bulgaria	117	Luxembourg
104	Cyprus	118	Malta
105	Czech Republic	119	The Netherlands
106	Denmark	120	Poland
107	Estonia	121	Portugal
108	Finland	122	Rumania
109	France	123	Slovakia
110	Germany	124	Slovenia
111	Greece	125	Spain
112	Hungary	126	Sweden
113	Ireland	127	United Kingdom
114	Italy		

200 Country regions

210	Southern countries
220	Northern countries
230	EU countries in general

980 Other

990 No main country beneficiary indicated

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

19 a) What does the article explicitly indicate as the main harmful consequence from the existence of the Euro currency?

If the article *explicitly* indicates harm, enter the number from the major categories below that best describes the primary harm caused. Otherwise enter 99.

10 Harmful consequences for national economy *(if selected also answer 19b)*

- 11 Harms to national businesses (e.g. loss of competitiveness) *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 12 Harms to national banks (e.g. increased exposure to risks) *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 13 Harms to consumers (e.g. rising prices) *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 14 Harms to financial markets (inflow of cheap money, bubbles etc.) *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 15 Interest rates too low/too high *(if selected also answer 19b)*

20 Harmful consequences for European economy

- 21 Harms to European businesses (e.g. loss of competitiveness)
- 22 Harms to European banks (e.g. increased exposure to risks)
- 23 Harms to consumers (e.g. rising prices)
- 24 Harms to financial markets (e.g. growing instabilities, risk of bubbles)
- 25 Interest rates too low/too high

30 Harmful national political consequences *(if selected also answer 19b)*

- 31 Restricts national control over economic policy *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 32 Restricts ability to regulate and control financial markets *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 33 Diminishes the scope of democratic decision-making *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 34 Diminishes national sovereignty *(if selected also answer 19b)*

40 Harmful European political consequences

- 41 Restricts ability to regulate and control financial markets
- 42 Creates a mis-match between monetary and fiscal authority
- 43 Diminishes democratic legitimacy in Europe / of the EU

50 Harmful national social consequences *(if selected also answer 19b)*

- 51 Worsens living standards and general well-being *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 52 Deteriorates social services and decreases social benefits *(if selected also answer 19b)*
- 53 Increases inequality *(if selected also answer 19b)*

60 Harmful Europe-wide social consequences

- 61 Worsens living standards and general well-being
- 62 Deteriorates social services and decreases social benefits
- 63 Increases inequality

98 Other

99 None

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

19 b) Country or region that receives main harm from the Euro as a currency

Please select the country or region where the main harm in category 19a occurs, if you answered 10-15, 30-34, or 50-53

100 Single country

101	Austria	115	Latvia
102	Belgium	116	Lithuania
103	Bulgaria	117	Luxembourg
104	Cyprus	118	Malta
105	Czech Republic	119	The Netherlands
106	Denmark	120	Poland
107	Estonia	121	Portugal
108	Finland	122	Rumania
109	France	123	Slovakia
110	Germany	124	Slovenia
111	Greece	125	Spain
112	Hungary	126	Sweden
113	Ireland	127	United Kingdom
114	Italy		

200 Country regions

210	Southern countries
220	Northern countries
230	EU countries in general

980 Other

990 No origin of main loser indicated

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

20 a) Who does the article indicate primarily benefits or will benefit (economically or politically) from the Euro crisis? (select one)

If the article *explicitly* indicates a party benefits, enter the number from the major categories below that best describes the what actor, group, or country benefits according to the article. Otherwise answer 99.

Code list 20

10 One country or region in particular (if selected also answer 20b)

20 Political and financial authorities

- 21 National Parliament (if selected also answer 20b)
- 22 National Government (if selected also answer 20b)
- 23 National High Courts (if selected also answer 20b)
- 24 European Commission
- 25 European Parliament
- 26 European Court of Justice
- 27 European Central Bank (ECB)b
- 28 International Monetary Fund (IMF)**

30 Private economic actors

- 31 Commercial banks
- 32 Large investors / speculators / hedgefunds
- 33 Non-financial industries (farmers, automotive, construction)**

40 Population

- 41 Population in general
- 42 Upper class
- 43 Lower / Middle class (ordinary people)
- 44 Younger people
- 45 Elderly people
- 46 Tax payers
- 47 Unemployed people

98 Other (e.g. science, arts, countries in general; other specific countries)

99 None (no group/country seen as losing)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

20 b) What country or region is portrayed as the main beneficiary of the Euro crisis?

Please select the country or region of the main beneficiary in category 20a if you answered 10, 21, 22, or 23

100 Single country

101	Austria	115	Latvia	
102	Belgium	116	Lithuania	
103	Bulgaria	117	Luxembourg	
104	Cyprus	118	Malta	
105	Czech Republic	119	The Netherlands	
106	Denmark	120	Poland	
107	Estonia	121	Portugal	
108	Finland	122	Rumania	
109	France	123	Slovakia	
110	Germany	124	Slovenia	
111	Greece	125	Spain	
112	Hungary	126	Sweden	
113	Ireland	127	United	Kingdom
114	Italy			

200 Country regions

210	Southern			countries
220	Northern countries			
230	EU countries in general			

980 Other

990 No origin of main beneficiary indicated

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

21 a) Who does the article indicate primarily suffers or will suffer costs (economically or politically) from the Euro crisis? (select one)

If the article *explicitly* indicates costs are incurred, enter the number from the major categories below that best describes the what actor, group, or country suffers according to the article. Otherwise enter 99.

Code list 21

10 One country or region in particular *(if selected also answer 21b)*

20 Political and financial authorities

21 National Parliament *(if selected also answer 21b)*

22 National Government *(if selected also answer 21b)*

23 National High Courts *(if selected also answer 21b)*

24 European Commission

25 European Parliament

26 European Court of Justice

27 European Central Bank (ECB)^b

28 International Monetary Fund (IMF)

30 Private economic actors

31 Commercial banks

32 Large investors / speculators / hedgefunds

33 Non-financial industries (farmers, automotive, construction)

40 Population

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

41 Population in general

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

42 Upper class

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

43 Lower / Middle class (ordinary people)

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

44 Younger people

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

45 Elderly people

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

46 Tax payers

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

47 Unemployed people

(if selected and it relates to a country or region—not Europe as a whole--also answer 21b)

98 Other (e.g. science, arts, countries in general; other specific countries)

99 None (no group/country seen as losing)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

21 b) What country or region is depicted as primarily suffering the identified consequences of the Euro crisis?

Please select the country or region of the main beneficiary in category 21a if you answered 10, 21, 22, 23, or 40-47

100 Single country

101	Austria	115	Latvia
102	Belgium	116	Lithuania
103	Bulgaria	117	Luxembourg
104	Cyprus	118	Malta
105	Czech Republic	119	The Netherlands
106	Denmark	120	Poland
107	Estonia	121	Portugal
108	Finland	122	Rumania
109	France	123	Slovakia
110	Germany	124	Slovenia
111	Greece	125	Spain
112	Hungary	126	Sweden
113	Ireland	127	United Kingdom
114	Italy		

200 Country regions

210	Southern countries
220	Northern countries
230	EU countries in general

980 Other

990 No origin of main loser indicated

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

22. Identity the main geopolitical frame of the article (select one)

Enter the number that best describes the frame

Code list 22

- 01 domestic (addressing the crisis and developments as an internal issue within the publication's country; portraying the "us/we/our" as citizens of the country)
- 02 foreign country (addressing the crisis and developments as an issue internal to another country; portraying "they/them" as separate from citizens of the country in which the article was published)
- 03 European (emphasizing the crisis and developments as European issue; approaching Europe as a collective; portraying the "us/we/our" as European-wide)
- 98 Other
- 99 None/No clear fame

23. What is the main portrayal of European Commission/European Union/Euro zone institutions? (select one)

Enter the number that best describes the portrayal

Code list 23

- 01 the article portrays them as insignificant in addressing the crisis
- 02 the article portrays them as lacking capabilities to address the crisis (not have authority or property tools)
- 03 the article portrays them as ineffectual or confused in addressing the crisis
- 04 the article portrays them as central to addressing the crisis
- 05 the article portrays them as strong and determined in addressing the crisis

- 98 Other
- 99 None (no portrayal of the institutions)

24. What is the main portrayal of European Central Bank? (select one)

Enter the number that best describes the portrayal

Code list 24

- 01 the article portrays it as insignificant in addressing the crisis
- 02 the article portrays it as lacking capabilities to address the crisis (not have authority or property tools)
- 03 the article portrays it as ineffectual or confused in addressing the crisis
- 04 the article portrays it as central to addressing the crisis
- 05 the article portrays it as strong and determined in addressing the crisis
- 06 the article portrays it as acting within its legal framework
- 07 the article portrays it as acting at the border or outside of its legal framework

- 98 Other
- 99 None (no ECB portrayal)

[CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE]

25. Forecast of the consequences of the rescue measures

Enter the number that best describes the portrayal of the forecast of the consequences

Code list 25

- 01 Deeper integration / transfer of national sovereignty to European institutions
- 02 Stronger and stable Euro
- 03 Success / Eurozone preserved
- 04 Final breakup of the Euro zone to more than one (north / south)
- 05 Failure / countries with sovereign debt problems will drop the Euro finally
- 06 Establishment of an enduring transfer system to countries with sovereign debt problems
- 07 Europe wide inflation

- 98 Other
- 99 None (no consequences indicated)

26. Metaphors used

Specify up to two metaphors describing the situation or issues if they exist in the headline and the lead paragraph. Metaphors are words or phrases that compare or apply concepts from something else (often not literally). Examples: describing the Euro Crisis, conditions or events as a “battle”, “war”, “assault”, “cancer”, “hurricane”, “tsunami”, “a sinking boat”, or “under protective umbrella”. Provide an English translation unless directed otherwise by your national research team.

Summary

Title of the dissertation: “**Communicative Construction of the Euro Crisis in the Press: Political Debate in Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom.**”

This doctoral dissertation investigates the communicative construction of media discourses on the Euro crisis in selected EU member states and is a part of an international research project “The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU” hosted by the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford, United Kingdom (2010-2012). Through the choice of subject and research methods, it overcomes the divide between communication and media studies, and political studies, placing the European experience in a comparative context.

By the term ‘Euro crisis’ I understand the crisis witnessed in the Euro zone which in many ways was a continuation of the 2008 global financial crisis. It was an important point of interest for both European and international media and even though it was caused by events far away from Brussels, it revealed internal and structural weaknesses of the European project. Although the European Union experienced many crises since its creation, the Euro crisis has been the most significant threat to its existence and is of fundamental importance to its future. Additionally, the Euro crisis allowed the governments of the Member States to introduce the rhetoric of the *state of exception* as the dominant paradigm to legitimise political decisions.

The thesis compares and contrasts the political debate in the media on the Euro crisis in selected EU member states and explores how the crisis has been communicatively constructed. My main objectives are to pinpoint the convergence and/or divergence in the communicative construction of the discourses in different countries and by different political orientations. My research questions are: 1. Was the discourse on the Euro crisis in the Polish, German and British press convergent or divergent? 2. If it was convergent, which dominant ideology did it represent? 3. If it was divergent, what were the lines along which the differences were constructed? Through a deconstruction of hegemonic opinions present in the press reports on the Euro crisis, this research discloses their ideological foundations. It analyses whether the discourse reflects various positions of all stakeholders involved or, on the contrary, reinforces a dominant one and, if so, investigates whose position this is.

The analysis is conducted within the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis, which allows to combine methods from various disciplines. Using a combination of quantitative content-based and qualitative text-based analyses, I have investigated the discursive constructions of the crisis in a selection of daily newspapers throughout a chosen time period in three EU member states: Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom.

In the first part, an entry phase analysis is performed through a quantification of the empirical material with the aim to establish the limits of the media discourse, main topics and key actors. Subsequently, this is used to identify analytical categories for the qualitative textual analysis of a selected sample of articles, which constitutes the main part of the dissertation. In this part, the discourse around the most broadly covered event within the sample – the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi from the position of Prime Minister of Italy and the

appointment of Mario Monti in his place (12-13 November 2011) – has been deconstructed with the focus on roots, solutions, consequences, and temporal and spatial representations of the Euro crisis. Furthermore, the representation of social actors and legitimation strategies – in particular, the use of metaphors – have been investigated.

My main findings point to an ideologically convergent picture across the three Member States and the newspapers under scrutiny. Alternative scenarios as regards the roots and solutions for the crisis were scarce. The thesis argues that the discourse employed by the examined outlets and deconstructed ideological positions present in the media reinforced the dominant story about the Euro crisis that was put forward by politicians along the lines of neoliberal economic theory. The structural reasons that led to the democratic deficit in the EU were underlined. The solution to the problem was broadly reported as being possible only through the adoption of structural reforms of the economies in trouble. The fiscal union was, therefore, legitimised as a security mechanism enforcing the reform on the peripheral countries. The voices that claimed these methods would not work economically, were unjust socially or could lead to ungovernability were largely excluded. As a consequence, the debate about the future of Europe gave rise to a wave of euroscepticism.

Expressions of duration are also present in the description of the crisis, suggesting a protracted state of affairs allowing the decision makers to operate in a permanent *state of exception* and to justify their decisions with the situation caused by the crisis. Additionally, the crisis was presented as not only having spanned across the continent, but having also penetrated deep into economies, leaving irreversible traces.

Also, the Euro crisis occupied the role of a key actor in the analysed sample. It was personified and endowed with enormous power. The governments of the EU member states were highly activated as well, often individualised and nominated. On the other hand, countries which fell into the crisis were represented as wild, irresponsible, unable to discipline themselves and in need of external help to temper them.

The press also predominantly legitimised the decisions of policy makers along with the dominant neoliberal ideology by means of authorisation strategies, in particular expert authorisation. These strategies often involved moral evaluation which presented the constructed practices in terms of discourses of moral values. The analysis of metaphors delivered further findings regarding the deagentalisation of policy makers through dominant metaphorical frames of disease and natural disaster. Crisis as a disease or a natural disaster was naturalised and eventualised as something that ‘just happens’, a natural cause of development which comes unexpected and without anyone’s fault – such as a natural part of the economic cycle. This points to the strategic use of metaphors to legitimise neoliberal ideology.

The findings of this analysis confirm that the media played a key role in shaping the perception of the crisis and in supporting EU policies. Not only did they report on a story but they were also driving it. At the same time, they have europeanised the discourse by focusing the debate on the same issues in different Member States.

Streszczenie w języku polskim

Tytuł w języku rozprawy (język angielski): **“Communicative Construction of the Euro Crisis in the Press: Political Debate in Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom.”**

Tytuł w języku polskim: **“Komunikacyjny konstrukt kryzysu waluty euro. Analiza debaty politycznej w prasie codziennej w Polsce, Niemczech i Wielkiej Brytanii.”**

Niniejsza praca doktorska analizuje obraz świata na temat kryzysu euro kształtowany w mediach i stanowi część międzynarodowego projektu badawczego „Kryzys euro, relacje mediów i postrzeganie Europy w UE”, prowadzonego przez Instytut Reutersa na Uniwersytecie Oksfordzkim w Wielkiej Brytanii (2010-2012). W szczególności niniejsza analiza bada komunikacyjny konstrukt dyskursu w prasie europejskiej w kontekście złożonej współzależności między systemem politycznym i medialnym.

Pod pojęciem „kryzysu euro” rozumiem kryzys obserwowany w strefie euro, który pod wieloma względami był kontynuacją światowego kryzysu finansowego z 2008 r. Był on ważnym punktem zainteresowania mediów zarówno w Europie, jak i poza nią i chociaż wywołany wydarzeniami z dala od Brukseli, jako zjawisko wielopoziomowe szybko ujawnił wewnętrzne i strukturalne słabości projektu europejskiego. Tym samym stanowił fundamentalne zagrożenie dla istnienia Unii Europejskiej i znacząco wpłynął na jej kształt. Ponadto kryzys umożliwił rządów krajów europejskich wprowadzenie retoryki “stanu wyjątkowego”, który stał się dominującym paradygmatem w polityce, służąc legitymizacji decyzji politycznych.

Celem niniejszej rozprawy jest analiza struktury komunikacyjnej kryzysu euro w debacie politycznej w mediach w wybranych państwach członkowskich UE (Niemczech, Polsce i Wielkiej Brytanii) oraz wskazanie zbieżności i/lub rozbieżności w komunikacyjnej budowie dyskursów w komunikatach prasowych w tych krajach, pochodzących z dzienników o różnych orientacjach politycznych. Głównie pytania badawcze obejmują: 1. Czy dyskurs o kryzysie euro w prasie polskiej, brytyjskiej i niemieckiej był zbieżny czy rozbieżny?, 2. Jeśli był zbieżny, jaką dominującą ideologię reprezentował?, 3. Jeśli był rozbieżny, jakie były linie, wzdłuż których powstały podziały?

W tym celu praca dekonstruuje hegemoniczne opinie i ideologie wyrażone w dyskursie i pokazuje, które wartości i systemy przekonań leżą u podstaw propozycji lub twierdzeń przedstawionych w dyskursie medialnym na temat kryzysu euro. Przedstawiona analiza pozwala także sformułować ocenę, czy dyskurs odzwierciedla stanowiska wszystkich zaangażowanych stron, czy też wzmacnia pozycję dominującą i czyje to stanowisko.

Niniejsza praca usytuowana została w tradycji krytycznej analizy dyskursu, która zaleca holistyczne podejście do analizowanych zjawisk, łącząc metody badawcze z różnych dyscyplin naukowych, tym samym umożliwiając wypełnienie luki między nauką o komunikacji i mediach, a naukami politycznymi. Przedstawione badania empiryczne łączą analizę ilościową i jakościową, jednocześnie uwzględniając perspektywę porównawczą.

Część pierwszą pracy stanowi porównanie wyników analizy ilościowej projektu „Kryzys euro, relacje mediów i postrzeganie Europy w UE” dla wybranych trzech państw członkowskich. Analiza ta służy ustaleniu granic dyskursu medialnego, głównych tematów i kluczowych aktorów, a także identyfikacji kategorii analitycznych do pogłębionej analizy tekstowej. Analiza jakościowa artykułów prasowych opublikowanych w kontekście rezygnacji Silvio Berlusconiego ze stanowiska premiera Włoch i nominacji na to stanowisko Mario Montiego (12-13 listopada 2011 r.), która była wydarzeniem najszerzej relacjonowanym w prasie w okresie analizy, stanowi właściwy przedmiot rozprawy, rozwinięty w drugiej części pracy. Analiza tekstowa skupia się na przyczynach, rozwiązaniach i skutkach kryzysu, a także przedstawieniu czasu i przestrzeni. Ponadto ta część pracy bada rolę aktorów społecznych i strategię legitymizacji, w tym użycie metafor.

Główne wnioski wskazują na ideologicznie zbieżny obraz kryzysu euro w analizowanych komunikatach prasowych. Pomimo próby pochodzącej z różnych krajów i dzienników o różnych orientacjach politycznych, alternatywne opinie na temat przyczyn i możliwych sposobów przeciwdziałania kryzysowi nie były szeroko prezentowane. Niniejsza analiza dowodzi, że dyskurs w prasie codziennej wzmocnił dominującą narrację polityków, która przedstawiała kryzys euro według wytycznych neoliberalnej teorii ekonomicznej. Podkreślano powody strukturalne, które doprowadziły do deficytu demokratycznego. Rozwiązania kryzysu oczekiwano poprzez wdrożenie reform strukturalnych i wprowadzenie planu stabilności finansowej. Unia fiskalna była legitymizowana jako mechanizm bezpieczeństwa egzekwujący wprowadzenie reform w krajach peryferyjnych. Głosy, które zwracały uwagę na niedostosowanie tych rozwiązań do sytuacji ekonomicznej w krajach dotkniętych kryzysem oraz ich negatywny aspekt społeczny, były w dużej mierze nieobecne. Jednym ze skutków debaty była rosnąca fala eurosceptycyzmu w Unii Europejskiej.

W opisie kryzysu obecne są również wyrażenia określające przedłużający się czas jego trwania, który pozwolił decydom działać w okolicznościach stałego stanu wyjątkowego i uzasadniać często kontrowersyjne decyzje polityczne sytuacją wywołaną przez kryzys. Ponadto kryzys został przedstawiony przestrzennie jako rozciągający się na cały kontynent oraz przenikający głęboko do gospodarek, pozostawiając nieodwracalne ślady.

Kryzys euro był również najważniejszym aktorem w analizowanej próbie (ang. social actor), który został spersonifikowany i obdarzony ogromną mocą. Rządy państw członkowskich UE były również wysoce aktywowane, często zindywidualizowane i nominowane. Natomiast kraje, których gospodarki najbardziej ucierpiały w kryzysie, zostały przedstawione jako niecywilizowane, nieodpowiedzialne, niezdolne do zdyscyplinowania się i potrzebujące pomocy zewnętrznej.

Prasa przede wszystkim legitymizowała decyzje polityczne oraz dominującą ideologię neoliberalną poprzez autoryzację wypowiedziami ekspertów, które przy wnikliwej analizie ujawniały kategorie wartości moralnych. Analiza metafor dostarczyła dalszych informacji na temat deagentalizacji rządów i polityków poprzez dominujące metafory choroby i kłęski żywiołowej. Przedstawienie kryzysu w tych kategoriach zakłada, że jest on naturalnym elementem rozwoju, który przychodzi niespodziewanie i bez niczyjej winy - na przykład naturalna część cyklu gospodarczego. Wskazuje to na strategiczne wykorzystanie metafor do wsparcia ideologii neoliberalnej.

Media odegrały kluczową rolę w procesie komunikacyjnej budowy kryzysu euro, wzmacniając opinie, które wpływały na postrzeganie wydarzeń, jednocześnie europeizując debatę publiczną w UE poprzez koncentrację na podobnych treściach.